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Abstract: Based on firm-level survey data, this thesis deals with two factors that are especially for
Switzerland of high economic importance: (a) apprenticeship training and (b) start-ups. Significant
changes within the firm structure, such as a shift in the employment structure from low to high skills, a
spreading of a body of new technologies (in particular the diffusion of information and communications
technologies), and a redesign of a firms’ workplace organization, can be observed over the last years. The
first part of this thesis analyzes how these changes affect the apprenticeship training system. Estimation
results show that apprenticeship training is an appropriate way of skill formation in advanced economies.
In leading-edge segments of the economy where the three elements of the “new firm paradigm” play a
significant role this, however, may not be the case. The second part of this work, which comprises two
studies, focuses on new firms. New firms are an important source of new business practices and new
technologies, and thus seem to be important drivers toward such a “new firm paradigm”. The second
study of this thesis analyzes whether the impact of financial constraints on success changes with increas-
ing firm age. Estimation results indicate that financial constraints are not only a problem of the first
years. While the negative impact of financial constraints on firm survival disappears with increasing
age of the firms, profit is persistently negatively affected by financial constraints. Ten years after firm
foundation, financially constrained firms still have more problems to achieve profit break-even. As most
start-ups are not growth-drivers, the allocation of start-up subsidies has important policy implications.
Innovative start-ups and not start-ups in general are considered to be drivers of innovation in existing
industries and should also positively affect the creation of new industries. Especially for policy mak-
ers it is thus important to be able to identify the innovative start-ups. The third study of this thesis
investigates this topic focusing on the innovation capability of firm founders. Estimation results show
that a combination of different founder characteristics such as university education (at best a combina-
tion of technical and commercial education), prior experience in RD, and strong motivation to realize
own innovative ideas increases innovative activities of start-ups by more than 40%. Hence, estimation
results indicate that founder characteristics contain important information to identify innovative start-
ups already in the beginning. Basierend auf Unternehmensumfragedaten werden in dieser Dissertation
zwei Faktoren untersucht, welche besonders für die Schweiz von grosser wirtschaftlicher Bedeutung sind:
(a) die Lehrlingsausbildung und (b) Neugründungen. In den letzten Jahren können signifikante Verän-
derungen innerhalb der Firmenstrukturen, wie eine Verschiebung der Beschäftigungsstruktur von tiefer
zu hoher Qualifikation, der vermehrte Einsatz von neuen Technologien (insbesondere die Verbreitung von
Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien), und eine Umgestaltung der Arbeitsplatzorganisation,
festgestellt werden. Der erste Teil dieser Dissertation untersucht, wie sich diese Veränderungen auf das
Lehrlingssystem auswirken. Die Resultate zeigen, dass die Lehrlingsausbildung in einem modernen Um-
feld eine geeignete Form der Ausbildung ist. In besonders modernen Bereichen der Wirtschaft, wo die
drei Elemente des neuen „Firmenparadigmas“ eine zentrale Rolle spielen, ist dies allerdings nicht zwin-
gend der Fall. Der zweite Teil dieser Arbeit, der zwei Studien umfasst, bezieht sich auf Neugründungen.
Neugründungen sind eine wichtige Quelle von neuen Unternehmenspraktiken und neuen Technologien
und scheinen deshalb wichtige Treiber hin zu einem solchen neuen „Firmenparadigma“ zu sein. Die
zweite Studie dieser Dissertation untersucht, wie sich mit steigendem Alter der Unternehmen der Ef-
fekt von finanziellen Hemmnissen auf den Unternehmenserfolg verändert. Die Resultate zeigen, dass
finanzielle Hemmnisse nicht bloss ein Problem der ersten Jahre sind. Während der negative Effekt von
finanziellen Hemmnissen auf das Überleben mit steigendem Alter verschwindet, wird die Profitabilität der
Unternehmen anhaltend negativ beeinflusst. So haben Unternehmen mit finanziellen Hemmnissen zehn
Jahre nach der Gründung noch immer mehr Probleme die Gewinnschwelle zu erreichen. Da die meisten
Neugründungen keine Wachstumstreiber sind, ist die Verteilung von Subventionen bei der Gründung von
grosser politischer Bedeutung. Innovative Neugründungen und nicht Neugründungen generell werden als
Treiber des ökonomischen Wachstums betrachtet. Entsprechend ist für politische Entscheidungsträger
wichtig, solche innovativen Neugründungen identifizieren zu können. Die dritte Studie dieser Disser-
tation beschäftigt sich mit den Innovationsfähigkeiten der Unternehmensgründer. Die Schätzresultate
zeigen, dass eine Kombination von verschiedenen Gründermerkmalen, wie Universitätsabschluss (idealer-
weise eine Kombination von technischer und kommerzieller Ausbildung), vorgängige FE Erfahrung und
eine starke Motivation eigene innovative Ideen umzusetzen, die Innovationsaktivität von Neugründun-
gen um mehr als 40% erhöht. Entsprechend deuten die Resultate darauf hin, dass die Charakteristik
von Unternehmensgründern wichtige Informationen enthält, um innovative Unternehmen bereits bei der
Gründung identifizieren zu können.
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Thesis summary 
Based on firm-level survey data, this thesis deals with two factors that are especially for 
Switzerland of high economic importance: (a) apprenticeship training and (b) start-ups. 
Apprenticeship training is in German-speaking countries a widespread practice of skill 
formation at the upper-secondary level. An open question, however, is whether this type of 
training will remain as attractive for the firms as it was in the past. Significant changes within 
the firm structure, such as a shift in the employment structure from low to high skills, a 
spreading of a body of new technologies (in particular the diffusion of “information and 
communications technologies”, ICT), and a redesign of a firms’ workplace organization, can 
be observed over the last years and present new challenges for the apprenticeship training 
system. These interrelated changes are often conceptualized as a shift towards a “new firm 
paradigm” (e.g., Burns and Stalker 1994, Lindbeck & Snower 2000, Milgrom & Roberts 
1990). Econometric studies dealing with a firm’s provision of apprenticeship training so far 
did not pay much attention to the influence of these changes within the firm structure. Based 
on data from two large sample surveys conducted among Swiss companies, the study 
presented in Chapter 2 attempts to fill this gap. The detailed information on the use of ICT, 
redesign of workplace organization and the input of human capital makes it possible to 
analyze the impact of the three constituent elements of the “new firm paradigm” on a firm’s 
provision of apprenticeship training in the same model. Furthermore, to analyze 
complementarities, interaction terms of human capital, ICT intensity and workplace 
organization can be included. Estimation results show that apprenticeship training is an 
appropriate way of skill formation in advanced economies. In leading-edge segments of the 
economy where the three elements of the “new firm paradigm” play a significant role this, 
however, may not be the case. 
The second part of this work, which comprises two studies, focuses on new firms. New 
firms are an important source of new business practices and new technologies, and thus seem 
to be important drivers toward such a “new firm paradigm”. Despite expected positive 
impacts, relatively little is known about new firms so far. Providing evidence on the potential 
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effect of financial constraints on firm success is of particular interest. Financial constraints are 
often seen as a strong barrier to entrepreneurship, and also to firm’s innovative effort. 
Accordingly, many studies deal with the question of how access to finance could be promoted 
(e.g., European Commission 2007a; OECD 2004, 2005; World Bank 2004, 2006). However, 
to draw adequate policy implications, it is important to know whether firms only need help in 
their first years or, instead, financial constraints are a persistent problem. While previous 
empirical studies provide some evidence that financial constraints do negatively affect the 
economic performance of start-ups during the first few years of existence, it is not well 
understood how the impact of financial constraints on economic performance changes with 
increasing firm age. Chapter 3 of this thesis analyzes this question based on an extensive data 
set for a cohort of Swiss start-ups that were observed during a period of ten years. Estimation 
results indicate that financial constraints are not only a problem of the first years. While the 
negative impact of financial constraints on firm survival disappears with increasing age of the 
firms, profit is persistently negatively affected by financial constraints. Ten years after firm 
foundation, financially constrained firms still have more problems to achieve profit break-
even. 
As most start-ups are not growth-drivers, the allocation of start-up subsidies has important 
policy implications. Innovative start-ups and not start-ups in general are considered to be 
drivers of innovation in existing industries and should also positively affect the creation of 
new industries (e.g., Acs & Audretsch 1990, Aghion et al. 2006, Schumpeter 1934). 
Especially for policy makers it is thus important to be able to identify the innovative start-ups. 
However, only a few studies analyze how such firms look like. As activities of start-ups are 
strongly related to firm founders, the study presented in Chapter 4 investigates this topic 
focusing on the innovation capability of firm founders. This study is again based on the data 
set for the start-up cohort 1996/97. One important feature of this data set is that it includes 
detailed information on the characteristics of up to three individual firm founders per firm. 
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The richness of the data makes it possible to describe in detail the characteristics of the whole 
founding team. Estimation results show that a combination of different founder characteristics 
such as university education (at best a combination of technical and commercial education), 
prior experience in R&D, and strong motivation to realize own innovative ideas increases 
innovative activities of start-ups by more than 40%. Hence, estimation results indicate that 
founder characteristics contain important information to identify innovative start-ups already 
in the beginning.  
 
  
1 
1 Introduction 
Over the last twenty years a significant shift in the employment structure from low to high 
skills has taken place in advanced economies. Several factors are hypothesized to have driven 
this development. To mention are, on the demand side, a skill-bias of technical change (in 
particular the diffusion of “information and communications technologies”, ICT) and a 
similar skill-bias of the redesign of workplace organization. Moreover, increasing 
specialization onto the production of knowledge intensive goods in the process of 
globalization also shifted labor demand towards higher skills. On the supply side, the long 
term trend towards higher education, as well as increasing preferences of employees for 
workplaces involving more autonomy, contributed to the observed increase in the 
employment of highly qualified personnel. 
According to the literature, the demand side elements, in particular the diffusion of ICT 
and adaptations of workplace organization are the key factors driving the observed increase of 
the share of high skilled workers in total employment. Moreover, the interplay of these forces 
seems to accentuate the shift towards higher skills, although only a few studies find clear 
evidence for such complementarities (e.g., Arvanitis 2005, Bertschek & Kaiser 2004, 
Bresnahan et al. 2002, Piva et al. 2005). According to Caroli (2001), who discusses in detail 
the role of the variables involved, ICT may be considered as the enabling factor triggering off 
a redesign of workplace organization. 
Many authors conceptualized these interrelated changes as a shift towards a “new firm 
paradigm”, which they characterized using different labels: from a “mechanistic” to an 
“organic” firm structure (Burns & Stalker 1994), from the “mass production model” to the 
“flexible multiproduct firm” (Milgrom & Roberts 1990), or from a “tailoristic” to a “holistic” 
organization of work (Lindbeck & Snower 2000). 
Since ICT is likely to provoke new challenges of adapting a firm’s organization and human 
resource practices, there might be a sustained need to increase the stock of human capital of 
firms and the economy as a whole. Obviously, there are many different ways of achieving this 
objective. In Switzerland, similar to the other German-speaking countries, apprenticeship 
training is a widespread practice of skill formation. In Switzerland, about 70% of a cohort 
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strives for a vocational qualification. 75% of them pass through the apprenticeship system, 
25% attend full-time vocational schools. The so-called “dual system” of apprenticeship-based 
vocational training combines education at a vocational school of one or two days a week, 
where general and occupation-specific skills are acquired, with work of three to four days a 
week in the training company, where learning is concentrated on occupation-specific and 
firm-specific skills. 
For the future of this training system it is important to analyze whether apprenticeship 
training is an appropriate way of skill formation in a highly advanced knowledge-based 
economy where the new firm paradigm plays a significant role. In doing so, Chapter 2 of this 
thesis analyzes the impact of the three constituent elements of the new firm paradigm, i.e., 
intensive use of ICT, redesign of workplace organization and augmenting the input of human 
capital, on the provision of apprenticeship training. Furthermore, to analyze 
complementarities, interaction terms of human capital, ICT intensity and workplace 
organization are included. 
The data used in this part of the thesis stem from two surveys conducted in 2000 and 2005, 
respectively, and cover the whole business sector of the Swiss economy. By merging the two 
cross-sectional data sets an unbalanced panel with about 3500 firms was constructed, of 
which more than 3000 could be used in model estimation. The data set is very rich in terms of 
variables that potentially explain the firms’ provision of apprenticeship training. 
While human capital is a standard variable in the empirical literature dealing, by use of 
econometric methods, with a firm’s demand for apprentices (see, among many others, 
Beckmann 2008, Franz et al. 2000, Niederalt 2004), such studies did not pay much attention 
to the influence of ICT and workplace organization. To my knowledge, only Arvanitis & 
Stucki (2011) and Beckman (2002, 2008) included ICT as an explanatory variable and, so far, 
the impact of workplace organization has not been econometrically investigated at all. 
Furthermore, previous studies dealing with apprenticeship training did not take account of 
complementarities among the three core variables.  
Against this background, Chapter 2 of this thesis provides new insights into the 
determinants of the firms’ provision of apprenticeship training by focusing on the relevance of 
the three constituent elements of the new firm paradigm and their interaction. Given the rich 
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database, it is possible to analyze the topic in a more differentiated way than it has been done 
in previous studies. 
Important drivers toward such a “new firm paradigm” seem to be new firms. New firms are 
more likely to promote new and flexible organizational forms (Kim et al. 2006) and they are 
considered to increase innovation incentives and productivity growth in incumbent firms 
(Schumpeter 1934, Aghion et al. 2006). So far, however, little is known about these firms. 
The second part of this thesis analyzes probably two of the main questions in this area: what 
determines (a) the economic and (b) the innovation performance of start-ups? 
The analysis of both questions is based on Swiss data for the start-up cohort 1996/97. This 
cohort was registered by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and contains all “green-field” 
start-ups (i.e. mergers and manager-takeovers are not included) that were founded in this 
period. Hence, the data set allows to analyze the performance of start-ups on an empirical 
basis that is representative of all firms founded in 1996/97 in Switzerland. In the beginning 
the cohort included 7112 firms. Among these firms three surveys were conducted, the last one 
in 2006, nine to ten years after firm foundation. 
The economic performance of new firms is analyzed with special focus on the impact of 
financial constraints. New firms generate only limited cash flows and seed capital is often too 
limiting for these firms. Thus, many start-ups must rely on the infusion of capital from 
external sources in order to survive. As particularly small and young firms have difficulties 
gaining access to external capital, start-ups are often financially constrained (e.g., Angelini & 
Generale 2008, Hallberg 2000, World Bank 2004). Economic performance of new firms 
should thus be strongly correlated with access to external capital.  
A main factor for these financial constraints is the asymmetric information between the 
owners of the start-ups and external investors (e.g., Binks & Ennew 1996, Stiglitz & Weiss 
1981). However, asymmetric information should primarily be a problem of the first years. 
With increasing age of the firms, outside investors get additional information about a firm’s 
quality and can adjust the terms of the financing contracts. Thus, for more mature firms costs 
of external capital should be lower and loan sizes should be less limited (see Brito & Mello 
1995). Accordingly, the impact of financial constraints on success should decrease with 
increasing age of the firms. 
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Most previous empirical studies that deal with the impact of financial constraints on firm 
success primarily focus on established firms (e.g., Ayyagari et al. 2008, Becchetti & Trovato 
2002, Hotz-Eakin et al. 1994 and Musso & Schiavo 2008). Fewer studies analyze this 
relationship for new firms (e.g., Aghion et al. 2007, Huynh et al. 2010, Hvide & Møen 2008, 
Saridakis et al. 2007, 2008). While both categories of studies provide some evidence that firm 
success is negatively affected by financial constraints, it is comparatively not well understood 
how that relationship changes with increasing age of the firms. The information whether firms 
only need help in their first years or, instead, financial constraints are a persistent problem, is 
of particular importance to draw adequate policy implications. To my knowledge, this 
question has not been empirically analyzed so far. Based on the data set for the start-up cohort 
1996/97 that was observed during a period of ten years, Chapter 3 of this thesis attempts to fill 
this gap. 
In addition to economic performance, innovation performance is a second important topic 
for research in the field of entrepreneurship. Most start-ups have more in common with self-
employment than with the creation of high-growth companies (Shane 2009, p. 142). Hence, 
encouraging more people to become entrepreneurs is not necessarily the best policy. 
Especially for policy makers it is thus important to be able to identify firms with a high 
probability of enhancing economic growth. An important characteristic of such firms is their 
innovation performance. Innovative start-ups are considered to be important drivers of 
innovation in existing industries (Schumpeter 1934, Aghion et al. 2006) and should also 
positively affect the creation of new industries (Acs & Audretsch 1990). Despite this expected 
positive impact on economic growth, relatively little is known about the factors that determine 
the innovation performance of start-ups. 
The innovative activity of start-ups might strongly depend on the characteristics of the firm 
founders, e.g., educational background and experience. The founders determine a firm’s 
strategies and coordinate the resources to implement them (Barringer et al. 2004, Bergmann 
Lichtenstein & Brush 2001). Further, as start-ups are mostly small firms, the capabilities of 
the founders themselves serve as important resources to create a competitive advantage 
(Hadjimanolis 2000). Founders do not only decide whether to innovate or not, but are directly 
involved in the innovation process of the start-ups. Hence, knowing the innovation capability 
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of firm founders would make the identification of the innovative start-ups much easier, 
especially as most of these characteristics are easy to observe and remain constant over time. 
While there is empirical evidence for a link between management characteristics and 
innovation activities for established firms (e.g., Barker & Mueller 2002, Chen et al. 2008, 
Hadjimanolis 2000, Romijn & Albaladejo 2002), the impact of founder characteristics on 
innovation activities of start-ups is unclear. As the data set for the start-up cohort 1996/97 
includes detailed information on the characteristics of individual firm founders, it seems well-
suited to investigate this topic. This is done in Chapter 4 of this thesis, where the impact of 
founder characteristics on innovative activities of start-ups is analyzed. 
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2 The “New Firm Paradigm” and the Provision of Training:  
The impact of ICT, workplace organization and human capital* 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last twenty years a significant shift in the employment structure from low to high 
skills has taken place in advanced economies. Several factors are hypothesized to have driven 
this development. To mention are, on the demand side, a skill-bias of technical change (in 
particular the diffusion of ICT) and a similar skill-bias of the redesign of workplace 
organization. Moreover, increasing specialization onto the production of knowledge intensive 
goods in the process of globalization also shifted labor demand towards higher skills. On the 
supply side, the long term trend towards higher education as well as increasing preferences of 
employees for workplaces involving more autonomy contributed to the observed increase in 
the employment of highly qualified personnel. 
According to the literature, the demand side elements, in particular the diffusion of ICT 
and adaptations of workplace organization are the key factors driving the observed increase of 
the share of high skilled workers in total employment. Moreover, the interplay of these forces 
seems to accentuate the shift towards higher skills, although only a few studies find clear 
evidence for such complementarities (e.g., Arvanitis 2005, Bertschek & Kaiser 2004, 
Bresnahan et al. 2002, Piva et al. 2005). According to Caroli (2001), who discusses in detail 
the role of the variables involved, ICT may be considered as the enabling factor triggering off 
a redesign of workplace organization. 
Many authors conceptualized these interrelated changes as a shift towards a “new firm 
paradigm”, which they characterized using different labels: from a “mechanistic” to an 
“organic” firm structure (Burns & Stalker 1994), from the “mass production model” to the 
“flexible multiproduct firm” (Milgrom & Roberts 1990), or from a “tailoristic” to a “holistic” 
organization of work (Lindbeck & Snower 2000). 
Since ICT is likely to provoke new challenges of adapting a firm’s organization and human 
resource practices, there might be a sustained need to increase the stock of human capital of 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is based on Hollenstein & Stucki (2008). 
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firms and the economy as a whole. Obviously, there are many different ways of achieving this 
objective. In this paper we concentrate on apprenticeship training, which in Switzerland, 
similar to the other German-speaking countries, is a widespread practice of skill formation at 
the upper-secondary level. 
In Switzerland, about 70% of a cohort strives for a vocational qualification. 75% of them 
pass through the apprenticeship system, 25% attend full-time vocational schools. The so-
called “dual system” of apprenticeship-based vocational training combines education at a 
vocational school of one or two days a week, where general and occupation-specific skills are 
acquired, with work of three to four days a week in the training company, where learning is 
concentrated on occupation-specific and firm-specific skills.1 
Since the 1990s, a certain shift in the content of apprenticeship training towards a higher 
proportion of general skill provision has taken place, in an attempt to better meet the demands 
of companies in a knowledge-based economy. To this end, the institutional arrangement of 
apprenticeship was adapted, with the introduction of a second, more demanding stream of 
training as the change with the most far-reaching consequences. It is based on an extension of 
the off-the-job apprenticeship training component and leads to a degree (“Berufsmatura”) that 
guarantees free access to non-academic, vocational-oriented, tertiary-level education 
(“Fachhochschule“, i.e. “university of applied sciences”). The creation of a “Berufsmatura” 
degree, which has been attained by one out of six apprentices in 2005, makes this type of 
secondary education more attractive for school leavers as well as for companies (for similar 
developments in Germany, see Finegold & Wagner 2002). 
The present paper aims at identifying econometrically the determinants of apprenticeship 
training based on firm-level data. In doing so, we focus on the three constituent elements of 
the new firm paradigm, i.e. intensive use of ICT, redesign of workplace organization and 
augmenting the input of human capital. We try to explain why a firm does or does not provide 
apprenticeship training (“training propensity”), and, if doing so, to what extent a firm is 
engaged in this type of training (“training intensity”). The investigation is expected to give 
                                                 
1
 For an international comparison of several systems of vocational skill formation in European countries, see e.g. 
Steedman (2001, 2005), or Ryan (2001) who emphasizes the labor market experience of graduates from different 
types of vocational training. 
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some indication of the appropriateness of the apprenticeship system as a way of skill 
formation in a highly advanced knowledge-based economy where the new firm paradigm 
plays a significant role. 
The data used in this study stem from two surveys conducted in 2000 and 2005, 
respectively, and cover the whole business sector of the Swiss economy. By merging the two 
cross-sectional data sets we got an unbalanced panel with about 3500 firms, of which about 
3000 could be used in model estimation. The data set is very rich in terms of variables that 
potentially explain the firms’ provision of apprenticeship training. Furthermore, the data set 
allows us to deal with potential econometrical problems such as endogeneity and firm 
heterogeneity. 
The empirical literature dealing, by use of econometric methods, with a firm’s demand for 
apprentices did not pay much attention to the influence of ICT and workplace organization. 
To our knowledge, only Arvanitis & Stucki (2011) and Beckman (2002, 2008) included ICT 
as an explanatory variable and, so far, the impact of workplace organization has not been 
econometrically investigated at all. In contrast, human capital is a standard variable used in 
such studies (see, among many others, Beckmann 2008, Franz et al. 2000, Niederalt 2004). 
On the other hand, we are not aware of any study dealing with apprenticeship training which 
takes account of complementarities among the three core variables.  
Against this background, the paper provides new insights into the determinants of the 
firms’ provision of apprenticeship training by focusing on the relevance of the three 
constituent elements of the new firm paradigm and their interaction. Given the rich database, 
we are able to analyze the topic in a more differentiated way than it has been done in previous 
studies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we present the 
conceptual background of the study as well as the hypotheses to be tested and the 
specification of the variables used in model estimation. In the next two sections, we shortly 
describe the database and expose the econometric procedure we applied in explaining a firm’s 
training propensity and training intensity. The findings from model estimation are presented 
in Section 0. Finally, we discuss the main results and draw some conclusions. 
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2.2 Conceptual background and model specification 
Basic approach 
The seminal paper of Becker (1964) serves as starting point of our investigation. In his model, 
firms as well as apprentices conceive firm-based training as an investment in human capital 
enabling both parties to profit from higher productivity in the future. The firm, however, 
provides training only if the expected productivity gains are higher than the costs it has to 
bear. Whether this is the case depends on the type of skills generated by training (general vs. 
firm-specific knowledge), the costs of training (net of the trainees’ productive contribution 
and subsidies) and the functioning of the market for skilled labor. If labor markets work 
perfectly well (what is assumed in Becker’s model), a firm provides general (transferable) 
skill training only at zero net costs. It is not prepared to bear higher costs, since the trainees 
can leave the firm at the end of the apprenticeship at any time in search of higher wage offers. 
In older empirical work the authors were puzzled by the finding that net costs of 
apprenticeship training were positive in many occupations. Therefore the investment theory of 
training has been further developed, with Acemoglu & Pischke (1998, 1999) probably the 
most influential contributions. This literature2 explains the empirical finding of widespread 
net costs of firm-based training mostly with labor market imperfections: asymmetric 
information between the training firm and other companies about the trainees’ productivity; 
unions and work councils enforcing firms to accept net training costs during apprenticeship; 
mobility costs (job search, costs of introduction at a new job; etc.). In addition, general and 
firm-specific skills often may be complements and are provided as a package (Kessler & 
Lülfesmann 2006).  
In sum, these considerations imply that the expected net costs of (apprenticeship) training a 
firm has to bear, in the first place, depend on all factors that determine future demand for 
skilled labor. In accordance with the literature, we use the following categories of variables 
that may influence future demand for labor skills and therefore a firm’s willingness to offer 
apprenticeship places: a) human capital endowment; b) usage of ICT; c) workplace 
                                                 
2
 See, for example, Beckman (2008) for a test of their propositions; for an overview of the most important 
approaches to the topic at hand see e.g. Franz et al. (2000) or Niederalt (2004). 
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organization; d) some specific control variables (physical capital, average wages, firm size, 
domestic/foreign ownership); e) dummy variables to capture effects not explicitly specified in 
the model (region, industry affiliation, time). In the following we discuss the impact of the 
explanatory variables and show how they are specified in the empirical model (see  
 for the exact definition of the variables). 
Human capital 
One of the constituent elements of the new firm paradigm is a shift from lower to higher 
skills. Since the share of employees holding high-level and medium-level degrees is 
correlated, a firm’s human capital endowment should reflect the future demand for skilled 
labor in general. We thus posit the following hypothesis: 
H1: A firm’s human capital endowment is positively correlated with the provision of 
apprenticeship training. 
In our model we use the share of employees holding a degree from tertiary education as 
proxy for a firm’s human capital endowment (variable “tertiary_share“). In some instances, 
this share is transformed to five dummy variables “tertiary_d” representing different value 
ranges of “tertiary_share”. Qualifications at the tertiary level are based, on the one hand, on 
academic education (primarily implying the production of general knowledge on top of 
general upper-secondary education), on the other hand, on more vocational-oriented education 
provided by universities of applied sciences and higher professional schools (to a large part as 
a follow-up to apprenticeship training). This second component, measured by its share in total 
tertiary education, weighs much more in Switzerland than in most other advanced economies. 
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Table 2.1: Variable definition and measurement 
Variable Definition / measurement 
Dependent Variables   
training_propensity Having at least one apprentice yes/no (training propensity) 
training_intensity Total number of apprentices (training intensity) (only firms having 
apprentices) 
Independent Variables   
Human capital   
tertiary_share Share of employees with a tertiary-level degree; logarithm 
tertiary_d 
Dummy variables for different shares of employees with a tertiary-
level degree (reference group: “less than 3% (10th percentile)”)                                                                              
tertiary_d1: 3-6% (25th percentile); tertiary_d2: 6-13%(50th percentile); 
tertiary_d3: 13-23.6% (75th percentile); tertiary_d4: 23.6-43% (90th 
percentile); tertiary_d5: 43-100% (100th percentile) 
Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) 
 
ICT_infrastructure 
ICT infrastructure                                                                                                        
(four-level ordinal variable constructed as the sum of four dummies 
measuring the availability of different elements of ICT infrastructure: 1) 
personal computer; 2) Internet; 3) intranet; 4) extranet) 
intranet_use_d 
Share of employees regularly using the intranet                                           
(dummy variables with 0-20% as reference group: 21-60% 
(intranet_use_d1); 61-100% (intranet_use_d2)) 
Internet_variety 
Variety and complexity of Internet applications                                                                           
(eight-level ordinal variable constructed as the sum of eight dummies 
measuring different types of Internet usage: 1) general search for 
information; 2) detailed search for market/price information; 3) 
presentation of the firm; 4) supply of product information; 5) internal 
communication; 6) further training; 7) E-purchasing; 8) E-selling) 
ICT_total 
Overall measure for ICT usage                                                                                      
(sum of the standardized values (average 0; standard deviation 1) of all 
three ICT variables) 
Workplace Organization  
∆_hierarchical_levels Change of the number of hierarchical levels in the preceding five years (decrease (value 1); otherwise (value 0)) 
∆_delegation Change of the degree of delegation of competencies in the preceding five years (increase (value 1); otherwise (value 0)) 
team_work 
Incidence of team work                                                                                                                                                                  
(six-level ordinal variable, ranging from “very high” (value 5) to 
“inexistent” (value 0)) 
job_rotation 
Incidence of job rotation                                                                                 
(six-level ordinal variable, ranging from “very high” (value 5) to “does not 
exist” (value 0)) 
decentralization 
Degree of decentralization of competencies:                                                   
(mean of seven ordinal variables ranging from “line manager decides 
alone” up to “employee decides alone”; 5-point scale: 1) speed of work, 2) 
procedures of work, 3) distribution of tasks, 4) modality of the execution of 
tasks, 5) problems in production, 6) regular contact with clients, 7) 
complaints of clients) 
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WO_total 
Overall measure for workplace organization                                                     
(sum of the standardized values (average 0; standard deviation 1) of all five 
organization variables) 
Control variables  
capital_intensity Gross capital income per employee; logarithm 
labor_costs Labor costs per employee; logarithm 
size_d 
Dummy variables for six firm size classes based on the number of 
employees (reference group: “less than 20”)                                                                                       
20-49 (size_d1); 50-99 (size_d2); 100-249 (size_d3); 250-499 (size_d4); 
500-999 (size_d5); 1000 and more (size_d6) 
foreign_owned Foreign-owned firm                                                                                             yes (value 1), no (value 0) 
region_d 
Dummies for six regions                                                                                  
(reference region: Ticino)                                                                                                  
Lac Léman (region_d1); Espace Midland (region_d2); North-western 
Switzerland (region_d3); Zurich (region_d4); Eastern Switzerland 
(region_d5); Central Switzerland (region_d6) 
industry_d Dummies for 27 industries                                                                                       (reference industry: “personal services”) 
year_2005 Time dummy for the year 2005                                                                   (reference: year 2000) 
Instruments  
wage_individual_performance Wage level primarily depends on individual performance                          five-level ordinal variable (level 1: 'very weak'; level 5: 'very strong') 
industry level of intranet use Average industry score of the share of employees regularly using the intranet (original variable is defined as “intranet_use”) 
industry level of decentralization Average industry score of the degree of decentralization of 
competencies (original variable is defined as “decentralization”) 
industry level of tertiary share 
Average industry score of the share of employees with a tertiary-
level degree; logarithm (original variable is defined as 
“tertiary_share”) 
ICT usage 
A more intensive use of ICT shifts the relative demand for qualified labor upwards. The 
literature mentions several properties of ICT driving the substitution of lower skills: a) ICT 
allows automating routine and well-defined tasks; it is much more difficult to do the same in 
case of complex tasks involving judgment and creativity (Autor et al. 2003, Bresnahan 1999, 
Bresnahan et al. 2002); b) highly computerized systems produce large quantities of data that 
need high-skilled workers to get adequately utilized (Arvanitis 2005); c) the adoption of ICT 
itself and its integration in the firm’s productive system requires skilled workers, the more so 
as the use of ICT involves many uncertainties (Caroli 2001). 
Whereas the positive effect of ICT on the demand for skilled labor as a whole is quite 
clear, it is less obvious which category of higher skills will “profit” from this technical 
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change. According to the results of the empirical work summarized in Arvanitis (2005), the 
demand for graduates from universities increases in parallel with a more intensive use of ICT, 
whereas the evidence with respect to medium skills is mixed (positive or neutral effect). 
However, the majority of empirical studies finds that the demand for skills at the higher 
intermediate level (vocational-oriented qualifications below a university degree but higher 
than medium skills) is positively affected. In view of these results we expect that the intensity 
of ICT usage is positively related to the demand for apprentices. 
H2:  Intensive use of ICT, in total as well as differentiated by specific dimensions of ICT 
use, positively affects a firm’s demand for apprentices.  
There are many possible indicators to capture the intensity of ICT use (see, e.g., Bocquet & 
Brossard 2007, European Commission 2007b; Hollenstein et al. 2003). In the present study 
we rely on three variables that are expected to positively affect the provision of 
apprenticeships (for details of measurement see Table 2.1): a) “ICT_infrastructure” captures 
a firm’s endowment with technical ICT infrastructure (ordinal variable representing the 
number of up to four ICT elements: PC, Internet, intranet, extranet); b) “intranet_use_d” 
stands for the broadness of use of ICT measured by two dummy variables reflecting, 
respectively, “medium” and “high intensity” of use of the intranet; the latter dummy should 
exert a stronger (positive) influence on the provision of apprenticeships than the former. The 
two dummies are based on originally quantitative data of the share of employees regularly 
working with the intranet; c) “Internet_variety” indicates the variety and complexity of 
Internet applications. The measurement of this variable is based on detailed information about 
the purposes for which a firm employs the Internet, ranging from simple “search for 
information” up to more demanding functions like “E-selling”; the value of this ordinal 
variable simply represents the number of (up to eight) applications as shown in Table 2.1. 
Finally, to account for all three aspects of ICT at once, we also consider an overall measure of 
ICT use (“ICT_total”) calculated as the sum of the standardized values of the three individual 
ICT variables. 
Workplace organization 
According to Caroli (2001) flattening hierarchies, decentralization of decision making, greater 
involvement at the shop floor, collective work practices (teamwork, quality circles, etc.), 
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multi-tasking and job rotation are the core elements of a workplace organization that fits into 
a production system characterized by an intensive use of ICT. A redesign of workplace 
organization along these lines reflecting the new firm model is expected to increase, similar to 
a more intensive use of ICT, the demand for high skills at the expense of unskilled workers 
(skill-biased organizational change; see Piva et al. (2005) and the literature reviewed by these 
authors). 
However, empirical studies show that the different aspects of workplace organization are 
not correlated to the same extent with the demand for higher skills. In the Swiss case, for 
example, teamwork and some aspects of delegation of competencies are positively related to 
the demand for high skills, whereas flattening of hierarchies or job rotation are not (Arvanitis 
2005). 
Against this background, we formulate two hypotheses with respect to the impact of new 
workplace organization on a firm’s provision of apprenticeship training.  
H3a:  The redesign of workplace organization as a whole is positively related to 
apprenticeship training (reflecting the overall shift to higher skills induced by new 
workplace organization). 
H3b: This holds true only for some of the five dimensions of workplace organization 
distinguished below. As a consequence, the overall effect, mentioned in H3a may not 
be very strong. 
Our empirical model contains most of the above-mentioned organizational dimensions. At 
the level of the firm as a whole, we consider the “change of the number of hierarchical layers” 
having occurred during the five year period preceding the survey of 2000 and 2005, 
respectively (“∆_hierarchical_levels”). The variable “∆_delegation” captures the “change of 
the degree of delegation of competencies at the workplace” that happened in the course of the 
preceding five years. The two variables “team_work“ and “job_rotation“ stand for the current 
level of diffusion of teamwork (quality circles, semi-autonomous production teams, etc.) and 
job rotation, respectively. Moreover, we rely on a composite measure of the “distribution of 
competencies at the work place among managers and workers” (“decentralization”). This 
variable reflects a firm’s assessment of the degree of decentralization of decision-making at 
the workplace in seven specific matters (“who decides on the work pace?”, “who is 
 15 
 
responsible for handling the complaints of clients? etc.; for details see Table 2.1). In addition 
to these variables that capture five specific aspects of new workplace organization, we also 
use an overall measure (“WO_total“) which is calculated as the sum of the standardized 
values of the variables representing the individual elements of workplace organization. 
According to hypothesis H3b, we do not expect that each dimension of workplace 
organization is positively related to the provision of apprenticeships. An insignificant 
relationship between “∆_hierarchical_levels” and “job_rotation”, respectively, and 
apprenticeship training would not be surprising. In case of “∆_ hierarchical_levels” we would 
argue that a reduction of the number of hierarchical layers is an organizational change taking 
place at the level of the firm as a whole, whereas decisions on apprenticeship training are 
primarily related to the needs of the “shop floor”; the two decisions may thus hardly be 
correlated. Job rotation often is a measure implemented by the management for maintaining 
work motivation among low skilled workers (assembly-line workers, etc.); in this case, 
“job_rotation“ would not be correlated with apprenticeship training or may even show a 
negative sign. Teamwork might be a very different matter. We presume that working in teams 
is an organizational arrangement that is well-suited for integrating apprentices, since team 
leaders and experienced co-workers are on the spot for supporting work-based training 
(positive sign of variable “team_work”). A high degree of decentralization of decision-making 
at the workplace (“decentralization”), at first sight, also may be expected to be conducive to 
apprenticeship training. However, depending on the hierarchical level at which it is decided 
on hiring apprentices, the training propensity may differ. One could argue that employees at 
low hierarchical levels have quite a weak preference for taking on apprentices because they 
are directly confronted with the costs of training (part of which they have to bear themselves). 
If decisions on the provision of training are made at relatively high hierarchical level to 
guarantee a longer-term view on the role of apprenticeship training, the preferences of the 
employees at the bottom of the hierarchy may be overridden. One also could argue that a 
work environment characterized by high autonomy and personal responsibility is very 
demanding and therefore not a suitable ambit for training apprentices. Similar arguments may 
apply to “∆_delegation“ (“degree of delegation of competencies increased”). In sum, though 
we still expect a positive sign for the variables “decentralization“ and “∆_delegation“, 
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reflecting the general hypothesis of a positive effect of workplace organization on training 
propensity, we do not rule out that these two elements of workplace organization are not (or 
even negatively) correlated with apprenticeship training. The reasoning on possible effects of 
the various aspects of workplace organization implies that, in accordance with H3b, it is very 
likely that only part of the considered organizational aspects is positively related to the 
provision of apprenticeships. 
Complementarities 
To analyze how the combination of the three constituent elements of the “new firm paradigm” 
affects apprenticeship training, we also include interaction terms of human capital, ICT 
intensity and workplace organization. We expect that intensive use of more than one of the 
three elements increases the effect of the single variables.  
H4:  The interaction terms related to the summary measures of human capital, ICT and 
workplace organization are positively related to the provision of apprenticeship 
training. 
Control variables 
To avoid biased estimates for the core variables of the new firm model, we control for the 
impact of some specific firm characteristics (physical capital intensity, wage costs, firm size, 
foreign/domestic ownership) and include a series of dummy variables that control for effects 
not explicitly captured by the model. 
Firstly, high wages per employee (“labor_costs“) are negatively related to a firm’s overall 
demand for labor and, other things being equal, to its need for qualified workers. 
Consequently, variable “labor_costs“ is negatively correlated with the provision of 
apprenticeship training. 
Secondly, in accordance with the bulk of empirical studies, we expect that the firm size 
(six firm size dummy variables “size_d”) is positively correlated with the provision of 
apprenticeship training. Economies of scale in providing in-house training (availability of 
specialized instructors, specific training facilities, etc.) as well as some monopsony power on 
the (local) labor market and the existence of internal labor markets (both involving higher 
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retention rates) are probably the most important reasons for the positive correlation of the 
training provision and the firm size.  
Thirdly, we expect that foreign-owned companies (variable “foreign_owned”) less often 
provide apprenticeship training than domestic ones, since they usually are less familiar with 
the Swiss apprenticeship system and/or prefer to rely on “modes of training” taken over from 
their home-country. 
Finally, we include dummy variables for a firm’s affiliation to specific regions and 
industries as well as a time dummy. These variables should control for effects not explicitly 
captured by the model. The time dummy “year_2005” may reflect, in addition to time-varying 
firm heterogeneity, macroeconomic developments or changes in training policy in the period 
2000–2005. The location of a firm, represented by six region dummies (“region_d”), should 
capture regional differences with respect to the institutional arrangements of apprenticeship 
training, the size and functioning of the regional labor market, the quality of the regional 
education system, etc. Besides, a firm’s product market environment in terms of demand 
prospects, market structure and intensity of price and non-price competition may influence 
training activities (Gersbach & Schmutzler 2006). For example, favorable demand prospects 
for a firm’s products should be positively related to its willingness to offer apprenticeships. 
We assume that such market-related variables, which, for data limitations, cannot be 
explicitly included in our model, are to a large extent industry-specific; hence, they are 
captured (in addition to other unspecified influences) by 27 dummies controlling for industry 
affiliation (“industry_d”). Furthermore, these variables should also capture effects of industry 
specific input prices that are not considered by other model variables. 
So far the cost side of training provision has not been considered explicitly. Training costs 
vary among firms, in the first place, because of differences with regard to technological 
requirements (reflecting, for example, physical capital and ICT intensity), the structure of the 
local labor market for trainees and skilled workers (market power of local firms, regulations, 
etc.), the institutional framework for apprenticeship and other vocational training as well as 
for general education at the upper-secondary level, etc. We expect that such variations, to a 
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large extent, are industry-specific3 and/or region-specific. Therefore we assume that the costs 
of training, as far as not yet captured explicitly by the variables representing the use of ICT or 
physical capital intensity, can be represented by region and industry dummies. 
2.3 Data 
The data used in this study were collected in the course of two surveys among Swiss 
companies conducted in 2000 and 2005, respectively. Both surveys were based on a 
disproportionately stratified random sample of firms covering the business sector (28 
industries) and three firm size classes with a cut-off point of 20 employees.4 We did not 
collect data from smaller companies as at least some of the organizational features we are 
interested in (e.g. “flattening hierarchical structures”) are not relevant for most of them. The 
two surveys yielded data for 1688 and 1803 firms, respectively, representing response rates of 
39.9% and 36.8%. The data were merged to a data set of 3491 companies, of which about 
3000 could be used in estimating our training regressions. 76% of them provided 
apprenticeship training, with an average employment number of apprentices of about 7%. In 
most cases, the means of the variables used in model estimation are quite similar for the two 
cross-sections (see the descriptive statistics in Table A.1). 
The two questionnaires, downloadable from www.kof.ethz.ch, contain questions about the 
adoption of several ICT technologies (Internet, intranet, extranet, etc.) and the intra-firm 
diffusion of some of these elements, the use of new organizational practices (team-work, job 
rotation, employees’ involvement in decision-making, etc.) and the employees’ degrees of 
general and vocational education. The two surveys also served to collect information on some 
financial variables and basic structural characteristics of firms. 
                                                 
3
 In Switzerland, regulation of vocational training is influenced to a significant extent by employer-employee 
agreements at industry level. 
4
 The cut-off point of 20 employees for the two samples underlying the surveys of the years 2000 and 2005 has 
been determined according to the data reported in the Census of Enterprises of 1998 and 2001 respectively. 
Since, in some companies, the actual number of employees was lower at the time the surveys were carried out in 
comparison with the data from the preceding census, our data set also contains some firms with less than 20 
employees (2.4% of all firms). 
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2.4 Econometric procedure 
As mentioned in the introductory section, we seek to explain, firstly, a firm’s training 
propensity indicating whether a firm does or does not provide apprenticeship training, and, 
secondly, training intensity reflecting the extent of a firm’s involvement in training, measured 
as the total number of apprentices. As theory does not offer specific explanations for training 
propensity and training intensity, we use the same set of independent variables in the two 
empirical models. 
In case of the binary dependent variable ”training_propensity”, estimating probit 
regressions is an adequate procedure. To take into consideration firm heterogeneity we use 
random-effects models. Likelihood-ratio tests showed that pooled probit models are not 
appropriate. However, pooled and random-effects model yield more or less the same results. 
We could not estimate fixed-effects models because we have only two years of data and, for 
most firms, the dependent variable “training_propensity“ does not vary over time. Random-
effects regression is thus the preferred method. Furthermore, for non-linear models we present 
the average marginal effects of the estimates as this allows us to better interpret the results, 
e.g. of the interaction terms.  
The quantitative dependent variable “training_intensity“ only refers to firms actually 
providing apprenticeship training. Consequently, selectivity bias may be a problem. We 
estimate a two-stage Heckman selection model to detect a potential bias (Heckman 1979). As 
shown in Table A.3, the intensity equation of the Heckman model is specified in the same 
way as our main model for “training intensity” shown in Table 2.3. The same set of 
explanatory variables is used in the selection equation, with the exception of the additional 
identifying variable “wage_individual_performance“ (for definition see Table 2.1), in order to 
make sure that the estimated coefficients are reliable (see Wooldridge 2002a). This variable 
measures whether the wage level within a firm primarily depends on the individual 
performance of the employees. This should be a good instrumental variable, as the 
productivity of apprentices is limited and thus primarily firms with performance-linked 
payment should be willing to do apprenticeship training. Training intensity, however, should 
not be affected by this wage variable. Firms with performance-linked payments should have 
no incentives to prefer a certain type of employee. The hypothesized relationship can also be 
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observed in the data. The variable “wage_individual_performance" is statistically significant 
in the training propensity equation but is uncorrelated with training intensity. As the mills 
ratio is statistically insignificant at the 10%-level, there is no evidence for a selection bias.5 
To consider firm heterogeneity we estimate for “training_intensity“ (as in case of “training 
propensity”) random-effects models, which, according to Lagrange-multiplier tests, are more 
appropriate than pooled models. Since five years elapsed between the first and the second 
survey, the number of observations that may be used for estimating fixed-effects models is 
substantially lower than in case of random-effects models (only about 18 percent of the firms 
responded in both surveys). Consequently, F-statistics are statistically insignificant indicating 
low model quality. We conclude that random-effects regression is the appropriate method to 
estimate the training intensity model. 
Due to multicollinearity we had to perform separate estimates for the variables 
representing the disaggregated measures of ICT (see the correlation matrix in Table A.2). 
Furthermore, we tested the impact of disaggregated measures of workplace organization and 
interaction terms separately in the training intensity models. 
A further potential problem is endogeneity that would imply inconsistent estimations. 
However, as the main objective of a firm is to produce and sell goods and/or services rather 
than to provide apprenticeship training, primarily economic objectives and not a firm’s 
training decisions should determine the structure of a firm. Therefore, the main results dealing 
with the impact of human capital, ICT endowment and workplace organization on training 
decisions should, at least, not be affected by reverse causality. Furthermore, endogeneity 
should be of little relevance, as we control in our models for different other factors that may 
affect apprenticeship training such as firm size or industry affiliation.  
Nevertheless we test for endogeneity by applying the Rivers-Vuong-Test (Wooldridge 
2002b, p.483) based on the null hypothesis that the core variables of our model are 
exogenous. In a first stage, we estimate instrument equations separately for each of three 
aggregate variables describing the “new firm paradigm”. We use industry averages as 
                                                 
5
 In the same way as the main model presented in Table A.3 we also tested the other models of Table 2.3 for 
selection bias. In all cases there is no evidence for a selection bias. 
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instruments.6 All instruments in these equations fulfill the required conditions: they are 
correlated with the dependent variable in the instrument equation but uncorrelated with the 
dependent variable in the structural equation (training equation) and they are not correlated 
with the residuals of the endogenized training equation (for details of measurement see Table 
2.1). In line with Cassiman & Veugelers (2002), we assume that each of these industry 
variables picks-up the effect of unobserved industry-specific attributes that contribute to the 
potential endogenous firm-specific variables (see Cassiman & Veugelers 2002, p. 1174). In a 
second stage, we include the residuals of the first stage in our training equation. To correct the 
standard errors of the estimated parameters we use bootstrapping. Under H0 the residuals of 
the instrument equations and the residuals of the second stage equations are uncorrelated. 
The tests for endogeneity in the training propensity and the training intensity equation refer 
to the summary measures of human capital (variable “tertiary share”), ICT (variable 
“ICT_total”) and workplace organization (variable “WO_total”). In case of random-effects 
probit models, such a test is very time consuming; therefore we perform the test without 
correcting for firm heterogeneity. Using our instruments we throughout cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of exogenous variables (see Table A.4). Therefore we conclude that the three core 
elements of the “new firm paradigm” affect apprenticeship training directly and there is no 
problem with reverse causality. 
                                                 
6
 The industry is defined at the NACE three-digit sector level. For industries with a sample of less than ten firms, 
we used average scores on the NACE two-digit level. Furthermore, to ensure the exogeneity of these variables, 
the average scores are constructed as the average score from the firms responding in the sample, but excluding 
the values of the firm itself. 
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Table 2.2: Estimates of the propensity of apprenticeship training  
(average marginal effects) 
Random-effects probit Explanatory 
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Human capital             
tertiary_share 0.010*** 0.006*             0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)              (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
tertiary_d1    0.095***     
     (0.030)        
tertiary_d2    0.126***     
     (0.028)        
tertiary_d3    0.126***     
     (0.030)        
tertiary_d4    0.123***     
     (0.034)        
tertiary_d5    -0.003        
     (0.038)        
ICT usage         
ICT_total 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.015***     
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)        
intranet_use_d1     0.051**    
      (0.021)    
intranet_use_d2     0.015    
      (0.025)    
Internet_variety      0.015***             
       (0.005)              
ICT_infrustructure       0.021*   
        (0.012)    
Work organization         
WO_total -0.006* -0.006* -0.005        
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)        
∆_hierarchical_levels     -0.038 -0.038 -0.034    
      (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)    
∆_delegation     -0.008 -0.008 -0.007    
      (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)    
decentralization     -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.038*** 
      (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)    
job_rotation     -0.005 -0.006 -0.005    
      (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
team_work     0.012** 0.011** 0.012**  
      (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
Complementarity         
HC*ICT   -0.002*      
    (0.001)      
HC*WO   0.000      
    (0.001)      
ICT*WO   -0.001      
    (0.001)      
Control variables         
labor_costs -0.028 -0.022 -0.015    -0.023 -0.024 -0.023    
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)    (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)    
foreign_owned -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.112*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)    (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)    
size_d1 0.075 0.078 0.077    0.064 0.072 0.066    
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)    (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)    
size_d2 0.197*** 0.200*** 0.202*** 0.185*** 0.191*** 0.188*** 
  (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)    (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)    
size_d3 0.297*** 0.299*** 0.303*** 0.287*** 0.295*** 0.288*** 
  (0.053) (0.052) (0.052)    (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)    
size_d4 0.429*** 0.431*** 0.429*** 0.415*** 0.422*** 0.422*** 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)    (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)    
size_d5 0.364*** 0.370*** 0.365*** 0.355*** 0.360*** 0.356*** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.066)    (0.066) (0.067) (0.066)    
size_d6 0.518*** 0.526*** 0.524*** 0.526*** 0.522*** 0.524*** 
  (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)    (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)    
year_2005 0.027* 0.027* 0.024    0.030** 0.030** 0.031**  
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)    (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)    
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 3005 3005 3005 3005 3005 3005 
Wald chi2 102.19*** 100.47*** 107.30*** 99.42*** 100.43*** 98.26*** 
Rho 0.775 0.781 0.762 0.783 0.784 0.784 
LR test of rho=0 116.48*** 117.53*** 111.49*** 119.77*** 121.76*** 118.40*** 
 
Notes: See Table 2.1 for the variable definitions; to estimate marginal effects, we fixed 
the group specific intercept at 0, but otherwise averaged the marginal effects over the 
other explanatory variables; standard errors are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, 
**, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% test level, respectively. 
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Table 2.3: Estimates of the intensity of apprenticeship training 
Random-effects GLS Explanatory 
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Human capital       
tertiary_share 0.019** 0.022***  0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
tertiary_d1   0.186**    
    (0.076)    
tertiary_d2   0.273***    
    (0.070)    
tertiary_d3   0.400***    
    (0.072)    
tertiary_d4   0.415***    
    (0.080)    
tertiary_d5   0.240**    
    (0.098)    
ICT usage       
ICT_total 0.009 0.005 0.006    
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)    
intranet_use_d1    0.059   
     (0.043)   
intranet_use_d2    0.040   
     (0.050)   
Internet_variety     0.005  
      (0.010)  
ICT_infrustructure      0.029 
       (0.027) 
Work organization       
WO_total 0.013** 0.014 0.011*    
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)    
∆_hierarchical_levels    0.093* 0.096* 0.101* 
     (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
∆_delegation    0.012 0.014 0.017 
     (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) 
decentralization    0.032 0.034 0.034 
     (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
job_rotation    -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
     (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
team_work    0.009 0.009 0.008 
     (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Complementarity       
HC*ICT  0.003     
   (0.002)     
HC*WO  -0.001     
   (0.003)     
ICT*WO  0.006*     
   (0.003)     
Control variables       
labor_costs -0.292*** -0.296*** -0.314*** -0.299*** -0.291*** -0.293*** 
  (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
foreign_owned -0.067 -0.068 -0.070 -0.056 -0.053 -0.067 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
size_d1 0.448*** 0.443*** 0.482*** 0.447*** 0.452*** 0.451*** 
  (0.142) (0.141) (0.139) (0.141) (0.140) (0.141) 
size_d2 0.789*** 0.785*** 0.840*** 0.785*** 0.793*** 0.793*** 
  (0.144) (0.144) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
size_d3 1.432*** 1.431*** 1.471*** 1.428*** 1.436*** 1.430*** 
  (0.145) (0.145) (0.142) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) 
size_d4 2.115*** 2.114*** 2.149*** 2.099*** 2.112*** 2.112*** 
  (0.149) (0.149) (0.146) (0.149) (0.148) (0.148) 
size_d5 2.794*** 2.785*** 2.823*** 2.789*** 2.799*** 2.797*** 
  (0.160) (0.160) (0.157) (0.160) (0.159) (0.159) 
size_d6 4.074*** 4.056*** 4.114*** 4.080*** 4.093*** 4.077*** 
  (0.181) (0.181) (0.176) (0.180) (0.179) (0.180) 
year_2005 0.049* 0.050* 0.040 0.048 0.050* 0.052* 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
constant 2.438*** 2.455*** 2.516*** 2.406*** 2.295*** 2.227*** 
  (0.748) (0.750) (0.737) (0.757) (0.746) (0.754) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 2274 2274 2274 2274 2274 2274 
Wald chi2 2375.56*** 2432.19*** 2466.27*** 2403.55*** 2408.67*** 2380.56*** 
R2 within 0.167 0.165 0.179 0.167 0.171 0.167 
Rho 0.597 0.597 0.599 0.595 0.596 0.594 
LM test 130.55*** 129.28*** 121.60*** 128.80*** 129.25*** 128.62*** 
 
Notes: See Table 2.1 for the variable definitions; the significance of the parameters is indicated 
with ***, ** and * resp. representing the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets under the coefficients (White 
procedure). 
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2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Training propensity 
Table 2.2 shows the results with training propensity as dependent variable. We primarily are 
interested in the influence on training propensity exerted by the variables representing the 
core dimensions of the new firm paradigm, i.e. human capital, ICT and workplace 
organization. Columns (1) and (2) refer to estimates where these core elements are specified 
as aggregate variables, with column (2) including complementarity effects. To better 
understand these main results, columns (3) to (6) contain the findings based on a more 
disaggregated specification of human capital, ICT and workplace organization. 
Firstly, the results with respect to human capital are fully in line with a priori expectations; 
hypothesis H1 is thus confirmed. Firms with a high share of employees with tertiary 
education are significantly more likely to offer apprenticeships. Interestingly, the positive 
effect of tertiary education is increasing only up to a share of 6-13% (dummy variable 
“tertiary_d2”) and becomes insignificant beyond the threshold of 43% (“tertiary_d5”). Hence, 
in case of very high levels of human capital input, the probability of apprenticeship training is 
low (i.e. not higher than for the reference group containing firms with a share of employees 
with tertiary qualifications below 3%). 
The second element of the new system of production, i.e. the usage of ICT, also is 
positively related to training propensity what again matches the a priori expectations as stated 
in hypothesis H2. This holds true independently of whether ICT is specified as an aggregate 
variable (“ICT_total”) or captured by three disaggregated measures. Training propensity is 
particularly high in firms with a broad ICT infrastructure (variable “ICT_infrastructure”) and 
a high variety of applications of the Internet use (“Internet_variety”). The influence of the 
intra-firm diffusion of the intranet (“intranet_use_d”) also is positive but, interestingly, the 
effect is not linear. We find a positive sign only at a medium intensity of intranet use, i.e. 
firms with regular intranet users in the range of 21% to 60% (“intranet_use_d1”). 
The third element – the redesign of workplace organization – is correlated with training 
propensity to a much lower extent than ICT usage, reflecting the fact that only some of the 
dimensions of workplace organization are correlated with training propensity. Working in a 
 25 
 
team (variable “team_work”), as hypothesized, is a favorable environment for in-house 
vocational training. The data also confirm the argument that flattening of hierarchies 
(“∆_hierarchical_levels”) and making use of job rotation (“job_rotation)” do not influence 
training propensity. The negative sign we find for the degree of decentralization of 
competencies (“decentralization”) and the insignificant coefficient of “∆_delegation” are not 
in line with the overall hypothesis of a positive effect of workplace organization on training 
propensity. However, we also have put forward some arguments in favor of a negative sign 
for “decentralization” (“insufficient incentive at the shop floor to instructing apprentices”; 
“high autonomy of performing work tasks as a too demanding work environment for 
apprentices”), and similar arguments may hold true in case of “∆_delegation”. Given the 
opposite effects of the individual elements of workplace organization, it is not surprising that 
the impact of aggregate workplace organization (“WO_total”) on training propensity is weak 
(with the negative effects slightly outweighing the positive ones). In conclusion, we do not 
find evidence for hypothesis H3a (positive overall effect of workplace organization). In 
contrast, hypothesis H3b is largely confirmed as the impact of the five organizational 
dimensions is different and more or less in line with our considerations in Section 2.2. 
Fourthly, theory posits that the new firm model is characterized by complementarities 
between human capital, ICT and workplace organization, which should have an additional 
positive effect on the demand for skilled labor. Therefore, although the evidence for such 
effects is not overwhelming (see Section 2.1), we hypothesized that the complementarities 
positively affect training propensity (hypothesis H4). However, this proposition is not 
corroborated by our empirical estimates. The interaction term based on the aggregate 
measures of ICT and workplace organization (ICT*WO) as well as on human capital and 
workplace organization (HC*WO) are statistically insignificant (see column 2 in Table 2.2). 
We even get a negative effect of the interaction of human capital with ICT (HC*ICT). Hence, 
the combination of intensive use of ICT and a high share of employees with tertiary 
qualifications reduces the propensity of apprenticeship training. This negative interaction 
effect partially reflects the results we got for the dummies “tertiary_d” and “intranet_use_d”. 
These show that a very high share of employees holding tertiary degrees and a high intensity 
of intranet use do not positively correlate with the firms’ training propensity, whereas at an 
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intermediate level of the two variables both effects are positive. Hence, the finding that the 
interaction effect HC*ICT is negative, may be attributed to the behavior of the segment of 
firms having implemented the new firm model to a very high degree. 
The effects of the control variables are in line with the expectations. An exception are 
average wage costs (“labor_costs“) which, contrary to the expectations, do not negatively 
correlate with training propensity; we have no explanation for this result. As expected, 
training propensity increases with firm size more or less monotonically (dummy variables 
“size_d”). Foreign companies (“foreign_owned”) are less involved in apprenticeship training 
than domestic ones, supporting the presumption that foreign enterprises are less familiar with 
the Swiss apprenticeship system. We also find a positive time effect for the year 2005, 
probably reflecting policy measures (campaigning among firms to offering apprenticeships, 
etc.) taken in the aftermath of the economic downturn of 2001/03. Finally, the dummies 
reflecting region and industry effects are statistically significant. 
Summing up, the empirical results for the model explaining a firm’s propensity to provide 
apprenticeship training supports three out of the five hypotheses we put forward in Section 
2.2. There is strong evidence for a positive relationship with training propensity in case of two 
of the three core elements of the new firm paradigm, that is human capital (hypothesis H1) 
and ICT (Hypothesis H2: summary and differentiated measures). Only very intensive use of 
these two elements discourages firms from providing apprenticeship training. The effect of 
workplace organization is significant just for some of the organizational dimensions included 
in the model, with the effects more or less in line with our considerations in Section 2.2 
(hypothesis H3b). Finally, we do not find evidence for positive interaction effects. On 
balance, we conclude that a change towards the new firm paradigm goes along with an 
increasing propensity of firms to provide apprenticeships. 
2.5.2 Training intensity 
In accordance with hypothesis H1, human capital positively affects the intensity of 
apprenticeship training (“tertiary_share“). Again, the effect of human capital (“tertiary_d”) on 
training does increase up to a certain threshold (see Table 2.3). We find a pattern which is 
quite similar to that we found in case of training propensity. More specifically, firms with a 
share of employees with tertiary qualifications of more than 3% show significantly higher 
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training intensities than the reference group (below 3%). A new result is that firms with a 
share of highly qualified employees in the range of 3% to 13% (“tertiary_d1 and d2”) have a 
significantly lower training intensity than firms with a share in the range of 13% to 43% 
(“tertiary_d3 and d4”), but this is not the case anymore beyond the threshold of 43% 
(“tertiary_d5”). The impact of human capital on training intensity is thus non-linear; it is 
stepwise increasing up to a share of 43% and is decreasing beyond this threshold value. 
The redesign of the workplace organization measured at the aggregate level (“WO_total“), 
in line with hypothesis H3a, positively affects a firm’s training intensity, whereas in case of 
training propensity we did not find such an effect. However, it is difficult to identify a single 
driver of this effect on a more disaggregated level. Despite the use of job rotation 
(“job_rotation”), all other measures of new workplace organization show a positive sign. Only 
a reduction of the hierarchical levels (“∆_hierarchical_levels”), however, does significantly 
affect the training intensity of the firms. Hypothesis H3b is thus supported but the evidence is 
not overwhelming. One may ask why the sign of the aggregated effect of new workplace 
organization differs for training intensity (positive) and training propensity (negative). A 
reason for the negative effect in case of training propensity may be the high fixed costs of 
apprenticeship training in a work environment with a high degree of new workplace 
organization. Once the (initial) investment has been made, it pays off to increase the number 
of apprentices; hence the impact on training intensity is positive. Furthermore, it is surprising 
that “∆_hierarchical_levels” does affect training intensity but not training propensity. A 
reason for this result may be that, in contrast to training propensity, intensive apprenticeship 
training is not a decision at the shop-floor and, hence, is more directly correlated with 
organizational changes taking place at the level of the firm as a whole. 
ICT does not contribute to explaining training intensity, irrespective of the way it is 
measured (“ICT_total” vs. differentiated ICT variables). Hypothesis H2 is thus not confirmed. 
This result, which is in contrast to that for training propensity, has to be qualified as we 
identify an indirect effect of ICT. The interaction term of ICT and workplace organization 
(ICT*WO) is significantly positive (see column 3 of Table 2.3). Companies combining an 
intensive use of ICT with a redesign of workplace organization exhibit a higher training 
intensity than other firms. Hence, there is some evidence for the existence of 
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complementarities in explaining the apprenticeship training intensity what is in line with 
hypothesis H4. 
The majority of the explanatory variables not related to the new firm paradigm show the 
expected influence on training intensity. As expected, the impact of “labor_costs” is 
significantly negative. The firm-size effect, as expected, differs among the two training 
variables. As for training propensity, training intensity monotonically increases with firm size. 
The impact of foreign ownership (“foreign_owned”) is not statistically significant anymore, 
implying that foreign firms, once familiar with the Swiss apprenticeship system, behave in 
training matters like domestic firms. The region and industry dummies again are statistically 
significant. Finally, we again get a positive time effect (variable “year_2005”). 
Summing up, we find evidence for a positive impact on training intensity for two of the 
three categories of variables representing the new firm paradigm, i.e. human capital intensity 
(hypothesis H1) and workplace organization (hypotheses H3a and H3b). This is not the case 
for ICT if taken separately (direct effect). However, the combined effect of ICT and 
workplace organization (interaction term) is positive, pointing to the importance of 
complementarities in explaining the extent of apprenticeship training (hypothesis H4). 
Although not all hypotheses are confirmed, one may conclude that a transition towards the 
new firm paradigm is accompanied by an increasing intensity of apprenticeship training in 
firms providing this type of training. 
2.6 Comparison with existing empirical literature 
How do the findings with regard to the core variables of our model compare to the results of 
previous econometric work? The few studies taking account of ICT yielded mixed results. 
Beckmann (2002, 2008), based on a very rough measure of IT investments, got a positive 
effect on training propensity and intensity for a cross-section of German firms, whereas we 
did so only in case of training propensity. Arvanitis & Stucki (2011) found some weak 
evidence for a negative influence of the usage of Internet and intranet on training propensity 
based on a cohort of Swiss start-up firms. In view of the different measurement of ICT 
(investment in IT vs. several characteristics of ICT) and of specific sample characteristics 
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(new vs. established firms) a comparison of the results of these studies with our findings is 
not very meaningful. 
It is even more difficult to compare the results with respect to the impact of workplace 
organization on the provision of apprenticeship training, since – to our knowledge – this paper 
is the only one that includes organizational variables in an econometric analysis of the topic. 
However, we notice that the results of this study are more or less in line with Finegold & 
Wagner (2002) who, based on a case study for the German banking sector, argue that hiring 
apprentices becomes more attractive when work organization gets more flexible and, in 
particular, when the incidence of teamwork increases. 
Human capital is used as a variable to explaining why and to what extent firms offer 
apprenticeship places in quite a few studies (see, e.g., Arvanitis 2008, Beckmann 2002, 2008, 
Franz et al. 2000). In accordance with our results, these authors throughout find a positive 
effect of qualified as compared to unqualified labor.  
2.7 Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we analyze the impact of the tree constituent elements of the new firm paradigm, 
i.e. intensive use of ICT, redesign of workplace organization and augmenting the input of 
human capital, on the provision of apprenticeship training. The investigation is expected to 
give some indication of the appropriateness of the apprenticeship system as a way of skill 
formation in a highly advanced knowledge-based economy where the new firm paradigm 
plays a significant role. 
In case of training propensity, there is strong evidence for a positive impact of two out of 
the three constituent elements of the new firm model: a) human capital intensity: positive 
effect of the employment share of workers with tertiary-level qualifications and b) ICT 
intensity: positive overall effect reflecting the availability of ICT infrastructure, the degree of 
intra-firm diffusion of the intranet and the variety of Internet applications. These results may 
be qualified by the observation that at the very highest level of both human capital and ICT 
intensity the propensity of apprenticeship training is low. The third core element of the new 
firm paradigm, i.e. the redesign of workplace organization, is less important as a determinant 
of training propensity. We find a significantly positive effect only for one of the five 
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organizational dimensions taken into consideration (“incidence of teamwork within the 
firm”), whereas the impact of a decentralization of competencies is negative. In sum, the 
results for training propensity suffice to conclude that apprenticeship training seems to be an 
appropriate way of skill formation in an advanced economy where the new firm paradigm 
plays a significant role. However, this may not be the case in the (technologically) most 
sophisticated segments of the economy. 
In case of training intensity also two of the three core elements turns out to be statistically 
significant: a) human capital intensity: positive effect of the share of employees with tertiary 
education and b) workplace organization: positive effect of a reduction of the number of 
hierarchical levels. ICT does not directly influence the intensity of training provision, but 
there is evidence for a positive indirect effect of ICT reflecting the complementarity of ICT 
and workplace organization. Again we find some evidence (though weaker than in case of 
training propensity) that apprenticeship training is less widespread in technologically leading 
activities. 
The findings with respect to ICT, workplace organization and human capital are 
encouraging for policy makers dealing with the Swiss apprenticeship system. They imply that 
the Swiss system is quite appropriate to accommodate the significant changes required for a 
transition to the new firm paradigm that plays an increasing role in economically advanced 
countries. This assessment may be qualified in one respect: the apprenticeship system without 
any doubt is very effective in providing skills in an advanced economy, but there is some 
evidence that this may not be the case in (technologically) leading-edge activities. It is up to 
further research to appraise this tentative conclusion. In any case, the reform of higher 
professional education in Switzerland set up in the late 1990s, particularly the establishment 
of universities of applied sciences (which provide science-based education mostly on top of 
apprenticeship training), is well-suited to counteract the (potential) weakness of the 
apprenticeship system we mentioned above. 
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3 Success of Start-up Firms: The Role of Financial Constraints* 
3.1 Introduction 
Many studies find evidence for the importance of start-ups. Start-ups positively impact 
economic growth and development (e.g., Audretsch et al. 2006, Gries & Naudé 2008) and 
they are important drivers of aggregate innovation and productivity (see Aghion et al. 2006). 
However, we can observe that many of these new firms fail in the initial years of life. 
Financial constraints should be an important reason for their failure. New firms generate only 
limited cash flows and seed capital is often too limiting for these firms. Thus, many start-ups 
must rely on the infusion of capital from external sources in order to survive. As particularly 
small and young firms have difficulties gaining access to external capital, start-ups are often 
financially constrained (e.g., Angelini & Generale 2008, Hallberg 2000, World Bank 2004). A 
main factor for these difficulties is the asymmetric information between the owners of the 
start-ups and external investors (e.g., Binks & Ennew 1996, Stiglitz & Weiss 1981). However, 
asymmetric information should primarily be a problem of the first years. With increasing age 
of the firms, outside investors get additional information about a firm’s quality and can adjust 
the terms of the financing contracts. Thus, for more mature firms costs of external capital 
should be lower and loan sizes should be less limited (see Brito & Mello 1995). Accordingly, 
the impact of financial constraints on success should decrease with increasing age of the 
firms. 
Most previous empirical studies that deal with the impact of financial constraints on firm 
success primarily focus on established firms (e.g., Ayyagari et al. 2008, Becchetti & Trovato 
2002, Hotz-Eakin et al. 1994 and Musso & Schiavo 2008). Fewer studies analyze this 
relationship for new firms (e.g., Aghion et al. 2007, Huynh et al. 2010, Hvide & Møen 2008, 
Saridakis et al. 2007 and Saridakis et al. 2008). While both categories of studies provide some 
evidence that firm success is negatively affected by financial constraints, it is comparatively 
not well understood how that relationship changes with increasing age of the firms. The 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is based on Stucki (2009). 
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information whether firms only need help in their first years or, instead, financial constraints 
are a persistent problem, is of particular importance to draw adequate policy implications. To 
our knowledge, however, no study empirically analyzes this question so far. Based on an 
extensive data set for a start-up cohort that was observed during a period of ten years, this 
study attempts to fill this gap. 
Our main research question asks whether the impact of financial constraints on the 
development of new firms decreases with increasing age of the firms. For this purpose, we 
analyze in a first step whether financial constraints affect the success of start-ups in the first 
years. First of all, we thus test whether our results confirm the negative impact found in most 
previous studies. In a second step, we then analyze the development of the effect of financial 
constraints on firm success when the firms grow older. 
As the impact of financial constraints may differ between success measures, we use two 
different dependent variables: (a) firm survival and (b) to describe a firm’s activity level, we 
use a dummy variable measuring whether a firm achieves profit break-even. To analyze the 
impact of financial constraints, we use separate measures for (a) external debt constraints and 
(b) venture capital constraints. Thus, a feature of our study is that we can analyze what kind 
of success is affected by which type of financial constraints.  
The population we use in this study refers to the cohort of Swiss enterprises that were 
founded between 1996 and 1997. This cohort was registered by the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office and contains all “green-field” start-ups (i.e. mergers and manager-takeovers are not 
included) that were founded in this period. Thus, we should be able to draw representative 
conclusions about the impact of financial constraints for start-ups. In the beginning the cohort 
included 7112 firms. Among these firms three surveys were conducted, the last one in 2006, 
nine to ten years after firm foundation. We thus have information on financial constraints at 
different stages in the development of the start-ups. This allows us to analyze whether the 
impact of financial constraints decreases when firms grow older. Potential econometrical 
problems of such an analysis like, e.g., endogeneity and sample selection are discussed in 
detail in a separate section. 
With regard to our first research question, we find further evidence that the success of 
start-ups is negatively affected by financial constraints. Based on data of our first survey, 
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three to four years after firm foundation, we find that the achievement of profit break-even is 
negatively correlated with external debt constraints as well as with venture capital constraints. 
Firm survival is only affected by external debt constraints. In the follow-up surveys the effect 
of financial constraints on firm survival disappears. However, financial constraints 
persistently impact the profitability of these firms. In all (three) cross-sections, we find a 
significant negative correlation of financial constraints (debt and venture capital constraints) 
with the probability to achieve profit break-even. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the conceptual 
background of the empirical analysis. Section 3.3 describes the database. Section 3.4 contains 
specifications of the empirical framework used to describe the success of the firms. Section 
3.5 presents the estimation results. Section 3.6 concludes our paper. 
3.2 Conceptual background 
The aim of this paper is to model the relationship between financial constraints and the 
success of start-ups embedded in a model of determinants of success. Our definition of 
financial constraints focuses on firms which are constrained by difficulties gaining access to 
external capital. Thus, financial constraints encompasses both, (a) a firm needs additional 
external capital and (b) has problems to acquire it.  
Measurement of success 
In the literature many different success indicators are used (for an overview see Albach et al. 
1985 or Meyer 1994). In this study, the success of start-ups is measured as firm survival and 
whether a firm achieves profit break-even. The purpose of venture capital is, for example, not 
merely to survive but primarily to increase performance. Venture capital constraints may thus 
primarily affect a firm’s activity level, but not survival. The use of two different dependent 
variables allows us to analyze what kind of success is affected by which type of financial 
constraints.  
We have also tested the impact of financial constraints on employment growth. As growth 
of the firms in our sample is limited, access to external capital is of low importance. It is thus 
no surprise that we found no statistically significant impact of financial constraints on 
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employment growth. Furthermore, financial constraints do not affect the volume of sales and 
growth in sales of the firms in our sample. This may have two reasons. Firstly, sales of small 
firms are extremely volatile. The volume of sales at a certain point in time is thus not a 
representative measure of a firms’ activity level. Secondly, as small firms often do not require 
audited financial statements, the exactness of absolute sales data is ambiguous. As our study 
bases on a representative sample of all start-ups in a certain period, most of the firms in our 
sample are small. Accordingly, data on the volume of sales is not a very good proxy to 
describe a firms’ activity level. Therefore, we use the achievement of profit break-even 
instead of the volume of sales to describe a firms’ activity level. 
Success vs. financial constraints 
Our conceptual framework builds upon the strategic management literature, which suggests 
that the performance of a firm depends on a firm’s environment (external analysis), as well as 
on a firm’s internal characteristics (internal analysis) (see Barney 1991). External analysis 
focuses on analyzing a firm’s opportunities and threats within its competitive environment 
(e.g., Caves & Porter 1977, Porter 1980, 1985). In the resource-based view, the individual 
firm resources – including human capital, physical capital and organizational capital resources 
– enable the firm to create and implement strategies that improve its competitiveness (see 
Barney 1991). Hence, lack of external financial resources should directly affect the success of 
the firms. 
According to the literature, difficulties gaining access to external capital are caused 
through asymmetric information between the owners of the start-ups and outside investors 
(e.g., Binks & Ennew 1996, Stiglitz & Weiss 1981). There are several reasons for a high level 
of asymmetric information. Firstly, the fact that start-ups have no track record directly leads 
to higher evaluation costs. A study of the World Bank finds that the availability of credit 
history information reduces processing time, processing costs and default rates of credit 
bureaus by more than 25 percent (World Bank 2006, p.13). Secondly, as small firms often do 
not require audited financial statements, start-ups do not have much publicly visible 
information. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for outside investors to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of start-ups. Given the high failure rate of these firms, agency costs of 
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external capital relative to capital size can be substantial. As a consequence, access to external 
capital may be expensive or even rationed. 
In the case of innovative start-ups, asymmetric information is not the only reason for 
problems to get access to external capital. Innovative start-ups may have problems to acquire 
external debt capital, even if asymmetric information is limited. Because innovative start-ups 
sell new products, it is difficult to judge whether their innovations will be successful or not. 
Venture capital can solve this problem of high risk. In exchange for the high risk that venture 
capitalists assume by investing in innovative start-ups, venture capitalists usually get a 
significant portion of the company’s ownership. Furthermore, venture capitalists mostly have 
sector-specific expertise that enables them to better evaluate the risk of an investment. Thus, 
for innovative start-ups primary access to venture capital is important. The availability of 
venture capital, however, is strongly limited (OECD 2008, p.156). 
Start-ups generate only limited cash flows. Therefore, firms with financial constraints will 
be less able to sustain unexpected losses, even for a limited period (see Mata et al. 1995). 
Furthermore, constrained firms need to cut costs in order to generate the resources they 
cannot raise on the financial market. Financial constraints should thus limit a firm’s 
investments in productivity-enhancing projects, what in turn negatively affects firm success 
(see Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994, Aghion et al. 2007). To analyze the impact of different forms of 
financial constraints we distinguish between external debt constraints and problems to acquire 
venture capital. 
The discussion above allows us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1:  Financial constraints do negatively affect the success of start-ups. 
Such a negative effect of financial constraints on the success of new firms was found in 
most previous empirical studies (e.g., Aghion et al. 2007, Huynh et al. 2010, Hvide & Møen 
2008, Saridakis et al. 2007 and Saridakis et al. 2008). The study of Cressy (1996) is an 
exception. Cressy (1996) finds that financial capital does not affect survival of start-ups if the 
model controls for the human capital of the firms. He thus concludes that “a reason for the 
divergence of empirical results in the area may be the failure to test a sufficiently rich 
empirical model” (Cressy 1996, p.1266). To counter this critique, we include our measures of 
financial constraints in an extensive base model that controls in detail for human capital and 
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founder characteristics (see Section 3.4.1 for a detailed description of the model 
specification). 
Persistence of the impact of financial constraints 
With increasing age, firms gain a track record and outside investors learn about the firm, 
wherefore the level of asymmetric information decreases. Unknown firms should thus “face 
greater liquidity restrictions and higher cost of capital than more mature firms with well-
known prospects” (Brito & Mello 1995, p.544). Furthermore internal financial flows should 
increase with increasing age of the firms, wherefore dependency on external capital would 
decrease. A track record should also reduce the risk of an investment in innovative start-ups 
and hence decrease their dependence on the availability of venture capital. In accordance with 
Brito & Mello (1995), we thus expect that financial constraints are negatively correlated with 
the age of the firms. Accordingly, the impact of financial constraints on the success of the 
firms should decrease with increasing firm age. 
We thus formulate the following hypothesis:  
H2:  The effect of financial constraints on the success of start-ups is strongest in the first 
years after firm foundation. 
Previous empirical studies analyze the impact of financial constraints either for established 
firms or for start-ups. To our knowledge, no other study empirically tests this hypothesis so 
far. 
Differences between the two dependent variables 
As firms probably stay in the market even though they sustain a loss in a certain period, 
survival is a more fundamental success measure than profit. This may affect our results in two 
ways. With respect to hypothesis 1, we would expect that the survival of firms is 
predominantly affected when a firm faces serious financial constraints, while the achievement 
of profit break-even may already be affected by a lower level of financial constraints. 
Secondly, as the level of financial constraints should decrease with firm age (hypothesis 2), 
we would not be surprised when the impact of financial constraints on the survival of these 
firms becomes insignificant at an earlier stage, than the impact on the achievement of profit 
break-even.  
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3.3 Description of the data 
3.3.1 Construction of the data set 
The population we use in this study refers to the cohort of Swiss enterprises that were founded 
between 1996 and 1997. In the beginning the cohort included 7112 firms. This cohort was 
registered by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and contains all “green-field” start-ups (i.e. 
mergers and manager-takeovers are not included) that were founded in this period and had 
conducted the business activities at least twenty hours a week.1 
In 2000, we checked which firms of this cohort still existed. We defined a firm to have 
exited when it did not answer our questionnaire and (a) was not registered in the Swiss 
Commercial Register anymore or (b) the exit was verified by telephone. 3288 (46.2%) of 
these start-ups were still in business in 2000. Among the firms that still existed by that time, 
data were collected by means of a postal survey. 49.4% (1625) of the firms answered the 
questionnaire. 1339 (82.4%) of these firms survived the next three years. In 2003 a follow-up 
survey was conducted among these firms. Answers were received from 70.6% (945) of the 
firms. In 2006, nine to ten years after firm foundation, 857 (90.7%) of the participants of the 
2003 survey still existed. 73.5% (630) of them were willing to fill out a third questionnaire. 
For some firms we thus have data at different points in time. For firms which dropped out of 
the sample we know whether the firm still existed at time of drop out and also whether the 
firm survived the following period up to 2006.  
The questionnaire covered questions about basic firm characteristics, firm success and 
activity level, resource endowment, innovative activities, the market environment and 
financial constraints.2 In 2000, the questionnaire included some additional questions about the 
founder characteristics (e.g., gender, age, education, experience and the wealth of the firm 
founders). 
3.3.2 Measurement of financial constraints 
Our measures of financial constraints are based on self-reported data. In each cross-section 
firms were asked to report on a five-level Likert scale the importance of different forms of 
                                                 
1
 The firms were recorded by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office independently whether they were enrolled in 
the Swiss Commercial Register or not. 
2
 The questionnaires are available in German, French and Italian at www.kof.ethz.ch/surveys/ structural/panel. 
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financial constraints with respect to the preceding three years. For external equity, we have 
information on the importance of limited availability of venture capital funding 
(VC_CONST). This question implicates that a firm is effectively looking for venture capital. 
Thus, primarily firms that regard themselves as potential receivers of venture capital should 
feel constrained with respect to our measure. For external debt capital, what for most of the 
start-ups in our sample is the more important source of external capital, we have more 
detailed information. We know the importance of different reasons for external debt capital 
constraints. These are unfavorable credit conditions (CRED_COND), a too low credit line 
(CRED_LINE) and insufficient information about external debt financing options 
(DEBT_INFO). This information allows us to separately analyze the impact of different types 
of external debt constraints, in particular price and quantity constraints. To be able to test the 
impact of external debt constraints as a whole, we further calculate an overall measure of 
external debt constraints (DEBT_CONST). The overall variable is calculated as the sum of 
the standardized values (average 0, standard deviation 1) of the three detailed variables. 
Self-reported data has been extensively used in the literature and is also common to 
measure financial constraints (e.g., Becchetti & Trovato 2002, Campello et al. 2009, Saridakis 
et al. 2008, Winker 1999). An advantage of self-reported data is that firms know best whether 
they are financially constrained or not. As financial constraints depend not only on the 
availability of external capital, but also on whether the firms effectively need additional 
capital, it is difficult to find objective measures that completely capture financial constraints. 
This applies all the more, as we have separate measures for different sources and different 
types of constraints. Subjective assessment of financial constraints, however, may reduce 
comparability between firms. Potential problems of survey data include that the measures of 
financial constraints may share a common unmeasured cause with firm performance (see, e.g., 
Hallward-Driemeier & Aterido 2009). To deal with such concerns we test our measures of 
financial constraints for endogeneity. The testing procedure is described in Section 3.4.2. 
  
39 
Table 3.1: Variable definition and measurement 
Variable Definition/ measurement 
Dependent variables   
SURVIVING Firm survives next three years yes/no  
BREAK Firm achieves profit break-even at time of survey yes/no  
    Independent variables   
MAIN At time of firm foundation founder worked on a regular basis yes/no 
UNEMPLOY Founder was unemployed before firm foundation yes/no 
LAGE Average age of the firm founders; natural logarithm 
GENDER Gender of the firm founders: male/female  
(value 1: ‘male’; value 0: ‘female’; the most frequently reported gender is regarded as 
representative for the firm founders; when the number of 'females' equals the number of 'males' 
we set 'female')  
QUAL Employees with tertiary-level education yes/no 
R&D R&D activities yes/no (in previous period) 
NP Development and introduction of new products yes/no (in previous period) 
MP Development and introduction of modified existing products yes/no (in previous 
period) 
PCOMP Intensity of price competition 
(transformation of a five-level ordinal variable (level 1: 'very weak'; level 5: 'very strong') to a 
binary variable (value 1: levels 4 and 5 of the original five-level variable; value 0: levels 1, 2 and 
3 of the original variable) 
NPCOMP Intensity of non-price competition 
(original and transformed variables as for PCOMP) 
LCAP Volume of seed capital; natural logarithm 
AG Public limited company 
(dummy variable with sole proprietorship as reference legal form) 
GmbH Private limited company 
(dummy variable with sole proprietorship as reference legal form) 
OTHER Other legal forms (for example general partnership) 
(dummy variable with sole proprietorship as reference legal form) 
LSIZE Number of employees; natural logarithm 
IND Dummies for three industries 
(construction (IND_1); modern services (IND_2); traditional services (IND_3); reference 
industry: manufacturing) 
DEBT_CONST Importance of external debt constraints in the preceding three years  
(sum of standardized values (average 0, standard deviation 1) of three ordinal variables: 1) 
unfavorable credit conditions, 2) credit line too low, 3) insufficient information about external 
debt financing options) 
CRED_COND Importance of unfavorable credit conditions in the preceding three years  
(five-level ordinal variable, ranging from “very high” (value 5) to “very low” (value 1)) 
CRED_LINE Importance of a too low credit line in the preceding three years  
(original variable as for CRED_COND) 
DEBT_INFO Importance of insufficient information about external debt financing options in the 
preceding three years  
(original variable as for CRED_COND) 
VC_CONST Importance of venture capital constraints in the preceding three years 
(original variable as for CRED_COND) 
REG Dummies for six regions 
(Lac Léman (REG_1); Espace Midland (REG_2); North-western Switzerland (REG_3); Zurich 
(REG_4); Eastern Switzerland (REG_5); Central Switzerland (REG_6); reference region: Ticino) 
BUS_PLAN Firm started with a business plan yes/no 
UNI Firm was founded to realize ideas from research at university yes/no 
T_MARK_SHARE Firm targets a high market share 
(five-level ordinal variable, ranging from “very high importance” (value 5) to “very low 
importance” (value 1)) 
T_NEW_TECH Firm targets the application of new technologies 
(original variable as for T_MARK_SHARE) 
T_NEW_PROD Firm targets the development and introduction of new innovative products/services 
(original variable as for T_MARK_SHARE) 
WEALTH_SHARE Share of founders with private assets at time of firm foundation  
SHORT Shortage of high-qualified personnel yes/no 
(the variable is based on the two ordinal variables 'high-qualified personnel is too expensive' and 
'high-qualified personnel is too difficult to find'; we calculated the average of the scores for these 
two variables; then transformed the mean of these two five-level ordinal variables (level1: 'very 
weak'; level 5: 'very strong') to a binary variable (1: values higher than 3 of the mean variable;0: 
values 3 and lower than 3)) 
INSAMPLE Firm is still in the sample in the following cross-section yes/no 
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3.3.3 Characteristics and development of the start-ups  
Most of the start-ups in the data set are firms in the service sector. In each point of time they 
represent about 83% of the observations. About 9% belong to the construction sector, the 
remaining 8% to the manufacturing sector. These shares remained almost constant during the 
period 2000–2006. In the service sector the sub-sector of modern (knowledge-intensive) 
services (e.g., banking and insurance, business services) has a larger share than the sub-sector 
of traditional services (e.g., trade, hotels and catering); the share of modern services increased 
considerably between 2000 and 2006. In the manufacturing sector there are more low-tech 
than high-tech start-ups. 
The observed start-ups are for the most part small firms. In each survey more than 80% of 
the enterprises employed less than five employees (measured in full-time equivalents). The 
average firm size only slightly increased from one period to the next. While in 2000 the firms 
had on average a size of 2.6 employees, the average size increased to 3.3 employees in 2003 
and 4.8 employees in 2006. In 2006, ten years since their foundation, only 6.7% of the firms 
employed more than ten employees. 
On average nearly 20% of the firms said that they face large difficulties (value 4 or 5 on 
respective Likert scale) gaining access to external debt capital. As expected, innovative firms 
have more problems to acquire external debt capital. External debt constraints of firms with 
R&D activities are significantly higher than the constraints of firms without R&D activities. 
As venture capital is primary to finance innovative start-ups, fewer firms are constrained by 
venture capital. About 10% of the firms were seriously constrained by the availability of 
venture capital. As expected, financial constraints of the start-ups in our sample decrease with 
firm age. While in 2000 external debt constraints were for 19.4% of the firms of high 
importance, the share decreased to 15.1% in 2003 and 14.5% in 2006. At the same time, the 
share of firms with serious venture capital constraints decreased from 10% in 2000 to nearly 
6% in 2006. The decrease is not only caused through sample selection. We can also observe 
decreasing financial constraints when we include only firms which answered all three 
questionnaires. Potential econometrical problems of our financial constraint variables such as 
sample selection and endogeneity are further discussed in Section 3.4.2. 
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3.4 Econometric framework 
3.4.1 Model specification 
To capture different aspects of firm success we estimate our model using two different 
dependent variables. SURVIVAL is a binary variable measuring whether a firm does or does 
not survive the next three years. BREAK is a dummy variable measuring whether a firm 
achieves profit break-even at time of survey. To be able to test whether the impact of financial 
constraints changes with firm age, we estimate the model separately for each cross-section. 
BREAK is modeled separately for cross-section 2000, 2003 and 2006, whereby data for the 
dependent and independent variables come from the same cross-section.3 As firms that left the 
market between two subsequent surveys did not answer the questionnaire at the end of the 
period, survival models include independent variables observed for all units at the beginning 
of a period. Since we have no survey data for 1996/97, we cannot explain firm survival 
between 1996/97–2000. Thus, we model firm survival for the periods 2000–2003 and 2003–
2006 only. 
We use in all models the same set of independent variables. As described in Section 3.3.2, 
we test the impact of financial constraints on firm success by including five variables. The 
effect of external debt constraints is analyzed using the overall as well as the detailed 
variables. To capture different effects on firm success, we include the variables measuring 
financial constraints in an extensive base model (for descriptive statistics and a detailed 
definition of the variables we refer to Table 3.1 and Table B.1, respectively). Following the 
theoretical literature, and in accordance with empirical studies (see, e.g., Brüderl et al. 1992, 
Marmet 2006, Stearns et al. 1995 and Saridakis et al. 2008 for a similar approach), we include 
the following categories of control variables: founder characteristics, human capital 
endowment, firm strategy, market conditions and general firm characteristics. To capture 
industry specific effects, we further include dummies controlling for industry affiliation. 
Founder characteristics. According the motivation theory we expect that firm founding as 
an act from necessity is negatively correlated with firm success (e.g., Gartner et al. 1992, 
Johnson 1986, Schjoedt & Shaver 2007). In our model we measure this effect by including 
                                                 
3
 An exception is the firm size variable that is included with a time lag of three years. 
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the employment status of the firm owners before firm creation (UNEMPLOY). Whether 
founders work on a regular basis or not (MAIN) measures a founder’s dedication to the firm 
and the seriousness of the founded firm (Brüderl et al. 2007, p.194). Age of the founders 
(LAGE) can be seen as a proxy for professional experience, and thus should be positively 
correlated with firm success. On the other hand, some age-related decisions such as exits to 
go into retirement negatively affect the current success measures of the firms. Since age-
related exits are probably not caused through lack of success, such exits may distort the use of 
SURVIVAL as success measure. LAGE should capture this effect of voluntary firm exits in 
the survival models.4 GENDER controls for effects through gender specific skills (e.g., 
Cooper et al. 1994). 
Human capital. Through formal education, people acquire skills that help to recognize 
opportunities in the surrounding environment (Baptista et al. 2007, p.9). Such skills are 
important to successfully compete with other firms. All in all, firms with tertiary educated 
employees (QUAL) should thus be more successful.5 
Strategy variables. Innovation variables measure the ability of a firm to use its resources to 
create capabilities (see Audretsch & Mahmood 1995). According to Buddelmeyer et al. 
(2010) effects on success may differ between innovation input and output. While innovation 
output by itself is a successful innovation, current innovation investments implicate a certain 
risk of failure, what indicates more uncertain returns. To completely capture innovation 
effects, we include in our model measures of innovation output as well as of innovation input. 
Innovation output is measured by the introduction of new (NP) and modified products (MP). 
R&D activities (R&D) indicate innovation input. Hence, we expect that innovation output is 
positively correlated with our success variables. Innovation input may have a negative impact. 
Market conditions. The intensity of competition differs among stages of an industry’s life 
cycle. The expectation of industry life cycle models is that in an early stage firms compete on 
product differentiation. As industries mature, products of different firms get more similar and 
                                                 
4
 To capture at the same time the effect of professional experience and age related decisions, we alternatively 
split the age variable into different dummy variables (see footnote 12). 
5
 As most firms in our sample are small, QUAL captures to a large extent also the impact of the education level 
of the firm founders. As measures for the education level of the firm founders and our measure for the 
qualification level of all employees are strongly correlated, it was not possible to control for both effects 
separately. 
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competition shifts from product innovation to process innovation (e.g., Adner & Levinthal 
2001, Cusumano et al. 2006, Utterback & Abernathy 1975). It should be easier for start-ups to 
establish and maintain a competitive advantage in young markets. We expect a positive 
impact of the intensity of non-price competition (NPCOMP) on firm success and a negative 
effect of the intensity of price competition (PCOMP). 
Firm variables. It depends on the legal form of a company to what extent founders are 
liable in case of failure. Founders of firms with limited liability (AG, GmbH) should be 
primary interested in projects with a high anticipated return, while the risk of failure is of 
lower importance (see Stiglitz & Weiss 1981). For example, full liability (sole proprietorship) 
may positively impact voluntary exits (see Harhoff et al. 1998). We thus expect that full 
liability is negatively correlated with firm survival. The impact of the legal form on profit is 
not a priori clear. 
The “liability of smallness” hypothesis assumes that business size affects firm success 
because larger firms have more resources to manage bad times (e.g., Aldrich & Auster 1986, 
Brüderl 2007). In accordance with this hypothesis, a firm’s financial strength serves as a 
buffer against external shocks. Further, a certain internal financial buffer reduces dependence 
on external capital. Hence, we expect a positive impact of firm size (LSIZE) and volume of 
seed capital (LCAP) on firm success. 
3.4.2 Econometric procedure 
To take into account the binary character of the two dependent variables measuring firm 
survival (SURVIVAL) and whether a firm achieves profit break-even (BREAK) we estimate 
probit models. Each cross-section reflects a further stage in the development of the start-ups. 
Differences of the results over these three points in time should thus represent different effects 
on firm success at different development stages. This allows us to analyze whether the impact 
of financial constraints on the success of start-ups changes with increasing age of the firms. 
Due to multicollinearity we have to conduct separate estimates for the different variables 
measuring financial constraints (see correlations in Table B.6). The base model is not affected 
by multicollinearity. 
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Correcting for selective attrition 
Between two subsequent surveys some firms disappeared from the market and some other did 
not want to participate to our survey anymore. The question is whether the remaining samples 
are still representative. If determinants of selection are correlated with our success measures, 
attrition is selective, and traditional econometrical techniques will lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates. 
When a firm refused to answer a questionnaire, we only know if this firm still existed, but 
we have no observations for the other variables in our models. Thus, the equation that 
describes whether a firm is still in the sample or not (selection equation) and the equation that 
describes the success of the start-ups (strategy equation) cannot be identically specified and 
we cannot use a Heckman procedure to detect a potential selection bias (see Wooldridge 
2002a, Briggs 2004). 
In the survival models we only have attrition through non-response. Because we know for 
firms which answered the previous questionnaire, as well as for firms which did not answer 
the questionnaire, if they survived the following period, we can analyze whether the survival 
probability is significantly different for respondents than for non-respondents. Using chi-
square tests, we find no evidence for a selection bias.6 
In the profit break-even models data may suffer from selective attrition through both non-
response and non-survival. Following Wooldridge (2002a, p.581) a test for selective attrition 
is to insert a selection indicator as an additional explanatory variable in our base model, run 
the regression and test the significance of the coefficient of the selection indicator. As a 
selection indicator we use the dummy variable INSAMPLE that takes the value one if a firm 
is still in our sample in the following cross-section and zero if not. Because we have no such 
indicator for cross-section 2006, we can only apply this test for cross-sections 2000 and 2003. 
The test results indicate that selective attrition may be a problem in the profit break-even 
models. The coefficient of the selection variable for both cross-sections is significant (see 
Table B.1 in the appendix).  
                                                 
6
 Further, we also analyzed the impact of attrition on survival using multiple regression models. Since we have 
only some basic data for firms which did not answer our questionnaire, the model quality was not good enough 
to interpret the relevant coefficients. 
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To correct the profit models for attrition bias, we apply the inverse probability weighting 
approach (see Wooldridge 2002a, 2007). Following this approach, we estimate in a first step 
the probability that a firm has not disappeared so far (retention probability). In a second step 
we weight each firm with the inverse of this estimated probability. The idea is that firms 
which have a higher attrition probability are underrepresented in the sample and therefore get 
more weight in the models. Wooldridge shows that the weighted estimator is consistent if the 
assumption called “selection on observables” holds. Under this assumption a vector of 
variables observed for firms that are in the sample in the first period t=1, zi1, predicts selection 
at time t, so that all variables in the consecutive models at time t, (yit,xit), are independent of 
selection (Wooldridge 2002a, p.587). To allow the explanation of selection by past outcomes 
of (yit,xit), zit, we must further assume that selection at time t is independent of future values 
of zit and (yit,xit). When sit is a selection indicator, where sit=1 if (yit,xit) are observed in period 
t, the probability of selection then is defined as 
1 , 1 , 1( 1 ,..., , 1) ( 1 , 1)it i iT i t it it i tP s v v s P s z s− −= = = = =
 
(1) 
where 
( , , ).it it it itv y x z≡  (2) 
In our data we have a two-stage selection between two cross-sections. In a first stage, firms 
which did not survive a period exit our sample. In a second stage, firms which did not answer 
our questionnaire at the end of the period drop out. The retention probability equals the 
probability to get an answer (ANSWERit=1), conditional on the probability that the firm still 
exists in that period (SURVIVALit=1). To calculate the probabilities of the different outcomes 
we estimate a multinomial probit model (see Kapteyn et al. 2006 for a similar approach).7 The 
retention probability then can be calculated as 
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 The multinomial probit procedure seems to be superior to a multinomial logit because it does not assume 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Greene 2003, p. 727). 
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We assume that the response behavior depends on the same determinants as firm survival. 
In a first step we used the whole success model to estimate the multinomial probit model. To 
increase the quality of our estimates, we excluded in a second step insignificant variables. 
Estimation results are presented in Table B.3. 
Following Wooldridge (2002a, p.589), in cases where attrition is an absorbing state8, the 
probabilities used in the inverse probability weighting procedure can be calculated as 
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1ˆ ( 1 , 1).it it it itP ANSWER z ANSWERpi −≡ = =  (5) 
In other words, we estimate multinomial probit models at each time t, including variables 
observed for all units in the sample at t-1.  
To correct our estimates for attrition bias, we finally weight our objective function by ˆ1/ itP . 
All in all, this procedure only marginally affects the estimation results. The impact of 
financial constraints is in the models with and without correction for attrition bias statistically 
significant. 
Testing for endogeneity 
A further potential problem is endogeneity. Endogeneity would imply inconsistent 
estimations. Since there is a lag between dependent and independent variables, at least the 
problem of reverse causality should be reduced in our models. With respect to our financial 
variables reverse causality may be a problem anyway, as it could be argued that external 
capital owners are able to predict future developments of start-ups. It is, however, not clear 
how important a firm’s quality is to acquire external capital. As a result of asymmetric 
information and the limited availability of external capital, even firms that have good 
prospects of success may have problems to acquire external capital. Hence, we would not 
expect a very high correlation between our measures of financial constraints and firm success. 
The fact that in our data set, the correlations between dependent variables and financial 
                                                 
8
 Absorbing state means that once a firm drops out of the sample, the firm is out forever. 
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constraints are in each cross-section bellow 0.2 strengthens this argument (see Table B.6). 
Endogeneity should thus be of little relevance in our model. This applies all the more as we 
include the constraint variables in an extensive base model that controls for different aspects 
of firm quality. 
To test for endogeneity we apply the Rivers-Vuong-Test (Wooldridge 2002b, p.483), 
which tests the null hypothesis that the financial variables are exogenous. In a first stage, we 
estimate instrument equations for the financial variables separately for each cross-section. All 
instruments in our instrument equations fulfill the required conditions: they are correlated 
with the dependent variable in the instrument equation (constraint equation) but not with the 
dependent variable in the structural equation (success equation) and they are not correlated 
with the residuals of the endogenized success equation (for details of measurement see Table 
3.1). In accordance with Wooldridge (2002b), we further test the over identifying restrictions 
(Wooldridge 2002b, pp.484–5). All instruments pass this test. In a second stage, we include 
the residuals of the first stage in our success equations. To correct the standard errors of the 
estimated parameters we use bootstrapping. Under H0 the residuals of the instrument 
equations and the residuals of the second stage equations are uncorrelated.  
We test for each cross-section the overall variables DEBT_CONST and VC_CONST.9 
Since the tests of endogeneity and tests of over identifying restrictions are conducted only 
after unweighted estimations, we test without correcting our estimates for selective attrition. 
Using our instruments, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogenous variables in any 
case (see Table B.4 and Table B.5). Further estimates with lagged financial variables,10 as 
well as the inclusion of past values of BREAK as additional independent variables,11 confirm 
                                                 
9
 In further estimates not presented here, we tested some of the detailed variables for endogeneity. In all cases, 
these tests confirmed the test results for the overall variable.  
10
 For cross-sections 2003 and 2006 we further conducted a weak test on endogeneity by lagging the financial 
variables by one period. In general, the additional time lag did not change the impact of the variables on firm 
success. Despite the large time lag, only the impact of the two variables measuring credit conditions 
(CRED_COND) and venture capital constraints (VC_CONST) on profit break-even was not significant anymore 
in cross-section 2003.  
11
 External capital constraints measure the need of additional external capital as well as the availability of 
external capital. The achievement of profit break-even in a certain cross-section may directly affect a firm’s 
financial constraints in the following period, what would implicate a problem with reverse causality. Although 
the Rivers-Vuong-Test indicates that our results are not affected by endogeneity, we further tested the robustness 
of our results by including past values of BREAK as additional independent variables in our model. This 
extension, however, did not affect our main results. 
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this result. We thus assume that financial constraints affect the success of the start-ups 
directly and there is no problem with endogeneity.  
3.5 Estimation results 
Estimation results are reported in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, respectively. The tables show 
average marginal effects of the variables and their corresponding standard errors. In both 
models only a few of the control variables have a statistically significant effect on firm 
success. In the survival models, the large time lag between dependent and independent 
variables may partially explain this fact. With respect to financial constraints we find, 
however, in both models the expected negative impact on firm success, what emphasizes the 
importance of financial constraints for start-ups. To test the robustness of these results, we 
alternatively estimated the equations including only variables that had a statistically 
significant effect in the particular success model. While this strongly increased the model 
quality, it only marginally affected the estimation results. 
The significant results for the control variables are in line with our expectations. The 
average age of the firm founders (LAGE) seems to capture the retirement effect – the impact 
of LAGE in each model is negative.12 While innovation output (NP, MP) in both models is 
positively correlated with firm success, we find a negative impact of R&D on the profitability. 
Limited liability (AG, GmbH) has a negative effect on profit, but positively impacts the 
survival of the firms. 
We turn attention now to the main focus of our paper, the impact of financial constraints. 
In a first step, we analyze for the first cross-section, whether the results confirm the 
expectations that financial constraints negatively affect success (hypothesis 1). 
Success vs. financial constraints 
In the survival model, the results for external debt constraints are in line with hypothesis 1. 
External debt constraints significantly affect firm survival in the first years after firm 
foundation. Unfavorable credit conditions (CRED_COND), a too low credit line 
                                                 
12
 Further tests with more than one dummy variable showed that the impact of professional experience on 
success is weak. Only surviving the period 2000-2003 is, up to a certain level, positively affected by an 
increasing age of the founders. 
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(CRED_LINE) as well as the overall variable DEBT_CONST have a significant negative 
impact on the survival of start-ups between the years 2000 and 2003 (see Table 3.2). Only 
insufficient information about external debt financing options (DEBT_INFO) does not have a 
significant effect in this period.  
Based on English data, Saridakis et al. (2008) find that survival is only affected if firms 
had serious financial problems. In further estimates, we thus analyze the threshold for the 
effect of external debt constraints on success by using dummy variables (see Table 3.4). As in 
the paper of Saridakis et al. (2008), we find that the impact on survival is only statistically 
significant if external debt constraints are of high importance (value 4 or 5 on respective five-
level Likert scale). A shift from a firm that has no external debt constraints to a firm that is 
highly constrained is correlated with a decrease of the survival probability of about 5%.13 
Interestingly, the effects of credit cost (CRED_COND) and credit rationing (CRED_LINE) on 
survival are quite similar. 
The results for venture capital constraints do not corroborate hypothesis 1. Venture capital 
constraints (VC_CONST) do not affect firm survival, not even the survival of firms with 
R&D activities.14 This is surprising, since innovative firms tend to have more problems to 
acquire external debt capital and should thus be more dependent on the availability of venture 
capital. An explanation for this insignificant effect could be that, as Switzerland is short of 
venture capital for start-ups (see OECD 2008), most founders do not expect to get venture 
capital funding after firm foundation. The low availability of venture capital may thus 
discourage firms to enter the market, but does not affect firm survival afterwards. 
In the break-even models, the results for external debt constraints as well as the results for 
venture capital constraints confirm hypothesis 1. External debt constrained firms have more 
problems to achieve profit break-even. As in the survival models, we cannot find different 
effects for different dimensions of external debt constraints. All measures of external debt 
constraints have a significant negative impact on profit (see Table 3.3). 
                                                 
13
 As we use ordinal variables to measure financial constraints, it is not possible to directly interpret the marginal 
effect of the estimates of Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. 
14
 This was tested in further estimates not presented here by including an interaction term between VC_CONST 
and R&D. 
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Compared with firm survival, we identify a lower threshold for the effect of external debt 
constraints on the achievement of profit break-even (see Table 3.4). While firm survival is not 
affected by low external debt constraints (value 2 or 3 on respective five-level Likert scale), 
they negatively impact the profits. A shift from a firm that has no external debt constraints to 
a firm with low constraints decreases the probability to achieve profit break-even by about 
8%. The negative impact is significantly larger for higher constrained firms. Serious financial 
constraints (value 4 or 5 on respective Likert scale) decrease the probability to achieve profit 
break-even by about 10%. 
Venture capital constraints are also negatively correlated with the probability to achieve 
profit break-even. However, the threshold is higher than that for external debt constraints. 
Only serious venture capital constraints (value 4 or 5 on respective Likert scale) significantly 
affect the probability to achieve profit break-even. On this level, the impact of financial 
constraints on the probability to achieve profit break-even is quite similar for external debt 
capital and venture capital (marginal effect of about -10%). 
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Table 3.2: Estimates of the survival of start-ups 
(average marginal effects of probit estimates)  
Period SURVIVING 2000-2003 SURVIVING 2003-2006 
Explanatory  
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MAIN 0.063*** 0.063** 0.063*** 0.062** 0.061**  -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003    
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)    (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)    
           UNEMPLOY 0.036 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.034    0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000    
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)    (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)    
           LAGE 0.028 0.028 0.033 0.032 0.039    -0.111** -0.111** -0.112** -0.114** -0.113**  
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)    (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)    
           GENDER 
-0.030 -0.031 -0.030 -0.032 -0.032   0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002    
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)    (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)    
           QUAL 
-0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002   0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016    
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)    (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)    
           R&D 
-0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013   -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 -0.009    
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)    (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)    
           NP 
-0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018   -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007    
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)    (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)    
           MP 0.040* 0.040* 0.039* 0.039* 0.038*   0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006    
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)    (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)    
           PCOMP 
-0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017   -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017    
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)    (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)    
           NPCOMP 
-0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013   -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010    
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)    (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)    
           LCAP 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010**  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001    
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
           AG 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.018    0.036 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.036    
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)    (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)    
           GmbH 
-0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003   0.062** 0.062** 0.062** 0.064** 0.062**  
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)    (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)    
           OTHER 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015    0.047 0.048 0.047 0.049 0.049    
  (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)    (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050)    
           LSIZE 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.016    0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)    (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)    
           IND_1 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.041    -0.069 -0.069 -0.069 -0.075 -0.070    
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)    (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)    
           IND_2 
-0.010 -0.012 -0.010 -0.007 -0.006   -0.030 -0.028 -0.029 -0.035 -0.029    
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)    (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)    
           IND_3 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.031 0.031    -0.071* -0.071* -0.072* -0.074* -0.072*   
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)    (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)    
           DEBT_CONST 
-0.007**                    -0.004                   
  (0.004)                    (0.004)                   
           CRED_COND 
  -0.014**                     -0.003                  
    (0.006)                     (0.007)                  
           CRED_LINE 
   -0.011*                     -0.003                 
     (0.006)                     (0.007)                 
           DEBT_INFO 
    -0.011                     -0.013                
      (0.007)                     (0.008)              
           VC_CONST 
     -0.006        -0.003    
       (0.008)         (0.008)    
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589    911 911 911 911 911    
McFadden’s R2 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.020    0.075 0.073 0.073 0.078 0.073    
Wald chi2 32.98** 33.21** 32.17** 31.48** 29.83*   41.24*** 40.07*** 40.15*** 41.22*** 39.39*** 
 
Notes: See Table 3.1 for the variable definitions; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Huber-White 
sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% test level, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Estimates of the profit break-even of start-ups 
(average marginal effects of weighted probit estimates) 
Period BREAK 2000 BREAK 2003 BREAK 2006 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MAIN 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 0.108*** 0.104*** 0.079** 0.083** 0.080** 0.077** 0.076**  -0.036 -0.033 -0.040 -0.039 -0.047    
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)    (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)    (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)    
                UNEMPLOY -0.035 -0.041 -0.036 -0.038 -0.037    -0.028 -0.030 -0.029 -0.031 -0.028    -0.007 -0.008 -0.011 -0.015 -0.028    
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) 
                LAGE -0.004 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.021    0.025 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.025    -0.150* -0.142* -0.145* -0.144* -0.130*   
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)    (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066)    (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075)    
                GENDER 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.011 0.009    0.047 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.048    0.035 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.029    
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)    (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)    (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)    
                QUAL 0.028 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.038    0.037 0.040 0.036 0.039 0.044    0.008 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.012    
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)    (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)    (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)    
                R&D -0.023 -0.028 -0.024 -0.025 -0.020    -0.083** -0.085** -0.089** -0.081** -0.085**  -0.083* -0.090** -0.085* -0.085* -0.094**  
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)    (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)    (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044)    
                NP -0.034 -0.034 -0.035 -0.038 -0.039    0.136*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 0.134*** 0.136*** 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.002    
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)    (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)    (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049)    
                MP 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.028 0.026    0.044 0.042 0.045 0.043 0.043    -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007    
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)    (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)    (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)    
                PCOMP -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.012 -0.008    -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.013    -0.013 -0.003 -0.013 -0.019 -0.009    
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)    (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)    (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)    
                NPCOMP 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.016    0.062** 0.063** 0.063** 0.060** 0.063**  0.123*** 0.120*** 0.128*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)    (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)    (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)    
                LCAP -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004    0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002    0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003    
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)    
                AG 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.028 0.028    -0.117*** -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.119*** -0.111**  -0.072 -0.065 -0.075 -0.070 -0.065    
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)    (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)    (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052)    
                GmbH -0.056** -0.054* -0.057** -0.061** -0.060**  -0.080** -0.081** -0.082** -0.079** -0.079**  -0.028 -0.031 -0.034 -0.028 -0.039    
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)    (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)    (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)    
                OTHER -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005    -0.039 -0.034 -0.041 -0.034 -0.028    0.034 0.029 0.024 0.035 0.028    
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)    (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)    (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.080)    
                LSIZE 0.047 0.043 0.047 0.046 0.044    -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006    0.021 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.021    
  (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)    (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)    (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)    
                IND_1 -0.128** -0.133** -0.128** -0.129** -0.124**  -0.053 -0.047 -0.048 -0.068 -0.052    0.053 0.060 0.066 0.046 0.059    
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)    (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)    (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075)    
                IND_2 0.055 0.052 0.055 0.063 0.069    -0.025 -0.020 -0.021 -0.033 -0.023    0.007 0.009 0.018 0.010 0.023    
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)    (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054)    (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)    
                IND_3 -0.105** -0.109** -0.108** -0.104** -0.100**  -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.013 -0.006    -0.025 -0.020 -0.020 -0.032 -0.026    
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)    (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)    (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)    
                DEBT_CONST -0.020***                   -0.015***                   -0.020***                   
  (0.004)                   (0.005)                   (0.006)                   
                CRED_COND  -0.031***                    -0.022**                    -0.037***                  
   (0.007)                    (0.010)                    (0.010)                  
                CRED_LINE   -0.033***                    -0.026**                    -0.038***                 
    (0.007)                    (0.010)                    (0.011)                 
                DEBT_INFO    -0.028***                    -0.029**                    -0.040***                
     (0.009)                    (0.012)                    (0.014)                
                VC_CONST     -0.030***      -0.028**       -0.029**  
      (0.010)         (0.012)         (0.015)    
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589    911 911 911 911 911    615 615 615 615 615    
McFadden’s R2 0.072 0.069 0.071 0.066 0.065    0.050 0.047 0.049 0.049 0.047    0.081 0.079 0.078 0.070 0.063    
Wald chi2 122.13*** 118.96*** 121.09*** 112.79*** 113.31*** 47.35*** 44.65*** 46.12*** 43.70*** 44.14*** 36.71*** 36.83*** 36.05** 31.73** 29.63*   
 
Notes: See Table 3.1 for the variable definitions; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Huber-White sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, * denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% test level, respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Analyzing the threshold for the effect of financial constraints  
(average marginal effects) 
 Probit estimates Weighted probit estimates 
Period SURVIVING 2000-2003 SURVIVING 2003-2006 BREAK 2000 BREAK 2003 BREAK 2006 
Explanatory  
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(…)                                   
LOW_CRED_COND -0.024                   0.013                  -0.091***                  -0.085***                  -0.081*                  
  
(0.027)                   (0.023)                  (0.031)                  (0.033)                  (0.043)                  
HIGH_CRED_COND -0.058**                   -0.015                  -0.104***                  -0.086**                  -0.128***                  
  
(0.023)                   (0.025)                  (0.027)                  (0.037)                  (0.039)                  
LOW_CRED_LINE   -0.033                   0.014                  -0.082***                   -0.074**                   -0.084*                 
  
  (0.026)                   (0.023)                  (0.031)                   (0.032)                (0.045)                 
HIGH_CRED_LINE   -0.045*                   -0.001                  -0.111***                   -0.095**                   -0.123***                 
  
  (0.024)                   (0.027)                  (0.028)                   (0.038)                   (0.040)                 
LOW_DEBT_INFO    0.033                   0.004                  -0.068**                   -0.023                   -0.081**                
  
   (0.028)                   (0.022)                  (0.031)                   (0.033)                   (0.040)                
HIGH_DEBT_INFO    -0.062**                   -0.062**                  -0.095***                   -0.131***                   -0.112**                
  
   (0.027)                   (0.029)                  (0.033)                   (0.045)                   (0.053)                
LOW_VC_CONST     0.035       -0.013       -0.043        -0.044        -0.070   
  
    (0.029)       (0.025)       (0.034)        (0.038)        (0.048)   
HIGH_VC_CONST     -0.036       -0.008       -0.109***     -0.096**      -0.095   
  
      (0.031)          (0.032)       (0.037)        (0.047)        (0.058)   
N 1589 1589 1589 1589    911 911 911 911    1589 1589 1589 1589    911 911 911 911    615 615 615 615    
McFadden’s R2 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.022    0.075 0.074 0.082 0.074    0.070 0.070 0.066 0.065    0.051 0.051 0.051 0.047    0.078 0.075 0.068 0.064   
Wald chi2 34.70** 33.52** 36.31** 32.20**  41.40*** 39.85*** 45.23*** 40.18*** 117.84*** 118.48*** 112.89*** 112.03*** 49.94*** 49.78*** 45.33*** 43.97*** 35.83** 35.89** 31.61** 29.48*  
 
Notes: In these estimations, we include for each ordinal measure of financial constraints two binary variables (low constraints: levels 2 and 3 of the original five-level variable; high constraints: levels 4 
and 5 of the original variable; reference: no constraints (level 1 of original variable)); as DEBT_CONST is calculated as the sum of standardized values, it is not possible to directly interpret the 
coefficients of this variable; we include the whole base model as control variables (see Table 3.2 or Table 3.3); heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Huber-White sandwich estimator) are in brackets 
under the coefficients; ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% test level, respectively.
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Persistence of the impact of financial constraints 
In a second step, we analyze whether the impact of financial constraints decreases with 
increasing age of the firms (hypothesis 2). The results of the survival model confirm 
hypothesis 2. The negative effect of external debt constraints on firm survival disappears with 
increasing age of the firms. External debt constraints do not affect surviving the years 2003–
2006. Further, the impact of venture capital constraints on firm survival remains statistically 
insignificant.  
One reason that the impact of financial constraints gets insignificant in the second period 
may be that firms with high financial constraints already dropped out in the previous period. 
In further estimates we thus analyzed the impact of persistent financial constraints by 
including only firms that were highly constrained (value 4 or 5 on respective Likert scale) in 
the period 1996/97–2000. We found that in the second period (2000–2003), financial 
constraints do not even impact survival of firms which were strongly constrained in the 
previous period (1996/97–2000). 
Rather unexpected, we find no supportive evidence for hypothesis 2 in the break-even 
models. In all three cross-sections, the negative impact of external debt constraints and 
venture capital constraints on profit remains significant. Furthermore, also marginal effects 
remain quite similar in magnitude. As most firms stayed small over time, a possible 
explanation for this persistent effect is that it remained difficult for the firms to gain access to 
external capital.15 Information collection of small firms relative to the loan size is more costly. 
External capital owners will thus hesitate to lend money to small firms. Since even the biggest 
firms in our sample remained quite small, it is hardly possible to test this explanation. It is 
thus no surprise that we found no significantly different effects for smaller firms when 
DEBT_CONST was interacted with firm size. A second explanation for the persistent effect 
may be that some years after firm foundation internal financial flows of the firms are still 
limited. While in 2000 27 percent of the firms reported that they had not enough internal 
                                                 
15
 In 2006, the firms in our sample had on average a size of 4.8 employees and only 2% of the firms had more 
than 20 employees. 
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capital, the share decreased to 19 percent in 2006. Accordingly, dependence on external 
capital remained large. 
Our analysis of hypothesis 2 is based on the assumption that each cross-section reflects a 
further stage in the development of the start-ups. However, as the surrounding environment 
also changes over time (time effect), it is not a priori clear whether different effects between 
different cross-sections are driven by increasing age of the firms (age effect). The most 
important factors to describe time effects are probably business fluctuations. The availability 
of external capital should be positively correlated with the business cycle. In Switzerland, 
1996–2000 and 2003–2006 were periods of economic growth, while 2000–2003 were years of 
relative stagnation. If in our model time effects would dominate age effects, the impact of 
financial constraints should remain significant in the second period, but should disappear in 
the third period. The estimation results, however, show that the impact of financial constraints 
on firm survival disappears in the period 2000–2003. Further, despite economic growth in the 
period 2003–2006, the impact of financial constraints on profit remains significant. We thus 
conclude that the different effects between cross-sections are driven by increasing age of the 
firms and not by changes in the surrounding environment. 
Differences between the two dependent variables 
A comparison of the results across the two dependent variables confirms that firm survival is 
a more fundamental measure of success than the achievement of profit break-even. Firstly, we 
find a lower threshold for the effect of financial constraints on profit than on survival, and the 
marginal effects are also larger in magnitude in the profit models. Secondly, while the impact 
of financial constraints on survival disappears with increasing firm age, the effect on profit 
remains statistically significant. Surprisingly, we find no evidence for hypothesis 2 in the 
profit break-even model. The impact of financial constraints on profit neither disappears nor 
decreases with increasing age of the firms. 
3.6 Conclusions 
Given the economic importance of start-ups and the intense interest by policymakers to 
encourage entrepreneurship, it is important to understand the link between financial 
constraints and success of these firms. In this study we do not only analyze whether the 
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success of start-ups is affected by financial constraints, but also whether the success of start-
ups is still affected when these firms grow older. 
The estimation results show that firm survival and the achievement of profit break-even are 
negatively correlated with financial constraints. Only the impact of venture capital constraints 
on firm survival is not statistically significant. With increasing firm age, the impact of 
financial constraints on the survival probability disappears. The negative effect on the 
probability to achieve profit break-even, however, remains statistically significant. Ten years 
after firm foundation, financially constrained firms still have more problems to achieve profit 
break-even. Furthermore, we cannot even observe a decreasing impact of financial constraints 
on profit when the firms grow older. We thus conclude that, at least in the medium term, 
success of start-ups is persistently affected by financial constraints. Accordingly, public 
support for the start-ups in the initial stage cannot solve the problem of financial constraints. 
Instead, financial market imperfections should be further reduced to permanently improve 
access to external capital.
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4 What Determines the Innovation Capability of Firm Founders?* 
4.1 Introduction 
Most start-ups have more in common with self-employment than with the creation of high-
growth companies (Shane 2009, p. 142). Along with Shane (2009), several recent papers thus 
conclude that simply encouraging more people to become entrepreneurs is not necessarily the 
best policy for enhancing economic growth (see, e.g., Bosma et al. 2011, Canter & Kösters 
2009, Fritsch & Schroeter 2009). Hence, especially for policy makers it is important to be 
able to identify firms with a high probability of growth perspectives. Starting point of our 
analysis is the idea that an important characteristic of such high-growth firms is their 
innovation performance. Innovative start-ups are considered to be important drivers of 
innovation in existing industries (Aghion et al. 2006, Schumpeter 1934) and should also 
positively affect the creation of new industries (Acs & Audretsch 1990). Despite this expected 
positive impact on economic growth, relatively little is known about the factors that determine 
the innovation performance of start-ups. 
The innovative activity of start-ups might strongly depend on the characteristics of the firm 
founders, e.g., educational background and experience. The founders determine a firm’s 
strategies and coordinate the resources to implement them (Barringer et al. 2004, Bergmann 
Lichtenstein & Brush 2001). Further, as start-ups are mostly small firms, the capabilities of 
the founders themselves serve as important resources to create a competitive advantage 
(Hadjimanolis 2000). Founders do not only decide whether to innovate or not, but are directly 
involved in the innovation process of the start-ups. Knowing the innovation capability of firm 
founders would make it much easier to identify the innovative start-ups, especially as most of 
these characteristics are easy to observe and remain constant over time.  
While there is empirical evidence for such a link between management characteristics and 
innovation activities for established firms (see, e.g., Barker & Mueller 2002, Chen et al. 2008, 
Hadjimanolis 2000, Romijn & Albaladejo 2002), to our knowledge only two studies deal with 
the relationship between founder characteristics and innovation using data of newly-founded 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is based on Arvanitis & Stucki (2010). 
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firms. The first one is the study of Lynskey (2004) that analyze the impact of the CEO 
characteristics based on Japanese firm-level data that were collected in 1999 and refer to 
technology-based firms that were founded 10 years or less before the survey, i.e. at the 
earliest in 1989. In a second study Koch & Strotmann (2008) analyze the impact of founder 
characteristics on the innovation performance of German start-ups in the knowledge-intensive 
business sector. In both studies, managerial characteristics and founder characteristics, 
respectively, showed rather low explanatory power. 
Our study contributes several new elements to existing empirical literature. First, our 
empirical basis is a sample of start-ups that is representative of all firms founded in 1996/97 
in Switzerland as recorded by a census of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office for this period. 
Further, while previous studies are based on data for one cross-section, we dispose of data for 
three cross-sections, so that we can follow the development of the start-ups over a period of 
almost ten years. This allows us to analyze at the same time the existence and the persistence 
of innovation activities. Furthermore, we can also investigate the effects of changes of the 
composition of the founding teams on innovation. Another important feature of our study is 
the wide spectrum of variables, especially with respect to founder characteristics, that could 
be taken into account in the model specification. In previous studies, the available founder 
information is limited and not really representative for the whole founding team.  
As already mentioned in this paper we investigate the influence of founder characteristics 
on the innovative activity of start-ups based on Swiss data for the start-up cohort 1996/97. We 
find that the founders’ education level, the level of their experience in R&D and the 
availability of innovation-relevant ideas coming from the founder persons are the main 
characteristics that enhance innovation activities of start-ups. We also find mutually 
reinforcing effects of these most important founder characteristics. At the maximum, 
combinations of these three factors within a founding team can increase the probability of 
innovative activities by about 40%. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the conceptual 
background of the empirical analysis and derives our main hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes 
the database. Section 4.4 discusses the methodology of our analysis. Section 4.5 presents the 
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estimation results. Section 4.6 contains a comparison with results of similar studies. Section 
4.7 concludes our paper. 
4.2 Conceptual background and hypotheses 
Our conceptual framework builds upon the resource-based approach of the firm, according to 
which a direct link is assumed between a firm’s competitive advantage and the individual 
resources of the employees, especially with respect to managing persons (see Barney 1991). 
Thus, the performance of start-ups should be strongly related to their innovation capability as 
reflected by the individual resources and capabilities of the founding persons (see, e.g., 
Capaldo et al. 2003, Hadjimanolis 2000 and Romijn & Albaladejo 2002 for a similar 
approach). As most start-ups are small firms, firm founders are directly involved in the 
operational process of the firms. Founders also make strategic decisions such as the choice to 
innovate or not. Knowledge and skills of entrepreneurs are thus important resources of the 
start-ups and should also impact innovative activity. In this paper we analyze the relationship 
between innovative activity of start-ups and founder characteristics, embedded in an extensive 
model of determinants of innovation. 
In view of the complexity of the innovation process characterized by several stages from 
basic research to the penetration of the market with new products, an approach relying on a 
single measure of innovation may leave out important relationships and produce results that 
are not robust (see, e.g., Kleinknecht et al. 2002, Rogers 1998). In this study we use two 
innovation measures covering the input as well as the output side of the innovation process. In 
our model, innovation output is measured by the introduction of new or modified products 
(IP). The existence of R&D activities (R&D) indicates innovation input. Following the 
theoretical literature and in accordance with empirical studies, our model includes three 
categories of independent variables: founder characteristics, firm characteristics and 
characteristics of a firm’s environment.  
4.2.1 Founder characteristics 
As we primarily focus on the impact of the founder characteristics on the innovative activity, 
we include an extensive set of variables which may impact the innovation capability of the 
firm founders. Firms in our sample may be founded by a group of founders or by a single 
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founder. Variables describing the characteristic of the firm founders thus refer to the 
characteristics of the whole founding team, independent of whether the firm was founded by a 
team with more than one founder or by a single founder.  
Theoretical literature on entrepreneurship either deals with single entrepreneurs (see 
Lazear 2005) or with team foundations (see Fabel 2004). Empirically, however, there may be 
significant differences between solo and team start-ups. Team foundations combine people 
with diverse personalities, characteristics, knowledge, skills and abilities. Such combinations 
should positively stimulate the performance of the firms (see Lechler 2001, Thakur 1999). 
Furthermore, the number of external network relationships and the availability of resources 
should be positively correlated with team foundations (see Brüderl et al. 2007), also 
indicating a positive impact on innovative activities. On the other hand, heterogeneity 
increases the risk of problems and conflicts within the founding team (see Brüderl et al. 2007, 
Stam & Schutjens 2006). In line with the findings of most previous empirical studies on the 
economic performance of start-ups, we expect, however, that the positive effects of team 
foundations outweigh the negative ones.  
H1:  Innovation propensity should be higher in firms with team foundations than in firms 
with single founders. 
The human capital of the founding team, especially the education level of the founders, 
should be an important factor for innovation. Through formal education, people acquire skills 
which help to recognize business opportunities in the surrounding environment (Shane 2000). 
Further, a higher level of education may increase the ability to absorb new ideas, thus the 
ability to identify innovative opportunities (Barker & Mueller 2002, p.787). This is the 
rationale of the competence-based view according to which founders with great human capital 
would outperform founders with less human capital (see Colombo & Grilli 2005 for the 
development of this argument). Furthermore, it is more likely that founders with a high 
education would dispose of more wealth than persons without a high education. Thus, they 
would also have access to more capital to finance firm’s operations. In this case economic 
access may be traced back primarily to better internal and external financing opportunities 
(wealth-based view; see, e.g., Åstebro & Bernhardt 2005) and the wealth effect would explain 
the positive effect of human capital (see Colombo & Grilli 2005). In this study we correlate 
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human capital directly with innovation, so we have the possibility to test the competence-
based view.  
H2:  We thus expect that firms with a founding team with a high level of education would 
show a higher propensity to innovation than firms with a founding team with a lower 
level of education.  
Not only the level of education, but also the type of education of the founders may impact 
innovation. Commercial education primarily enhances accounting and marketing capabilities. 
In contrast, people with a technical education background may have a more complete 
understanding of technology and innovation (Barker & Mueller 2002, p.787; Hambrick & 
Mason 1984, p.201).  
H3:  These arguments suggest that firms with founding teams with pronounced technical 
know-how would tend to have more innovative activities than firms with founding 
teams with primarily commercial education. 
Besides formal education, prior industry experience also affects considerably the ability to 
detect (innovative) opportunities (Colombo & Grill 2005, Shane 2000). As new firms have no 
track record, such experience is of special importance. In order to be able to identify 
opportunities for new products and services, it is important for a firm founder to be familiar 
with customer needs and market developments.  
H4:  We thus expect that founding teams with prior industry experience would tend to 
initiate more innovative activities than founding teams without or little prior industry 
experience. 
Previous self-employment experience indicates the accumulation of business skills. 
Experience gained in previous self-employment episodes is a preparation for the 
entrepreneurial role (Brüderl et al. 1992, p. 229; see also Colombo & Grilli 2005). Starting a 
new business requires specific management know-how, for example with respect to finances 
or organization of production or marketing. Prior experience as self-employed reduces costs 
to manage “basic” tasks, thus allowing firm founders to concentrate on other tasks such as 
innovation activities.  
H5: We expect that founding teams with self-employment experience have more 
innovative activities than founding teams without self-employment experience. 
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Innovative activities imply a certain level of innovation-specific know-how. This type of 
knowledge is needed to assess the potential of competing research streams, to develop R&D 
strategies or to organize and coordinate research projects (see Barker & Mueller 2002, 
Lynskey 2004). 
H6:  Founding teams with R&D experience have more innovative activities than founding 
teams without such experience. 
Besides specific innovation know-how in technical terms, innovative activities often build 
upon concrete ideas about possible innovative projects based on experience made in earlier 
occupations of the founders either in research or in business. The realization of such 
innovation-relevant ideas is often an important motivation for starting a new business. The 
decision whether a firm has innovative activities should thus also depend on the availability of 
such innovation-relevant ideas. 
H7:  In firms which were founded to implement concrete ideas from a founder’s former 
occupation, innovation-relevant ideas seem to be available. Therefore, we would 
expect that these firms have more innovation activities. 
The hypotheses H6 and H7 refer to core capabilities for innovation and build in a certain 
sense the nucleus of our investigation. The idea is that even if formal education and previous 
industry and management experience are often necessary pre-conditions they may not be 
sufficient for innovation. “The idiosyncratic, non-contractible nature of entrepreneurial 
judgment when an individual identifies a new and hitherto unrecognized business 
opportunity” as Colombo & Grilli (2005, p. 80) put it, is presumably a crucial characteristic of 
innovative founders (see also Foss 1993). 
Investment in innovation is a long-term investment and pay-offs are uncertain at the time 
of investment. Innovative activities would thus be related to the risk behavior of the founding 
team. An important proxy for this behavior is the age of firm founders. As older firm founders 
have a shorter investment horizon and are more inclined to secure primarily their retirement 
income, they would tend to be more risk-averse than younger founders (see Hambrick & 
Mason 1984, p. 198). Risk-taking is also influenced by gender. Women typically are more 
likely to be risk-averse (see, e.g., Eckel & Grossman 2002, Jianakopolos & Bernasek 1998). 
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So we include in our model specification also controls for the average age as well as for the 
gender of the majority of the founding team. 
4.2.2 Firm characteristics 
As most start-ups are small firms, it is difficult to separate the effect of the founding team and 
the effect of the other employees of the start-ups. Thus, we refrain from including in addition 
to the variables describing the founder characteristics also variables measuring the human 
resources of the other employees. We control for such resources by inserting a variable for 
firm size. Larger firms are expected to have more resources for innovation projects than 
smaller ones. Firm size should thus positively impact innovation activities. 
Competing on the international market requires competitive advantages. The export 
orientation of a firm would thus be positively correlated with its innovative activity (see 
Roper & Love 2002). Since diversified firms have more opportunities to use new knowledge, 
product diversification would enhance innovative activities of these firms (see Katila 2002, 
p.1002).1 
4.2.3 Market conditions 
We expect that positive demand expectations would positively stimulate present innovation 
activities (see Horbach 2007). 
Internal resources of start-ups are limited. External networks can provide additional 
knowledge and expertise (Malerba & Torrisi 1992, Shan et al. 1994). Cooperation with other 
firms or institutes, especially cooperation in R&D, would increase the amount of available 
knowledge and thus positively impact innovative activities. Furthermore, as start-ups are 
often financially constrained, innovation activities may be stimulated by public financial 
support. In our sample, however, less than 5 percent of the firms received public subsidies and 
for only 1 percent of the firms this financial support was of high importance. So we refrain 
from inserting a variable for public support in our model. 
Markets with intensive competition require greater flexibility and would in general force 
firms to become more innovative (Katila & Shane 2005). However, as experience and 
                                                 
1
 Diversification would make it more difficult for the management to monitor the firm’s R&D activities. In large 
firms, this may lead to decreasing commitment to innovation activities, but this is of limited relevance for the 
small start-ups in our sample. 
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resources of start-ups in general are limited, intensive price competition may discourage 
innovation, intensive non-price competition encourage it. Finally, to capture industry specific 
effects, we further include dummies controlling for sector affiliation. To capture different 
effects for modern services and traditional services, respectively, we include a separate 
dummy for each of the two sub-sectors.2 
4.3 Description of the data 
The sample we use in this study is based on the cohort of Swiss enterprises that were founded 
between 1996 and 1997 and recorded by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. This cohort 
contained 7112 “green-field” start-ups (i.e. mergers and manager-takeovers were not 
included) that were founded in this period and were active (i.e. conducted business activities 
at least twenty hours a week).3 For this sample only the firm size, the industry affiliation and 
the region of the firms’ location were known. 3288 of these start-ups were still in business in 
2000 (survival rate 2000: 46.2%).4 Among these firms data were collected by means of a 
postal survey. 1625 of them firms answered the questionnaire (response rate 2000: 49.2%). 
1339 of these firms survived the next three years (survival rate 2003: 82.4%). In 2003 a 
follow-up survey was conducted among these firms. Answers were received from 945 of the 
firms (response rate 2003: 70.6%). In 2006, three years after the second survey and nine to ten 
years after the firm’s foundation, 857 of the participants of the 2003 survey still existed 
(survival rate 2006: 90.7%). 630 of them were willing to fill out a third questionnaire 
(response rate 2006: 73.6%). For some firms we thus have data at different points in time. For 
firms which dropped out of the sample we know whether the firm still existed at the time of 
drop out and also whether the firm survived the following period up to 2006. In sum, the data 
set covers 3200 observations. Because of missing values for single variables only 2393 
observations could be used for econometric estimations. 
Most of the start-ups in the data set are firms in the service sector. In each point of time 
they represent about 83% of the observations. About 9% belong to the construction sector, the 
                                                 
2
 As less than 10% of the firms in our sample belong to the manufacturing sector, it was not possible to make 
such a distinction for the manufacturing sector. 
3
 The firms were recorded by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office independently whether they were enrolled in 
the Swiss Commercial Register or not. 
4
 The current status of the firms was checked to a large part by phone. 
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remaining 8% to the manufacturing sector. These shares remained almost constant during the 
period 2000–2006. In the service sector the sub-sector of modern (knowledge-intensive) 
services (e.g., banking and insurance, business services) has a larger share than the sub-sector 
of traditional services (e.g., trade, hotels and catering); the share of modern services increased 
considerably between 2000 and 2006 (about 47% in 2006). In the manufacturing sector there 
are more low-tech (about 5%) than high-tech start-ups (about 3%). 
The observed start-ups are for the most part small firms. In each survey more than 80% of 
the enterprises employed less than five employees (measured in full-time equivalents). The 
average firm size only slightly increased from one period to the next. While in 2000 the firms 
had on average a size of 2.8 employees, the average size increased to 3.6 employees in 2003 
and 5.3 employees in 2006. In 2006, ten years since their foundation, only 8.4% of the firms 
employed more than ten employees.  
The questionnaire covered questions about basic firm characteristics, firm performance and 
activity level, resource endowment, innovative activities and the market environment.5 In 
2000, the questionnaire included detailed questions about the founder characteristics (e.g., 
gender, age, education, experience) at time of firm foundation. As we have this information 
for up to three representative firm founders and less than 4% of the firms in our sample have 
more than three founders, we are able to describe in detail the characteristics of the whole 
founding team. 
4.4 Econometric framework 
To capture different aspects of innovative activity we estimate our model using a proxy for 
innovation input as well as a proxy for innovation output. R&D is a binary variable measuring 
whether a firm had R&D activities. IP is a binary variable measuring whether a firm 
introduced new or modified products. 
To explain innovative activities we include all variables presented in Section 4.2 (for a 
detailed definition of the variables and descriptive statistics by cross-section see Table 4.1 and 
Table C.1, respectively). Models comprise for both innovation variables the same independent 
                                                 
5
 The questionnaire is available in German, French and Italian at www.kof.ethz.ch/surveys/structural/panel. 
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variables. To take into account the binary character of the dependent variables we estimate 
probit models. 
4.4.1 Sample attrition 
Between two subsequent surveys some firms disappeared from the market and some other did 
not want to participate to our survey anymore. The question is whether the remaining samples 
are still representative. When determinants of selection are correlated with innovative 
activities, attrition is selective, and traditional econometrical techniques will lead to biased 
and inconsistent estimates. Following Wooldridge (2002a, p. 581) we test for selective 
attrition between two cross-sections by inserting a selection indicator as an additional 
explanatory variable in our model, running the regression and testing the statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the selection indicator. As a selection indicator we use the 
dummy variable INSAMPLE that takes the value one if a firm is still in our sample in the 
following cross-section and zero if not. We have no such indicator for cross-section 2006, so 
we can apply this test only for the cross-sections 2000 and 2003. Test results indicate that 
selective attrition is of minor importance; the coefficient of the selection variable is only in 
one of eight models statistically significant (at the 5% test-level) (see Table C.2 in the 
appendix). This result is further supported by cross-section specific descriptive statistics for 
the founder characteristic variables. Descriptive statistics for these time-invariant variables 
show that the composition of the data set does not significantly vary between cross-sections 
(see Table C.1). Thus, pooling the data of the different cross-sections without correcting for 
selective attrition seems to be an adequate procedure.
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Table 4.1: Analyzing combinations of founder characteristics 
Variable Definition/ measurement 
Dependent variables   
R&D R&D activities yes/no (in previous period) 
IP Development and introduction of new/modified existing products yes/no (in 
previous period) 
Independent variables   
LEVEL_UNI, 
LEVEL_O_TERTIARY 
Dummies describing the dominant education level of the firm founders 
(most founders have a university degree (LEVEL_UNI); most founders have another tertiary-
level education (LEVEL_O_TERTIARY); reference group: most founders do not have a 
tertiary-level education) 
TYPE_TECHNICAL,  
TYPE_COMMERCIAL,  
TYPE_MIX 
Dummies describing the type of strength of the founding team 
(team has pronounced technical but not management know-how (TYPE_TECHNICAL); team 
has pronounced management but not technical know-how (TYPE_COMMERCIAL); team has 
pronounced technical as well as management know-how (TYPE_MIX); reference group: team 
has not pronounced technical and management know-how; transformation of two five-level 
ordinal variables (level 1: 'very weak'; level 5: 'very strong') to binary variables (value 1: levels 
4 and 5 of the original five-level variable; value 0: levels 1, 2 and 3 of the original variable)) 
EXP_IND At least one of the founders has industry experience yes/no 
EXP_SELF At least one of the founders has experience with self employment yes/no 
EXP_RAD At least one of the founders has R&D experience yes/no 
INNO_IDEA Firm was founded to implement concrete ideas from the founders former occupation 
yes/no 
(transformation of a five-level ordinal variable (level 1: 'very low importance'; level 5: 'very 
high importance') to a binary variable (value 1: levels 4 and 5 of the original five-level 
variable; value 0: levels 1, 2 and 3 of the original variable)) 
LAGE Average age of the firm founders; natural logarithm 
GENDER Gender of the firm founders: male/female  
(value 1: ‘male’; value 0: ‘female’; the most frequently reported gender is regarded as 
representative for the firm founders; when the number of 'females' equals the number of 'males' 
we set 'female') 
MALE_TEAM, MIXED_TEAM Dummies describing the gender mix of the founding team 
(all team members are male (MALE_TEAM); there are males and females in the founding 
team (MIXED_TEAM); reference group: all team members are female) 
TEAM_FOUNDATION Firm was founded by at least two founders yes/no 
LSIZE Number of employees; natural logarithm 
EXPORT Firm exports goods and/or services yes/no 
DIVERSIFICATION Firm is present in more than one product and/or service sector yes/no 
DEMAND_FUTURE Development of a firm’s specific product demand in the next two years 
(transformation of a five-level ordinal variable (level 1: ‘strong decrease’; 5; ‘strong increase’) 
referring to the (reference year: survey year); to a binary variable (value 1: levels 4 and 5; 
value 0: levels 1, 2 and 3 of the original five-level variable)) 
COOPERATION Firm cooperates with other firms/institutes yes/no 
(dummy variable measures whether or not a firm cooperates in acquisition, production, 
distribution or R&D) 
PCOMP Intensity of price competition 
(transformation of a five-level ordinal variable (level 1: 'very weak'; level 5: 'very strong') to a 
binary variable (value 1: levels 4 and 5 of the original five-level variable; value 0: levels 1, 2 
and 3 of the original variable)) 
NPCOMP Intensity of non-price competition 
(original and transformed variables as for PCOMP) 
MANUFACT, MOD_SERV, 
TRAD_SERV 
Dummies for three sectors 
(manufacturing (MANUFACT); modern services (MOD_SERV); traditional services 
(TRAD_SERV); reference sector: construction) 
Y2003, Y2006 Time dummies for the years 2003 and 2006, respectively 
(reference year: 2000) 
INSAMPLE_03 Firm is still in the sample in cross-section 2003 yes/no 
INSAMPLE_06 Firm is still in the sample in cross-section 2006 yes/no 
INSAMPLE_NEXT_PERIOD Firm is still in the sample in the next cross-section yes/no 
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4.4.2 Heterogeneity 
Likelihood-ratio tests show that the pooled probit model is not the appropriate estimation 
method (see the lower part of Table 4.2). Fixed-effects approaches cannot be applied to our 
data. Our main variables describing the founder characteristics have no variation over time 
within a firm. Hence, these variables would be wiped out when taking first differences and we 
would not be able to identify the effects of the founder characteristics (see Raymond et al. 
2010 for a detailed discussion on this issue). To deal with unobserved firm heterogeneity 
through individual effects, we estimate random-effects models where the likelihood functions 
are calculated by Gauss-Hermite quadratures. 
4.4.3 Endogeneity 
A further potential problem is the possible endogeneity of some of the right-hand variables 
that would imply inconsistent estimates. Since the data dealing with the founder 
characteristics refer to the point of time of the firm foundation and remain constant over time, 
our main results should at least not be affected by reverse causality. However, endogeneity 
may still be a problem, as we cannot eliminate the potential problem of initial conditions. The 
only straightforward way to solve the initial conditions problem – run a fixed effects model – 
is ruled out because we have no over-time variation in founder characteristics. As a 
consequence, we refrain from making causal claims. Instead, our estimation results are 
interpreted as partial correlations.  
Finally, as one can see in the correlation matrix in Table C.3 in the appendix, the results 
are also not driven by multicollinearity. 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Factors influencing the innovation performance of start-ups 
General Pattern 
The results of the random-effects estimates are reported in Table 4.2. Column (1) and (3) 
show the estimated coefficients and the corresponding standard errors. Column (2) and (4) 
show average marginal effects. 
Team foundations (TEAM_FOUNDATION) perform better with respect to innovation 
output, but not with respect to innovation input. Thus, hypothesis H1 is confirmed, at least for 
innovation output. This result is quite similar to the one for education types (see below). A 
mix of qualification types as well as a combination of more than one founding individual 
correlate positively with the introduction of innovative products. 
Primarily, we are interested in the influence on innovative activities exerted by the 
variables describing the specific founder characteristics. As expected, the education level of 
the firm founders shows a positive correlation with innovation activities of the start-ups. 
Firms with a majority of founders that have a university degree (LEVEL_UNI) have 
significantly more innovative activities. A shift from a founding team that predominantly 
comprises of persons that do not have (academic) university education to a team, in which 
most members have such education, is correlated with an increase of 11.1% and 9% of the 
likelihood that the firm introduces innovative products and conducts R&D activities, 
respectively. Interestingly, we can observe such an effect only for university education. The 
impact of the variable for tertiary-level education other than academic university education 
(LEVEL_O_TERTIARY), such as a degree from universities of applied science, is not 
statistically significant. Thus, hypothesis H2 is confirmed, at least for university education. 
The estimates in Table 4.2 corroborate only partly hypothesis H3, namely with respect to 
R&D activities. For start-ups with a founding team with pronounced technical know-how 
(TYPE_TECHNICAL) a significantly positive correlation with R&D propensity is found, 
while for new firms that have founders with primarily commercial know-how 
(TYPE_COMMERCIAL) the estimates show a negative correlation with R&D propensity. 
We could not find significant effects of these two variables for the output variable IP. The 
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founders’ technical background might be positively related with R&D activities but is 
apparently not a necessary precondition for innovation output. Moreover, our results 
demonstrate that a mix of both qualification types (TYPE_MIX) is required for having R&D 
activities as well as for being able to introduce innovative products. 
Hypothesis H4 is not confirmed as the results for the variable EXP_IND demonstrate. The 
effect of industry experience on innovation output IP is statistically insignificant, while the 
effect on R&D activities is significantly negative. A reason for this negative effect may be 
that teams with industry experience are less inclined to conduct R&D than founders with 
research background. In our sample less than 3 percent of the firms have at the same time 
industry experience and R&D experience. However, as industry experience helps people to 
find market niches, it is not surprising that firms that have founders with industry experience 
show, despite less R&D activities, not significantly less innovation output. 
The coefficient of the variable for self-employment experience (EXP_SELF) is statistically 
insignificant. The expected positive effect of accumulation of business skills is discernible 
only in the early years. In estimates of the model separately for each cross-section, we find 
that in the first period 1996/97–2000 founding teams with self-employment experience have 
significantly more innovative activities (innovation input as well as innovation output) than 
other teams. In the later stages, the effect gets insignificant. This is an intuitively plausible 
result, as particularly in the first period self-employment experience helps to limit costs of 
administrative tasks and more time is available for innovative activities. With increasing firm 
age other teams also make such experience, wherefore the advantage disappears. Thus, 
hypothesis H5 receives only partial confirmation. 
The strongest effect on innovative activities as measured by the respective marginal effect 
is found for the variable that measures R&D experience (EXP_RAD). The availability of such 
innovation specific know-how increases the probability of innovation input and innovation 
output by 20.2% and 18.2%, respectively. The coefficient of the variable for concrete 
innovation-relevant ideas from prior occupations (INNO_IDEA) is also positive and 
statistically significant. Firms that were founded in order to realize concrete ideas for 
innovations from the founder’s former occupation (either in research or in business) have on 
average an 8.3% and 10.3% higher probability of innovation input and innovation output, 
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respectively, than firms without such ideas. Therefore, the hypotheses H6 and H7 are clearly 
confirmed by our estimates. 
In the pooled data set, the effect of the average age of the founders (LAGE) is statistically 
insignificant. However, as we will see in Section 0, the effect of the risk behavior of the firm 
founders becomes significant when investment in R&D is persistent; persistent innovation 
activities are negatively correlated with the average age of the firm founders (see column 4 in 
Table 4.5).  
As expected, we find a positive sign for male founding teams. However, the effect is 
statistically significant only for R&D activities. Thus, start-ups with only male team members 
(MALE_TEAM) show a higher propensity to perform R&D than firms with exclusively 
female members or firms with founding teams that are mixed with respect to gender.  
Finally, the results for the other variables are in line with the expectations. Exporting firms 
(EXPORT), firms with product diversification (DIVERSIFICATION), firms with cooperation 
(COOPERATION) and firms that expect a positive development of the firm-specific product 
demand (DEMAND_FUTURE) tend to a higher innovation propensity than firms without 
such characteristics. While intensive non-price competition (NPCOMP) correlates positively 
with innovation output, no effect is found for the intensity of price competition (PCOMP).  
Not surprisingly, sector affiliation is related to R&D activities. Firms in the manufacturing 
sector have significantly more R&D activities than firms in other sectors. Further, there is 
more R&D activity in the service sector than in the construction sector. Contrary to 
expectation, firm size (LSIZE) does not affect innovative activities. As the observed start-ups 
are for the most part small firms, little variance in firm size may be the reason for this result. 
On the whole, estimation results show that innovative activities of start-ups are strongly 
related to the characteristics of the firm founders. Innovation capability of the founders is 
primarily determined by the education level (LEVEL_UNI), R&D experience (EXP_RAD) 
and the availability of concrete innovation-relevant ideas from earlier occupations 
(INNO_IDEA).  
Mutually reinforcing effects of firm founders’ characteristics 
The strong impact of the founder characteristics becomes even clearer, when we analyze the 
effect of combinations of these three variables within a firm. In Table 4.3 we estimated once 
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more the innovation input and the innovation output model inserting now instead of the 
original variables for university-level education, R&D experience and the availability of 
innovation-relevant ideas all six possible combinations of these variables (reference group: 
firms without any of these characteristics), including the “pure” cases with only one 
characteristic (combinations: u1_r0_i0 (university-level education); u0_r1_i0 (R&D 
experience); u0_r0_i1 (innovative ideas) in Table 4.3). Not astonishingly, the “pure” effects 
are smaller than the “mixed” effects in Table 4.2. At the maximum, combinations of these 
factors increase the probability of innovation output by more than 40% (combination 
u0_r1_i1; R&D experience and innovative ideas) and the probability of performing R&D by 
nearly 35% (combination u1_r1_i1; all three characteristics). 
For innovation output, all three combinations of two characteristics show marginal effects 
that are larger than the pure effects of each of the underlying characteristics. In two cases – 
the combinations “R&D experience/innovative ideas” and “R&D experience/university-level 
education” – these effects are larger than the sum of the underlying pure effects, thus 
indicating the existence of mutually reinforcing effects of the respective pairs of 
characteristics. This is not the case for the combination “university-level education/innovative 
ideas”. Taken as a whole, there is a hint for the existence of complementarity of the 
underlying pairs of characteristics, R&D experience being a necessary ingredient of the 
reinforcing combinations. Innovative ideas and university-level education alone are not 
enough for such a reinforcing effect. This conclusion is further strengthened by the result for 
the combination of all three characteristics. In this case the marginal effect is smaller than the 
respective effect for the combination of the two characteristics “university-level education” 
and “R&D experience”, which means that having the third characteristic (“innovative ideas”) 
together with the other two characteristics even decreases the likelihood of generating 
innovation output.  
Turning now to R&D, we find that also in this case two of the three two-characteristics 
combinations show a mutually reinforcing effect: “R&D experience/innovative ideas” (as for 
innovation output) and “university-level education/innovative ideas”. Contrary to innovation 
output, the three-characteristics combination yields in this case a mutually reinforcing effect. 
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Education and innovative ideas are not sufficient for performing R&D, obviously it needs in 
addition experience in R&D.  
There is a policy implication of these results: it is advisable for public agencies supporting 
the foundation of new innovative firms that they would take these mutually reinforcing effects 
of founders’ characteristics into account when assessing projects of start-ups. 
4.5.2 Influence of changes in the composition of founding teams 
Over time, changes in the composition of the founding teams (that are at the same time also 
management teams of the firms) are possible. The firms reported the characteristics of the 
founding team at the time of firm foundation, so it is possible that some of these factors may 
change later. The results of the estimates excluding firms with changes in the composition of 
the founding team are reported in Table 4.4. In the innovation output model, the effect of 
team foundations (TEAM_FOUNDATION) disappears. This means that the team effect 
found in Table 4.2 is traced back primarily to firms with changes in the composition of the 
founding team. In the R&D model, the variable for other tertiary level education 
(LEVEL_O_TERTIARY) now is positively correlated with R&D activities (the effect of 
LEVEL_O_TERTIARY is however significantly smaller than the effect of LEVEL_UNI). On 
the other hand, the effect of commercial know-how (TYPE_COMMERCIAL) becomes 
insignificant. We also find a significant positive effect of self-employment experience 
(EXP_SELF) that can be interpreted as a hint that this effect is discernible only for firms that 
kept their founding team, thus also their management team, unchanged.  
Despite the fact that more than 20% of the firms reported changes in their management 
teams, excluding firms with such changes does only marginally affect our estimates. 
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Table 4.2: Estimates of innovative activity  
(random-effects probit) 
Dependent variable IP R&D 
  
 dy/dx  dy/dx 
Expected 
sign 
Founder characteristics      
LEVEL_UNI 0.338*** 0.111*** 0.740*** 0.090*** + 
  (0.115) (0.037) (0.197) (0.023)  
LEVEL_O_TERTIARY 0.081 0.027 0.235 0.029 + 
  
(0.092) (0.030) (0.168) (0.020)  
TYPE_TECHNICAL 0.142 0.047 0.638*** 0.078*** + 
  (0.119) (0.039) (0.204) (0.024)  
TYPE_COMMERCIAL 0.107 0.035 -0.363* -0.044* - 
  (0.109) (0.036) (0.201) (0.025)  
TYPE_MIX 0.234** 0.077** 0.312* 0.038* ? 
  (0.111) (0.036) (0.189) (0.023)  
EXP_IND -0.008 -0.003 -0.299** -0.037** + 
  (0.082) (0.027) (0.144) (0.017)  
EXP_SELF 0.034 0.011 0.355 0.043 + 
  (0.135) (0.044) (0.225) (0.027)  
EXP_RAD 0.556*** 0.182*** 1.658*** 0.202*** + 
  (0.136) (0.044) (0.218) (0.021)  
INNO_IDEA 0.313*** 0.103*** 0.679*** 0.083*** + 
  (0.081) (0.026) (0.146) (0.017)  
LAGE -0.116 -0.038 -0.106 -0.013 - 
  (0.170) (0.056) (0.289) (0.035)  
MALE_TEAM 0.052 0.017 0.527** 0.064** + 
  (0.135) (0.044) (0.265) (0.032)  
MIXED_TEAM -0.003 -0.001 0.254 0.031 ? 
  (0.165) (0.054) (0.309) (0.038)  
TEAM_FOUNDATION 0.184* 0.060* -0.028 -0.003 + 
  (0.102) (0.033) (0.170) (0.021)  
Firm characteristics      
LSIZE 0.043 0.014 0.023 0.003 + 
  
(0.055) (0.018) (0.087) (0.011) 
 
EXPORT 0.483*** 0.159*** 0.589*** 0.072*** + 
  
(0.088) (0.028) (0.130) (0.016) 
 
DIVERSIFICATION 0.406*** 0.133*** 0.237* 0.029* + 
  
(0.079) (0.025) (0.134) (0.016) 
 
Market conditions      
DEMAND_FUTURE 0.280*** 0.092*** 0.362*** 0.044*** + 
  
(0.075) (0.024) (0.122) (0.015) 
 
COOPERATION 0.405*** 0.133*** 0.958*** 0.117*** + 
  (0.073) (0.023) (0.120) (0.015)  
PCOMP -0.074 -0.024 -0.130 -0.016 ? 
  (0.069) (0.023) (0.110) (0.013)  
NPCOMP 0.268*** 0.088*** 0.093 0.011 ? 
  (0.069) (0.022) (0.111) (0.014)  
MANUFACT 0.341* 0.112* 1.867*** 0.228***  
  (0.191) (0.062) (0.409) (0.049)  
MOD_SERV 0.144 0.047 1.197*** 0.146***  
  (0.151) (0.050) (0.358) (0.043)  
TRAD_SERV 0.274* 0.090* 1.161*** 0.142***  
  (0.149) (0.049) (0.359) (0.043)  
Y2003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.138 -0.017  
  (0.080) (0.026) (0.121) (0.015)  
Y2006 -0.043 -0.014 -0.511*** -0.062***  
  (0.087) (0.029) (0.143) (0.017)  
CONSTANT -1.201*  -4.460***   
  (0.645)  (1.183)   
N 2393 2393 2393 2393  
Groups 1204  1204   
Wald chi2 238.72***  179.83***   
Rho 0.357  0.629   
LR test of rho=0 70.19***  117.47***   
 
Notes: See Table 4.1 for the variable definitions; to estimate marginal effects, we fixed the group 
specific intercept at 0, but otherwise averaged the marginal effects over the other explanatory 
variables; standard errors are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% test level, respectively. 
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Table 4.3: Analyzing combinations of founder characteristics 
(random-effects probit) 
Dependent variable IP R&D 
   dy/dx  dy/dx 
u1_r0_i0 0.432** 0.141** 0.534* 0.064* 
  (0.171) (0.055) (0.299) (0.036) 
u0_r1_i0 0.316 0.103 1.263*** 0.150*** 
  (0.262) (0.085) (0.401) (0.048) 
u0_r0_i1 0.302*** 0.099*** 0.414** 0.049** 
  (0.095) (0.031) (0.176) (0.021) 
u0_r1_i1 1.227*** 0.401*** 2.586*** 0.308*** 
  (0.212) (0.067) (0.339) (0.033) 
u1_r0_i1 0.672*** 0.219*** 1.421*** 0.169*** 
  (0.149) (0.047) (0.258) (0.029) 
u1_r1_i0 1.024*** 0.335*** 1.543*** 0.184*** 
  (0.360) (0.116) (0.491) (0.057) 
u1_r1_i1 0.807*** 0.264*** 2.865*** 0.341*** 
  (0.256) (0.083) (0.434) (0.045) 
LEVEL_O_TERTIARY 0.070 0.023 0.227 0.027 
  (0.092) (0.030) (0.168) (0.020) 
TYPE_TECHNICAL 0.149 0.049 0.661*** 0.079*** 
  (0.119) (0.039) (0.204) (0.024) 
TYPE_COMMERCIAL 0.108 0.035 -0.323 -0.039 
  (0.109) (0.036) (0.200) (0.024) 
TYPE_MIX 0.221** 0.072** 0.352* 0.042* 
  (0.111) (0.036) (0.190) (0.022) 
EXP_IND 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.295** -0.035** 
  (0.082) (0.027) (0.144) (0.017) 
EXP_SELF 0.029 0.009 0.332 0.040 
  (0.134) (0.044) (0.224) (0.027) 
LAGE 
-0.109 -0.036 -0.162 -0.019 
  (0.170) (0.056) (0.289) (0.034) 
MALE_TEAM 0.044 0.014 0.552** 0.066** 
  (0.134) (0.044) (0.266) (0.032) 
MIXED_TEAM 
-0.004 -0.001 0.299 0.036 
  (0.164) (0.054) (0.309) (0.037) 
TEAM_FOUNDATION 0.180* 0.059* -0.039 -0.005 
  (0.101) (0.033) (0.169) (0.020) 
LSIZE 0.045 0.015 0.019 0.002 
  (0.054) (0.018) (0.087) (0.010) 
EXPORT 0.483*** 0.158*** 0.601*** 0.072*** 
  (0.088) (0.028) (0.130) (0.016) 
DIVERSIFICATION 0.413*** 0.135*** 0.236* 0.028* 
  (0.079) (0.025) (0.134) (0.016) 
DEMAND_FUTURE 0.278*** 0.091*** 0.351*** 0.042*** 
  (0.075) (0.024) (0.122) (0.014) 
COOPERATION 0.406*** 0.133*** 0.947*** 0.113*** 
  (0.073) (0.023) (0.119) (0.015) 
PCOMP 
-0.078 -0.025 -0.136 -0.016 
  (0.069) (0.022) (0.110) (0.013) 
NPCOMP 0.268*** 0.088*** 0.096 0.011 
  (0.069) (0.022) (0.111) (0.013) 
MANUFACT 0.306 0.100 1.768*** 0.211*** 
  (0.190) (0.062) (0.402) (0.047) 
MOD_SERV 0.130 0.042 1.156*** 0.138*** 
  (0.151) (0.049) (0.352) (0.042) 
TRAD_SERV 0.257* 0.084* 1.098*** 0.131*** 
  (0.148) (0.048) (0.353) (0.042) 
Y2003 
-0.009 -0.003 -0.145 -0.017 
  (0.080) (0.026) (0.121) (0.014) 
Y2006 
-0.044 -0.015 -0.518*** -0.062*** 
  (0.087) (0.029) (0.143) (0.017) 
CONSTANT 
-1.208*  -4.090***  
  (0.648)  (1.177)  
N 2393 2393 2393 2393 
Groups 1204  1204  
Wald chi2 242.81***  180.94***  
Rho 0.353  0.625  
LR test of rho=0 68.34***  115.27***  
 
Reading Aid: u=LEVEL_UNI, r=EXP_RAD, i=INNO_IDEA; Combinations of these three 
binary variables: u0_r1_i1= a firm with LEVEL_UNI=0, EXP_RAD=1 and INNO_IDEA=1; 
u1_r0_i0= a firm with LEVEL_UNI=1, EXP_RAD=0 and INNO_IDEA=0; etc; reference 
group: u0_r0_i0. 
Notes: See Table 4.1 for the variable definitions; to estimate marginal effects, we fixed the 
group specific intercept at 0, but otherwise averaged the marginal effects over the other 
explanatory variables; standard errors are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, * 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% test level, respectively. 
  
76 
Table 4.4: Estimates of innovative activity excluding firms with changes in 
the composition of the founding team 
(random-effects probit) 
Dependent variable IP R&D 
   dy/dx  dy/dx 
Expected 
sign 
Founder characteristics      
LEVEL_UNI 0.412*** 0.130*** 0.979*** 0.106*** + 
  (0.136) (0.042) (0.250) (0.026)  
LEVEL_O_TERTIARY 0.156 0.049 0.501** 0.054** + 
  (0.105) (0.033) (0.206) (0.022)  
TYPE_TECHNICAL 0.167 0.053 0.705*** 0.076*** + 
  (0.139) (0.044) (0.247) (0.026)  
TYPE_COMMERCIAL 0.153 0.049 -0.260 -0.028 - 
  (0.126) (0.040) (0.238) (0.026)  
TYPE_MIX 0.211* 0.067* 0.447** 0.048** ? 
  (0.126) (0.040) (0.226) (0.024)  
EXP_IND -0.023 -0.007 -0.362** -0.039** + 
  (0.094) (0.030) (0.170) (0.018)  
EXP_SELF 0.120 0.038 0.610** 0.066** + 
  (0.167) (0.053) (0.285) (0.031)  
EXP_RAD 0.667*** 0.211*** 1.833*** 0.199*** + 
  (0.167) (0.051) (0.278) (0.022)  
INNO_IDEA 0.335*** 0.106*** 0.708*** 0.077*** + 
  (0.093) (0.029) (0.175) (0.018)  
LAGE -0.027 -0.008 -0.085 -0.009 - 
  (0.192) (0.061) (0.336) (0.036)  
MALE_TEAM 0.002 0.000 0.520* 0.056* + 
  (0.149) (0.047) (0.307) (0.033)  
MIXED_TEAM -0.049 -0.016 0.492 0.053 ? 
  (0.195) (0.062) (0.379) (0.041)  
TEAM_FOUNDATION 0.141 0.044 -0.231 -0.025 + 
  (0.130) (0.041) (0.224) (0.024)  
Firm characteristics      
LSIZE 0.080 0.025 0.068 0.007 + 
  (0.071) (0.022) (0.122) (0.013)  
EXPORT 0.487*** 0.154*** 0.630*** 0.068*** + 
  (0.103) (0.031) (0.157) (0.017)  
DIVERSIFICATION 0.525*** 0.166*** 0.205 0.022 + 
  (0.092) (0.027) (0.159) (0.017)  
Market conditions      
DEMAND_FUTURE 0.293*** 0.093*** 0.373** 0.040** + 
  (0.088) (0.027) (0.148) (0.016)  
COOPERATION 0.447*** 0.141*** 1.062*** 0.115*** + 
  (0.084) (0.026) (0.154) (0.016)  
PCOMP -0.088 -0.028 -0.024 -0.003 ? 
  (0.080) (0.025) (0.132) (0.014)  
NPCOMP 0.304*** 0.096*** 0.094 0.010 ? 
  (0.080) (0.025) (0.135) (0.015)  
MANUFACT 0.313 0.099 2.017*** 0.219***  
  (0.211) (0.066) (0.470) (0.049)  
MOD_SERV 0.085 0.027 1.210*** 0.131***  
  (0.168) (0.053) (0.406) (0.043)  
TRAD_SERV 0.207 0.066 0.959** 0.104**  
  (0.163) (0.051) (0.401) (0.043)  
Y2003 -0.022 -0.007 -0.359** -0.039**  
  (0.094) (0.030) (0.152) (0.016)  
Y2006 -0.007 -0.002 -0.729*** -0.079***  
  (0.104) (0.033) (0.187) (0.020)  
CONSTANT -1.613**  -4.849***   
  (0.731)  (1.398)   
N 1875 1875 1875 1875  
Groups 1026  1026   
Wald chi2 199.80***  117.50***   
Rho 0.378  0.654   
LR test of rho=0 55.42***  77.95***   
 
Notes: See Table 4.1 for the variable definitions; to estimate marginal effects, we fixed the group specific 
intercept at 0, but otherwise averaged the marginal effects over the other explanatory variables; standard 
errors are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% test level, respectively. 
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Table 4.5:  Estimates of the persistence of innovative activity 
(multinomial logit estimates; base category: firms with discontinuous 
innovative activities) 
Dependent variable IP R&D 
  
no persistently no persistently 
Founder characteristics     
LEVEL_UNI -0.746** 0.286 -0.683* 0.329 
 (0.377) (0.366) (0.378) (0.609) 
LEVEL_O_TERTIARY -0.553** -0.405 -0.215 -0.073 
 (0.280) (0.323) (0.336) (0.549) 
TYPE_TECHNICAL 0.236 0.199 -0.075 0.910 
 (0.349) (0.420) (0.395) (0.690) 
TYPE_COMMERCIAL 0.246 0.488 0.669* 0.165 
 (0.323) (0.402) (0.395) (0.803) 
TYPE_MIX -0.195 0.458 -0.075 0.596 
 (0.364) (0.394) (0.380) (0.646) 
EXP_IND -0.214 -0.323 0.497* 0.047 
 (0.256) (0.296) (0.287) (0.503) 
EXP_SELF -0.146 -0.251 0.649 1.158 
 (0.462) (0.520) (0.553) (0.799) 
EXP_RAD -1.525** 0.228 -1.299*** 1.720*** 
 (0.620) (0.394) (0.452) (0.505) 
INNO_IDEA -0.480* 0.443 -0.889*** 0.507 
 (0.251) (0.287) (0.285) (0.523) 
LAGE 0.577 0.583 0.099 -1.484* 
 (0.517) (0.571) (0.672) (0.869) 
GENDER -0.324 -0.110 -0.225 0.091 
 (0.293) (0.315) (0.312) (0.588) 
TEAM_FOUNDATION -0.419 0.184 -0.552* -0.887* 
 (0.297) (0.304) (0.324) (0.527) 
Firm characteristics     
LSIZE 0.355 0.805** -0.389 0.383 
 (0.341) (0.337) (0.362) (0.522) 
EXPORT 0.141 0.832*** -0.635** 0.278 
 (0.319) (0.272) (0.285) (0.415) 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.871*** 0.207 -0.386 0.460 
 (0.253) (0.268) (0.268) (0.425) 
Market conditions     
DEMAND_FUTURE -0.744*** 0.534 -0.331 0.636 
 (0.286) (0.381) (0.332) (0.577) 
COOPERATION -0.421 0.417 -0.875*** 0.773* 
 (0.264) (0.264) (0.275) (0.432) 
PCOMP 0.217 -0.008 0.775*** -0.129 
 (0.246) (0.275) (0.268) (0.439) 
NPCOMP -0.653*** 0.581** -0.061 -0.292 
 (0.245) (0.276) (0.269) (0.406) 
MANUFACT 0.354 1.331* -2.523*** -0.944 
 (0.585) (0.757) (0.893) (1.214) 
MOD_SERV 0.185 1.097* -2.047*** -1.157 
 (0.405) (0.639) (0.761) (1.165) 
TRAD_SERV -0.260 1.077* -1.316* -0.942 
 (0.411) (0.630) (0.784) (1.159) 
CONSTANT -0.532 -6.611*** 4.572* 2.510 
  (1.944) (2.275) (2.634) (3.568) 
N 484 484 
Wald chi2 143.79*** 176.38*** 
 
Notes: We define the following categorical variables to measure the persistence of innovative 
activities: no (firm has no innovative activities), discontinuously (firm has in some cross-sections 
innovative activities) and persistently (firm has in all three cross-sections innovative activities); see 
Table 4.1 for the variable definitions; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White procedure) 
are in brackets under the coefficients; a Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis that the 
assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA-assumption) is fulfilled in any single 
case (suest-based Hausman test implemented in Stata); standard errors are in brackets under the 
coefficients; ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% test level, 
respectively. 
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4.5.3 Persistently innovative start-ups 
So far we have considered all firms that have had innovation activities in some point of time. 
However, it would be interesting to know whether founder characteristics also correlate with 
the persistence of innovation over time. In order to investigate such differences, we estimate a 
multinomial logit model including only firms that answered all three questionnaires and 
choose the base category so that we can analyze whether the effects of founder characteristics 
differ for firms that have in each cross-section (persistently) innovative activities from firms 
with discontinuous innovative activities.6 Estimation results for firms without innovation 
activities in any point of time confirm previous results (column 1 and 3 in Table 4.5). The 
reduction of the sample size thus does only marginally affect the estimation results. 
The results for the firms with continuous innovation activities show that founder 
characteristics are not the main factors correlating with the persistence of innovation in start-
ups (see column 2 and 4 of Table 4.5). The coefficients of all founder characteristics variables 
are statistically insignificant in the innovation output estimates, only a few of them are 
significant in the innovation input estimates. R&D experience (EXP_RAD) seems to be 
significantly more important in firms that have had in each cross-section R&D activities than 
in firms with discontinuous R&D activities. Further, founding teams with a high average age 
(LAGE) tend to invest less in innovation input. This is intuitively plausible, as investment 
costs increase with persistent innovation activities, whereby risk behavior of the firm founders 
gets even more important. Surprisingly, we find a weak negative effect of team foundations 
(TEAM_FOUNDATION) on the persistence of R&D activities. However, this effect is 
primarily driven by a strong correlation with the variable LSIZE (r= 0.33). While this 
correlation does not affect the results in the estimates based on all observations, in this 
regression the significant negative effect for the variable TEAM_FOUNDATION disappears, 
when we do not control for firm size.  
                                                 
6
 See the note in Table 4.5 for the construction of the dependent variables for the multinomial logit model. 
Because we do not have enough observations for each of the three categories to test the gender effect in detail as 
in the previous models, we include just a single variable measuring the dominant gender of the founding team 
(GENDER) in the estimates in Table 4.5. 
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In sum, we conclude that the founders’ characteristics are primarily related to the 
likelihood of a firm getting engaged in innovative activities but not to the persistence of such 
innovative activities over time.  
Firm size (LSIZE) is positively correlated with innovation persistence. Further factors with 
(partly) positive effects either on innovation output or innovation input are the degree of 
exposition to international competition as measured by the existence of exporting activities 
(EXPORT), the intensity of non-price competition (NPCOMP), and finally the existence of 
cooperation with other firms/institutes (COOPERATION). 
4.6 Comparison with existing empirical literature 
We could find only two empirical studies that deal with the innovation capabilities of firm 
founders in start-ups. A third study comes near to our topic as it investigates the influence of 
human capital and other related founders’ characteristics on the growth perspectives of new 
technology-based firms. The first one is the study of Lynskey (2004) that analyzes the impact 
of the CEO characteristics based on Japanese firm-level data. In this study, innovative activity 
is measured by the number of patent applications and the number of new products. Several 
managerial variables are included in the estimated models. They also include a variable that 
captures effects of the education level of the CEO, a dummy that measures whether the CEO 
has previous R&D experience and a variable that denotes the age of the CEO. Moreover, they 
test the impact of management experience and whether the CEO is engaged in a research 
network. An additional variable denotes whether the CEO is also the founder of the firm, so 
that possible differences between these two functions can be captured. However, only a few 
of these variables show statistically significant effects on innovation activity. While in the 
new product regression no variable significantly correlates, R&D experience and a research 
network positively affect the number of patent applications of the start-ups. In contrast with 
our results, managerial characteristics show no explanatory power in their models. An 
explanation could be that the firms in their sample are much larger than our firms. While the 
average age of the firms is quite similar, average sales of their firms are above 1.5 million 
USD compared with 0.1 million USD in our sample. We would expect that the CEO is less 
directly involved in the innovation process in such large firms than in smaller firms. 
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Accordingly, the impact on innovative activities should be more limited. Further, the CEO is 
probably only one person of a founding team that as a whole may have a stronger impact on 
innovation activities of the start-ups. 
In a second study Koch & Strotmann (2008) analyze the impact of founder characteristics 
on the innovation performance of German start-ups in the knowledge-intensive business 
sector. They distinguish two categories of innovation performance, incremental innovation 
and radical innovation. As independent variables they include variables describing the 
characteristics of one firm founder such as age and sex. Further, they use information on this 
founder’s last occupation before the foundation (university, private economy or self-
employed) as a proxy for the professional background of the founder. Beside a dummy for 
team foundations, they also have information on whether a concrete idea from the founder’s 
former occupation was decisive for the foundation, what is similar to the variable 
INNO_IDEA in our study. Similar to Lynskey (2004), Koch & Strotmann (2008) find only a 
few significant effects. Male founders tend to have more radical innovations than female 
founders and firms of founders that were self-employed before foundation have fewer 
innovations (incremental and radical) than firms of founders that worked in the private 
economy. All other variables that describe the founder characteristics do not significantly 
affect the innovation performance. Concerning firm size, the firms in their sample are quite 
similar to the firms in our sample. While their firms on average have 4.5 employees, the firms 
in our sample have on average 1.6 employees. However, it is questionable whether the 
information on one founder’s last occupation adequately describes the professional 
background of the whole founding team. This information is only available for one founder 
per firm (about 60% of the firms were team foundations) and is also not available for previous 
occupations of the founders. A dummy variable that measures whether the background of the 
founders is diversified can only partially solve this problem. 
Based on a sample of 506 Italian young firms in high-tech industries in both manufacturing 
and services Colombo & Grill (2005) find that the nature of the education and of the prior 
experience of founders exerts a significant influence on firm performance. More concretely, 
founders’ years of economic and managerial education and to a lesser extent scientific and 
technical education positively affect economic performance, while education in other fields 
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does not. Furthermore, technical work experience as well as prior entrepreneurial experience 
seem to contribute significantly to superior economic performance. Even if the target variable 
is not the same as in our study (employment growth vs. innovation performance), the results 
point in the same direction as ours. 
4.7 Conclusions 
As most start-ups are not growth-drivers, the allocation of start-up subsidies has important 
policy implications. Misallocation may keep inefficient firms on the market and/or lead to a 
crowding out effect of non-subsidized firms. Policy makers should thus focus on firms with 
high growth potential and stop subsidizing typical start-ups (Shane 2009). Accordingly, it is 
important to be able to identify firms with a high probability of enhancing economic growth. 
As innovation performance is a crucial precondition for the growth of such firms, identifying 
factors that determine whether a young firm would have innovative activities or not seems to 
be an important step in this direction. So far it is unclear how innovative start-ups look like. In 
this paper we investigate whether information on the founder characteristics is correlated with 
the innovative activity of start-ups. 
Following pattern emerges from our estimates: the ability of start-ups to conduct R&D and 
introduce innovative products depends on founders having a university education (at best 
mixed technical and commercial), prior experience in R&D, and – especially important – 
strong motivation to realize own innovative ideas. There are also mutually reinforcing effects 
of these three characteristics, especially with respect to R&D activities. Team foundations 
perform better than single founders with respect to sales of innovative products, but not with 
respect to R&D. 
All in all, we conclude that knowing the founder characteristics would help policy makers 
to identify the innovative start-ups already in the beginning and thus to increase efficiency of 
start-up subsidies, given that such a promotion policy is pursued. A further reason to use 
founder characteristics as selection criteria for subsidies is that they are easily observable and 
remain constant over time. Accordingly, the identification of innovative start-ups would be 
possible at relatively low costs. This applies all the more as changes in the composition of the 
founding team have no discernible influence on the innovation activities of the firms. On the 
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other hand, the use of these variables as identification variables may be limited, as founder 
characteristics seem to determine whether a firm gets engaged in innovative activities but not 
whether such activities are persistent over time (with the exception of experience in R&D). 
Based on founder information, it is not possible to distinguish between start-ups that have 
persistent innovation activities and firms with discontinuous innovation activities. 
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics 
(means of variables included in training equations) 
Dependent variable training_propensity training_intensity   
Explanatory  
variable 
Whole data  
set  
(N=3005) 
Cross-section 
2000 
(N=1389) 
Cross-section 
2005 
(N=1616) 
Whole data  
set  
(N=2274) 
Cross-section 
2000 
(N=1029) 
Cross-section 
2005 
(N=1245) 
Explanatory 
variable 
training_propensity 0.76 0.74 0.77 1.77 1.74 1.79 training_intensity 
tertiary_share 1.98 1.81 2.13 2.19 2.01 2.34 tertiary_share 
intranet_use_d1 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 intranet_use_d1 
intranet_use_d2 0.21 0.17 0.25 0.22 0.17 0.25 intranet_use_d2 
Internet_variety 4.41 4.32 4.48 4.52 4.43 4.59 Internet_variety 
ICT_infrustructure 3.39 3.37 3.41 3.44 3.43 3.44 ICT_infrustructure 
∆_hierarchical_levels 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.09 ∆_hierarchical_levels 
∆_delegation 0.44 0.56 0.34 0.44 0.56 0.34 ∆_delegation 
decentralization 2.38 2.35 2.41 2.38 2.33 2.41 decentralization 
job_rotation 0.57 0.64 0.51 0.57 0.62 0.52 job_rotation 
team_work 2.22 2.18 2.25 2.31 2.25 2.35 team_work 
labor_costs 11.29 11.24 11.33 11.29 11.24 11.34 labor_costs 
foreign_owned 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 foreign_owned 
size_d1 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.22 size_d1 
size_d2 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.23 size_d2 
size_d3 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.29 size_d3 
size_d4 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 size_d4 
size_d5 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 size_d5 
size_d6 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 size_d6 
 
Notes: The variables “tertiary_share” and “labor_costs” are logarithms, the other ones are either ordinal or nominal 
(dummies) variables. 
 
 93
 
 
Table A.2: Correlation matrix  
 (N= 3005) 
  tertiary_share ICT_total intranet_use_d1 intranet_use_d2 Internet_variety ICT_infrustructure WO_total ∆_hierarchical_levels ∆_delegation decentralization 
ICT_total 0.260          
intranet_use_d1 0.069 0.223         
intranet_use_d2 0.161 0.579 -0.287        
Internet_variety 0.154 0.755 0.070 0.245       
ICT_infrustructure 0.235 0.803 0.214 0.260 0.432      
WO_total 0.150 0.320 0.115 0.169 0.253 0.245     
∆_hierarchical_levels 0.029 0.101 0.071 0.030 0.078 0.085 0.521    
∆_delegation 0.072 0.122 0.072 0.027 0.108 0.112 0.625 0.216   
decentralization 0.134 0.251 0.053 0.209 0.157 0.173 0.513 0.072 0.178  
job_rotation 0.023 0.087 0.043 -0.007 0.113 0.066 0.493 0.065 0.121 -0.009 
team_work 0.153 0.317 0.077 0.202 0.237 0.234 0.587 0.075 0.197 0.165 
labor_costs 0.207 0.268 0.036 0.278 0.134 0.176 0.100 0.023 -0.014 0.149 
foreign_owned 0.069 0.173 0.051 0.147 0.078 0.133 0.117 0.034 0.056 0.124 
size_d1 -0.109 -0.241 -0.093 -0.108 -0.143 -0.233 -0.125 -0.050 -0.017 -0.071 
size_d2 -0.023 -0.060 -0.001 -0.063 -0.030 -0.048 -0.025 -0.010 -0.004 -0.063 
size_d3 0.070 0.066 0.051 -0.005 0.021 0.104 0.026 0.012 0.007 0.009 
size_d4 0.068 0.144 0.063 0.070 0.081 0.139 0.073 0.034 -0.004 0.059 
size_d5 0.054 0.129 0.023 0.103 0.073 0.098 0.085 0.011 0.045 0.073 
size_d6 0.044 0.203 0.017 0.177 0.150 0.123 0.110 0.038 0.009 0.118 
 
  job_rotation team_work labor_costs foreign_owned size_d1 size_d2 size_d3 size_d4 size_d5 
team_work 0.171                 
labor_costs -0.037 0.153         
foreign_owned 0.001 0.107 0.147        
size_d1 -0.036 -0.169 -0.107 -0.083       
size_d2 0.039 -0.031 -0.033 -0.037 -0.350      
size_d3 -0.016 0.058 0.042 0.068 -0.368 -0.333     
size_d4 0.003 0.108 0.057 0.043 -0.219 -0.198 -0.208    
size_d5 0.004 0.100 0.069 0.064 -0.139 -0.126 -0.132 -0.079   
size_d6 0.038 0.100 0.062 -0.019 -0.130 -0.118 -0.124 -0.074 -0.047 
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Table A.3: Testing for sample selection  
(Heckman selection model) 
  OLS Heckman 
Dependent variable Training intensity Training intensity Training propensity 
tertiary_share 0.017** 0.019** 0.033*** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
ICT_total 0.015 0.017 0.049*** 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
WO_total 0.011* 0.011 -0.012 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) 
labor_costs -0.295*** -0.302*** -0.168* 
  (0.066) (0.068) (0.092) 
foreign_owned -0.062 -0.078 -0.388*** 
  (0.051) (0.070) (0.075) 
size_d1 0.377** 0.388** 0.197 
  (0.149) (0.151) (0.169) 
size_d2 0.731*** 0.760*** 0.585*** 
  (0.150) (0.171) (0.171) 
size_d3 1.343*** 1.385*** 0.914*** 
  (0.151) (0.193) (0.172) 
size_d4 2.047*** 2.102*** 1.363*** 
  (0.154) (0.222) (0.195) 
size_d5 2.781*** 2.832*** 1.181*** 
  (0.164) (0.221) (0.217) 
size_d6 4.068*** 4.131*** 1.653*** 
  (0.181) (0.249) (0.251) 
year_2005 0.042 0.045 0.088 
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.055) 
wage_individual_performance -0.002  0.084** 
  (0.023)  (0.033) 
constant 2.617*** 2.580*** 0.818 
  (0.761) (0.774) (1.086) 
Region dummies yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes 
N 2274 2274 
F 61.14***   
R2 0.588   
Wald chi2  1764.64*** 
rho  0.124 
LR test of rho=0: Prob > chi2  0.736 
 
Notes: See Table 2.1 for the variable definitions; standard errors are in brackets 
under the coefficients; ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% test level, respectively.
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Table A.4: Testing for endogeneity  
(Rivers-Vuong-Test) 
Dependent variable training_propensity training_intensity 
Tested variable ICT_total WO_total tertiary_share ICT_total WO_total tertiary_share 
Instruments 
industry level of  
intranet use 
industry level of 
decentralization 
industry level of 
tertiary share 
industry level of  
intranet use 
industry level of 
decentralization 
industry level of 
tertiary share 
Validity test of instruments:             
• Correlation with dependent variable in first stage (instrument equation) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
• Correlation with dependent variable in  second stage (training equation) no no no no no no 
• Correlation with the residuals of the endogenized estimation no no no no no no 
Rivers-Vuong-Test:         
• Chi2 0.21 0.07 1.13 1.66 1.93 0.32 
• Prob>Chi2 0.645 0.797 0.288 0.197 0.165 0.572 
 
Notes: For definition of the instruments see Table 2.1; the training equations are specified as in column 1 of Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, respectively; the instrument 
equations are specified as the training equations with the exception of the tested variables that are replaced by the instrument variables. 
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Table B.1: Descriptive statistics 
Period 2000  
(N=1589) 
2003  
(N=911) 
2006 
 (N=615) 
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
SURVIVING 0.824 0.381 0.907 0.291   
BREAK 0.722 0.448 0.782 0.413 0.833 0.374 
MAIN 0.831 0.375 0.849 0.359 0.852 0.355 
UNEMPLOY 0.130 0.336 0.134 0.341 0.140 0.347 
LAGE 3.652 0.217 3.656 0.210 3.650 0.212 
GENDER 0.767 0.423 0.751 0.433 0.750 0.434 
QUAL 0.659 0.474 0.697 0.460 0.691 0.462 
R&D 0.234 0.424 0.189 0.392 0.154 0.362 
NP 0.149 0.356 0.112 0.315 0.124 0.329 
MP 0.403 0.491 0.387 0.487 0.372 0.484 
PCOMP 0.422 0.494 0.483 0.500 0.486 0.500 
NPCOMP 0.536 0.499 0.526 0.500 0.515 0.500 
LCAP 10.553 1.959 10.559 1.832 10.537 1.788 
AG 0.163 0.369 0.181 0.385 0.151 0.359 
GmbH 0.254 0.436 0.262 0.440 0.306 0.461 
OTHER 0.097 0.296 0.041 0.198 0.041 0.198 
LSIZE 1.069 0.555 1.150 0.632 1.186 0.716 
IND_1 0.084 0.278 0.080 0.272 0.081 0.274 
IND_2 0.444 0.497 0.462 0.499 0.506 0.500 
IND_3 0.379 0.485 0.368 0.482 0.320 0.467 
DEBT_CONST 0.002 2.621 0.011 2.626 -0.024 2.671 
CRED_COND 2.047 1.514 2.113 1.419 1.896 1.406 
CRED_LINE 2.014 1.502 2.019 1.354 1.789 1.341 
DEBT_INFO 1.711 1.282 1.699 1.138 1.511 1.027 
VC_CONST 1.566 1.169 1.529 1.098 1.395 0.971 
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Table B.2: Test for selective attrition  
(selection indicator included in success 
models; probit estimates) 
Dependent variable BREAK 
Period 2000 2003 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT 0.400 0.265 0.016 0.211 
  (0.617) (0.618) (0.886) (0.887) 
MAIN 0.335*** 0.308*** 0.290** 0.282** 
  (0.090) (0.091) (0.131) (0.130) 
UNEMPLOY -0.110 -0.113 -0.148 -0.153 
  (0.104) (0.103) (0.140) (0.138) 
LAGE -0.040 0.041 0.093 0.085 
  (0.164) (0.162) (0.230) (0.230) 
GENDER 0.087 0.069 0.113 0.115 
  (0.084) (0.084) (0.114) (0.114) 
QUAL 0.088 0.125 0.148 0.172 
  (0.078) (0.077) (0.110) (0.111) 
R&D -0.088 -0.076 -0.285** -0.296** 
  (0.093) (0.094) (0.128) (0.128) 
NP -0.111 -0.130 0.460*** 0.463*** 
  (0.099) (0.099) (0.170) (0.169) 
MP 0.082 0.071 0.145 0.137 
  (0.077) (0.077) (0.105) (0.105) 
PCOMP -0.066 -0.069 -0.013 -0.037 
  (0.071) (0.070) (0.097) (0.096) 
NPCOMP 0.041 0.041 0.183* 0.186* 
  (0.072) (0.072) (0.097) (0.097) 
LCAP -0.017 -0.017 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) 
AG 0.118 0.095 -0.366** -0.346** 
  (0.115) (0.114) (0.151) (0.151) 
GmbH -0.146* -0.157* -0.341*** -0.339*** 
  (0.087) (0.087) (0.116) (0.116) 
OTHER -0.025 -0.037 -0.032 -0.000 
  (0.123) (0.123) (0.248) (0.248) 
LSIZE 0.180* 0.172 -0.058 -0.067 
  (0.108) (0.106) (0.100) (0.101) 
IND_1 -0.381** -0.363** -0.104 -0.099 
  (0.163) (0.164) (0.233) (0.234) 
IND_2 0.168 0.215 -0.050 -0.044 
  (0.135) (0.135) (0.186) (0.188) 
IND_3 -0.325** -0.304** 0.044 0.028 
  (0.131) (0.131) (0.183) (0.184) 
DEBT_CONST -0.067***  -0.051***   
  (0.013)  (0.018)   
VC_CONST   -0.107***   -0.094** 
    (0.029)   (0.041) 
INSAMPLE 0.219*** 0.224*** 0.199** 0.209** 
  (0.070) (0.070) (0.102) (0.101) 
N 1589 1589 911 911 
McFadden’s R2 0.080 0.074 0.054 0.051 
Wald chi2 140.10*** 130.11*** 53.56*** 50.07*** 
 
Notes: See Table 3.1 for the variable definitions; 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Huber-White 
sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% test level, respectively. 
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Table B.3: Multinomial probit estimations used to compute the inverse probability weights  
[reference: ( )it itP NOANSWER SURVIVAL∩ ] 
Period 2000 2003 2006 
Explanatory variables NONSURVIVAL ANSWER ∩  SURVIVAL NONSURVIVAL 
ANSWER ∩  
SURVIVAL NONSURVIVAL 
ANSWER ∩  
SURVIVAL 
CONSTANT 0.656*** -0.520*** 0.733* 1.275*** -3.027* 1.079 
  (0.144) (0.167) (0.394) (0.355) (1.623) (1.101) 
LAGE     0.727* -0.076 
      (0.431) (0.294) 
GENDER   0.050 -0.201*   
    (0.141) (0.121)   
R&D   0.288** 0.298**   
    (0.146) (0.126)   
MP   -0.314** -0.178*   
    (0.123) (0.105)   
LCAP   -0.064** -0.020   
    (0.031) (0.029)   
AG   -0.051 -0.105 -0.622** -0.427** 
    (0.181) (0.158) (0.277) (0.196) 
GmbH   -0.041 -0.189 -0.416* 0.108 
    (0.140) (0.122) (0.221) (0.158) 
OTHER   0.180 0.322* -0.708 -0.582* 
    (0.208) (0.181) (0.436) (0.315) 
LSIZE -0.475*** -0.149** -0.221* -0.134 -0.521*** 0.041 
  (0.058) (0.060) (0.115) (0.097) (0.197) (0.113) 
IND_1 0.182 0.138 -0.360 -0.246 0.760* 0.203 
  (0.115) (0.124) (0.269) (0.229) (0.450) (0.313) 
IND_2 0.186** 0.248*** 0.155 0.172 0.516 0.368 
  (0.088) (0.095) (0.206) (0.178) (0.373) (0.234) 
IND_3 0.406*** -0.002 -0.165 -0.127 0.444 -0.226 
  (0.085) (0.094) (0.206) (0.179) (0.365) (0.232) 
REG_1 0.129 0.150     
  (0.122) (0.148)     
REG_2 0.163 0.626***     
  (0.121) (0.146)     
REG_3 0.222* 0.593***     
  (0.124) (0.148)     
REG_4 0.142 0.628***     
  (0.119) (0.143)     
REG_5 0.241* 0.706***     
  (0.126) (0.150)     
REG_6 0.210 0.591***     
  (0.128) (0.152)     
N 7112 1625 945 
Wald chi2  244.31*** 49.49*** 58.86*** 
 
Notes: See Table 3.1 for the variable definitions; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Huber-White sandwich 
estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
test level, respectively. To increase the model quality we excluded variables with insignificant effects. As usual in 
empirical literature, we control in each model for sector affiliation. 
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Table B.4: Testing DEBT_CONST for endogeneity 
(Rivers-Vuong-Test) 
Dependent variable SURVIVING BREAK 
Period 2000-2003 2003-2006 2000 2003 2006 
Instruments: T_MARK_SHARE T_MARK_SHARE T_NEW_TECH T_NEW_TECH T_MARK_SHARE 
  T_NEW_TECH T_NEW_PROD SHORT BUS_PLAN WEALTH_SHARE 
  WEALTH_SHARE  T_MARK_SHARE   
Validity test of instruments:      
Correlation with dependent 
variable in first stage (instrument equation) yes yes yes yes yes 
Correlation with dependent variable in  
second stage (structural equation) no no no no no 
Correlation with the residuals for 
the endogenized estimation no no no no no 
Test of over identifying restrictions (prob>chi2): 0.677 0.635 0.474 0.169 0.630 
Results of Rivers-Vuong-Test:      
Chi2 0.21 0.76 1.17 1.07 0.17 
prob>chi2 0.650 0.383 0.279 0.301 0.681 
 
Notes: For definition of the instruments see Table 3.1; the structural equations are specified as in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, 
respectively; the instrument equations are specified as the training equations with the exception of the tested variables 
that are replaced by the instrument variables. 
 
Table B.5: Testing VC_CONST for endogeneity 
(Rivers-Vuong-Test) 
Dependent variable SURVIVING BREAK 
Period 2000-2003 2003-2006 2000 2003 2006 
Instruments: T_MARK_SHARE T_MARK_SHARE T_MARK_SHARE T_NEW_TECH T_MARK_SHARE 
  T_NEW_TECH T_NEW_PROD SHORT BUS_PLAN BUS_PLAN 
Validity test of instruments:      
Correlation with dependent 
variable in first stage (instrument equation) yes yes yes yes yes 
Correlation with dependent variable in  
second stage (structural equation) no no no no no 
Correlation with the residuals for 
the endogenized estimation no no no no no 
Test of over identifying restrictions (prob>chi2): 0.639 0.560 0.813 0.177 0.636 
Results of Rivers-Vuong-Test:      
Chi2 0.80 0.40 0.02 1.10 0.03 
prob>chi2 0.371 0.525 0.889 0.295 0.852 
 
Notes: For definition of the instruments see Table 3.1; the structural equations are specified as in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, 
respectively; the instrument equations are specified as the training equations with the exception of the tested variables that are 
replaced by the instrument variables. 
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Table B.6: Correlation matrix  
Correlation matrix for cross-section 2000 (N=1589) 
  SURVIVING BREAK MAIN UNEMPLOY LAGE GENDER QUAL R&D NP MP PCOMP NPCOMP LCAP AG GmbH OTHER LSIZE IND_1 IND_2 IND_3 
DEBT_ 
CONST 
CRED_ 
COND 
CRED_ 
LINE 
DEBT_ 
INFO 
BREAK 0.101                       
 
MAIN 0.070 0.114                      
 
UNEMPLOY 0.026 -0.041 0.044                      
LAGE 0.035 0.029 0.046 0.066                     
GENDER -0.036 0.062 0.057 0.054 0.017                    
QUAL -0.011 0.090 -0.019 -0.078 0.098 0.052                   
R&D -0.011 -0.008 -0.041 0.017 0.037 0.063 0.188                  
NPCOMP -0.025 -0.052 -0.066 -0.025 -0.012 0.018 0.063 0.232                 
MP 0.046 0.038 0.004 -0.008 0.000 0.005 0.132 0.327 0.023                
PCOMP -0.024 -0.044 -0.016 0.004 -0.048 -0.025 -0.027 -0.021 0.003 -0.017               
NPCOMP -0.015 0.028 0.013 0.006 -0.028 0.042 0.079 0.127 0.071 0.189 0.100              
LCAP 0.072 -0.009 0.071 -0.057 0.115 0.017 0.030 0.009 -0.002 0.028 0.054 0.033             
AG 0.029 0.072 0.003 -0.109 0.065 0.107 0.123 0.062 0.031 0.137 -0.001 0.052 0.206            
GmbH -0.008 -0.073 -0.034 -0.053 -0.052 -0.207 -0.016 0.029 0.011 0.009 0.083 0.016 -0.046 -0.258           
OTHER 0.006 0.009 -0.017 0.007 -0.002 -0.020 0.038 0.005 -0.030 -0.014 -0.039 -0.045 -0.036 -0.145 -0.191          
LSIZE 0.044 0.054 0.080 -0.121 -0.035 0.012 0.104 0.050 0.066 0.134 0.014 0.029 0.184 0.441 0.033 -0.069         
IND_1 0.021 -0.085 0.022 0.072 0.020 0.028 -0.111 0.084 0.013 0.004 0.025 0.005 -0.006 -0.017 0.036 -0.008 -0.014        
IND_2 -0.044 0.195 0.044 -0.051 0.065 0.104 0.285 0.149 0.003 0.095 -0.030 0.135 -0.050 0.117 -0.015 0.011 -0.050 -0.271       
IND_3 0.037 -0.172 -0.109 0.000 -0.034 -0.188 -0.155 -0.119 0.030 -0.058 0.002 -0.075 0.071 -0.095 0.012 -0.019 0.000 -0.237 -0.697      
DEBT_ 
CONST -0.045 -0.163 0.010 0.053 -0.148 0.018 -0.091 0.071 0.081 0.056 0.082 0.012 -0.002 0.034 0.046 -0.024 0.071 0.071 -0.147 0.104     
CRED_ 
COND -0.048 -0.152 0.005 0.023 -0.141 0.007 -0.079 0.038 0.077 0.042 0.088 0.007 0.012 0.032 0.061 -0.038 0.070 0.059 -0.156 0.108 0.893    
CRED_ 
LINE -0.032 -0.153 0.026 0.054 -0.114 0.037 -0.084 0.065 0.073 0.053 0.088 -0.005 0.034 0.056 0.034 -0.023 0.095 0.080 -0.136 0.077 0.902 0.769   
DEBT_ 
INFO -0.038 -0.123 -0.005 0.062 -0.133 0.003 -0.076 0.083 0.063 0.052 0.039 0.029 -0.051 0.001 0.026 -0.002 0.020 0.046 -0.094 0.086 0.825 0.569 0.592  
VC_ 
CONST -0.019 -0.123 -0.047 0.060 -0.065 -0.013 0.046 0.162 0.080 0.079 0.077 0.030 -0.011 0.030 0.038 -0.024 0.032 0.051 -0.047 0.068 0.490 0.428 0.432 0.423 
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Correlation matrix for cross-section 2003 (N=911) 
  SURVIVING BREAK MAIN UNEMPLOY LAGE GENDER QUAL R&D NP MP PCOMP NPCOMP LCAP AG GmbH OTHER LSIZE IND_1 IND_2 IND_3 
DEBT_ 
CONST 
CRED_ 
COND 
CRED_ 
LINE 
DEBT_ 
INFO 
BREAK 0.050                       
 
MAIN 0.012 0.073                      
 
UNEMPLOY -0.029 -0.026 0.067                      
LAGE -0.089 0.018 0.051 0.070                     
GENDER -0.010 0.039 0.061 0.048 0.012                    
QUAL 0.043 0.045 -0.039 -0.091 0.076 0.062                   
R&D 0.010 -0.064 -0.062 0.000 -0.044 0.064 0.098                  
NPCOMP 0.006 0.070 -0.044 -0.027 -0.034 0.028 0.037 0.211                 
MP 0.023 0.017 -0.003 -0.002 -0.039 -0.016 0.088 0.267 0.082                
PCOMP -0.007 -0.021 0.010 0.007 -0.062 -0.027 0.040 0.016 0.040 0.025               
NPCOMP -0.010 0.051 -0.015 0.031 -0.014 -0.029 0.034 0.076 0.044 0.106 0.029              
LCAP 0.001 -0.004 0.062 -0.048 0.114 0.044 0.033 0.001 -0.026 0.070 0.014 0.062             
AG 0.073 -0.055 -0.040 -0.110 0.057 0.119 0.118 0.079 0.113 0.094 0.030 0.059 0.174            
GmbH 0.080 -0.083 -0.013 -0.022 -0.059 -0.216 -0.009 0.038 -0.030 0.058 0.058 0.007 -0.059 -0.281           
OTHER 0.009 0.015 -0.006 0.017 0.018 -0.100 -0.022 0.000 0.015 0.008 0.046 0.017 -0.007 -0.097 -0.123          
LSIZE 0.128 0.022 0.042 -0.108 -0.087 0.039 0.112 0.106 0.149 0.061 0.070 0.058 0.170 0.443 0.014 -0.006         
IND_1 -0.030 -0.030 0.035 0.086 -0.002 0.039 -0.122 0.106 -0.002 0.047 0.047 0.029 0.003 -0.034 0.008 0.001 -0.019        
IND_2 0.055 0.011 0.029 -0.041 0.067 0.096 0.290 0.048 -0.064 0.081 -0.041 0.082 -0.060 0.124 0.028 -0.035 -0.065 -0.274       
IND_3 -0.068 0.007 -0.110 -0.006 -0.026 -0.171 -0.136 -0.065 0.090 -0.032 0.006 -0.028 0.093 -0.081 -0.031 0.051 0.024 -0.225 -0.707      
DEBT_ 
CONST -0.042 -0.110 -0.011 0.055 -0.001 0.004 -0.072 0.068 0.029 0.082 0.107 0.033 0.056 -0.003 0.055 -0.029 0.041 0.058 -0.160 0.145     
CRED_ 
COND -0.025 -0.085 0.014 0.046 -0.004 -0.004 -0.054 0.051 0.023 0.062 0.095 0.042 0.091 0.011 0.035 -0.016 0.061 0.073 -0.155 0.162 0.898    
CRED_ 
LINE -0.024 -0.095 -0.008 0.057 -0.002 -0.001 -0.079 0.035 0.031 0.089 0.107 0.031 0.049 0.015 0.029 -0.040 0.044 0.071 -0.127 0.117 0.913 0.812   
DEBT_ 
INFO -0.062 -0.107 -0.036 0.042 0.002 0.015 -0.057 0.093 0.020 0.064 0.080 0.014 0.007 -0.034 0.081 -0.019 0.001 0.007 -0.138 0.102 0.811 0.544 0.582  
VC_ 
CONST -0.010 -0.089 -0.042 0.037 -0.001 0.037 0.033 0.064 0.038 0.070 0.026 0.043 0.024 0.051 0.033 0.002 0.040 0.057 -0.068 0.058 0.530 0.477 0.455 0.459 
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Correlation matrix for cross-section 2006 (N=615) 
  BREAK MAIN UNEMPLOY LAGE GENDER QUAL R&D NP MP PCOMP NPCOMP LCAP AG GmbH OTHER LSIZE IND_1 IND_2 IND_3 
DEBT_ 
CONST 
CRED_ 
COND 
CRED_ 
LINE 
DEBT_ 
INFO 
MAIN -0.028                       
UNEMPLOY -0.033 0.062                      
LAGE -0.064 0.040 0.078                     
GENDER 0.072 0.066 0.060 -0.032                    
QUAL 0.039 -0.021 -0.065 0.037 0.020                   
R&D -0.061 -0.025 0.035 -0.124 0.008 0.091                  
NPCOMP -0.043 -0.052 -0.009 0.015 0.012 0.037 0.250                 
MP -0.006 -0.020 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.248 0.058                
PCOMP -0.008 0.048 0.002 -0.059 -0.024 0.052 -0.002 -0.019 -0.009               
NPCOMP 0.140 0.008 -0.050 -0.016 -0.035 0.056 0.036 0.077 0.155 0.032              
LCAP 0.009 0.087 -0.019 0.134 0.028 -0.017 0.043 -0.008 0.041 0.053 0.043             
AG 0.019 -0.029 -0.079 0.084 0.129 0.096 0.033 0.090 0.069 0.034 0.091 0.233            
GmbH -0.090 -0.042 -0.074 -0.083 -0.228 0.001 0.078 -0.013 0.029 0.018 -0.042 -0.068 -0.270           
OTHER 0.004 -0.077 0.059 -0.006 -0.071 0.031 0.072 -0.027 0.080 -0.003 -0.048 -0.025 -0.064 -0.137          
LSIZE 0.051 -0.006 -0.099 -0.112 0.038 0.149 0.145 0.102 0.136 0.087 0.080 0.186 0.374 0.003 0.020         
IND_1 0.006 0.040 0.069 -0.008 0.062 -0.123 0.136 0.015 0.066 0.008 -0.057 0.060 -0.009 -0.004 -0.001 0.014        
IND_2 0.053 0.046 -0.033 0.039 0.082 0.331 0.072 -0.024 0.055 0.012 0.128 -0.090 0.118 0.035 -0.027 -0.043 -0.301       
IND_3 -0.056 -0.126 0.005 0.032 -0.182 -0.190 -0.091 0.071 -0.082 -0.047 -0.060 0.083 -0.076 -0.032 0.070 -0.018 -0.204 -0.694      
DEBT_ 
CONST -0.176 0.014 0.110 -0.140 -0.020 -0.105 0.101 0.103 0.067 -0.008 0.009 -0.066 -0.093 0.109 0.014 0.039 0.048 -0.164 0.099     
CRED_ 
COND -0.176 0.047 0.100 -0.103 -0.027 -0.132 0.073 0.074 0.069 0.049 -0.016 -0.026 -0.066 0.072 0.009 0.042 0.073 -0.194 0.113 0.920    
CRED_ 
LINE -0.149 0.009 0.092 -0.122 -0.021 -0.111 0.091 0.089 0.041 -0.017 0.039 -0.061 -0.069 0.089 -0.004 0.031 0.065 -0.134 0.085 0.922 0.831   
DEBT_ 
INFO -0.150 -0.020 0.106 -0.152 -0.005 -0.041 0.107 0.117 0.069 -0.053 0.001 -0.091 -0.117 0.134 0.034 0.031 -0.009 -0.113 0.069 0.855 0.652 0.655  
VC_ 
CONST -0.087 -0.047 0.019 -0.071 -0.047 -0.061 0.090 0.148 0.068 0.036 0.026 -0.022 -0.027 0.075 0.010 0.040 -0.017 -0.087 0.080 0.561 0.513 0.487 0.513 
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Table C.1: Descriptive statistics 
(selection indicator included in the innovation models) 
    Panel Cross-sections 
Test on statistical significant relationship  
between two cross-sections 
Period   1996/97-2006 1996/97-2000 2000-2003 2003-2006 2000 vs. 2003 2003 vs. 2006 
Number of observations   2393 1204 707 482 
    
Variable Type Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p-value p-value 
IP binary 0.478  0.500  0.502  0.500  0.451  0.498  0.456  0.499  0.030 0.859 
R&D binary 0.212  0.409  0.245  0.430  0.192  0.394  0.160  0.367  0.008 0.150 
LEVEL_UNI binary 0.232  0.422  0.233  0.423  0.235  0.424  0.224  0.417  0.911 0.666 
LEVEL_O_TERTIARY binary 0.468  0.499  0.459  0.499  0.472  0.500  0.483  0.500  0.579 0.710 
TYPE_TECHNICAL binary 0.211  0.408  0.205  0.404  0.214  0.410  0.224  0.417  0.661 0.667 
TYPE_MANAGEMENT binary 0.264  0.441  0.258  0.438  0.264  0.441  0.278  0.448  0.766 0.606 
TYPE_MIX binary 0.267  0.443  0.275  0.447  0.264  0.441  0.253  0.435  0.621 0.660 
EXP_IND binary 0.437  0.496  0.428  0.495  0.447  0.498  0.444  0.497  0.413 0.919 
EXP_SELF binary 0.101  0.301  0.107  0.309  0.098  0.297  0.089  0.285  0.508 0.627 
EXP_RAD binary 0.118  0.322  0.117  0.322  0.115  0.319  0.124  0.330  0.867 0.604 
INNO_IDEA binary 0.564  0.496  0.544  0.498  0.587  0.493  0.581  0.494  0.068 0.835 
LAGE continuous 3.649  0.234  3.650  0.237  3.652  0.231  3.644  0.231  0.860  0.585  
MALE_TEAM binary 0.672  0.470  0.681  0.466  0.663  0.473  0.662  0.474  0.425 0.956 
MIXED_TEAM binary 0.232  0.422  0.222  0.416  0.238  0.426  0.247  0.432  0.425 0.714 
TEAM_FOUNDATION binary 0.473  0.499  0.478  0.500  0.471  0.500  0.465  0.499  0.754 0.831 
LSIZE continuous 0.485  0.734  0.347  0.584  0.565  0.790  0.710  0.895  0.000  0.003  
EXPORT binary 0.247  0.432  0.263  0.441  0.231  0.421  0.232  0.423  0.111 0.942 
DIVERSIFICATION binary 0.496  0.500  0.503  0.500  0.494  0.500  0.479  0.500  0.683 0.626 
DEMAND_FUTURE binary 0.585  0.493  0.762  0.426  0.342  0.475  0.498  0.501  0.000 0.000 
COOPERATION binary 0.393  0.488  0.433  0.496  0.335  0.472  0.378  0.485  0.000 0.133 
PCOMP binary 0.461  0.499  0.422  0.494  0.506  0.500  0.494  0.500  0.000 0.670 
NPCOMP binary 0.533  0.499  0.543  0.498  0.528  0.500  0.515  0.500  0.509 0.658 
MANUFACT binary 0.077  0.267  0.080  0.271  0.075  0.264  0.075  0.263  0.707 0.986 
MOD_SERV binary 0.467  0.499  0.456  0.498  0.460  0.499  0.504  0.501  0.875 0.132 
TRAD_SERV binary 0.365  0.482  0.373  0.484  0.379  0.485  0.326  0.469  0.789 0.060 
Y2003 binary 0.295  0.456         
    
Y2006 binary 0.201  0.401              
    
 
Notes: To test the relationship for binary variables, we used Pearson's chi-squared (H0: the rows and columns in a two-way table are independent). Test results for 
continuous variables are based on two independent sample t-tests (H0: variable has the same mean within the two cross-sections). 
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Table C.2: Test for selective attrition 
(selection indicator included in the innovation models) 
Dependent variable IP R&D 
Period  1996/97- 
2000 
1996/97- 
2000 
2000- 
2003 
1996/97- 
2003 
1996/97- 
2000 
1996/97- 
2000 
2000- 
2003 
1996/97- 
2003 
Founder characteristics            
LEVEL_UNI 0.272** 0.271** 0.321** 0.311*** 0.588*** 0.590*** 0.383**  0.496*** 
  (0.115) (0.116) (0.151) (0.091) (0.139)    (0.138)    (0.177)    (0.108)    
LEVEL_O_TERTIARY 0.061 0.062 0.131 0.108 0.333*** 0.336*** -0.058    0.199**  
  (0.093) (0.093) (0.122) (0.073) (0.120)    (0.119)    (0.154)    (0.094)    
TYPE_TECHNICAL 0.169 0.170 0.010 0.108 0.439*** 0.439*** 0.442**  0.413*** 
  (0.121) (0.121) (0.157) (0.095) (0.142)    (0.142)    (0.182)    (0.112)    
TYPE_MANAGEMENT 0.047 0.048 -0.022 0.031 -0.188    -0.192    -0.398*   -0.271**  
  (0.111) (0.111) (0.144) (0.088) (0.146)    (0.147)    (0.216)    (0.120)    
TYPE_MIX 0.225** 0.222** -0.010 0.145* 0.277**  0.274**  0.078    0.194*   
  (0.112) (0.112) (0.146) (0.088) (0.137)    (0.137)    (0.186)    (0.110)    
EXP_IND -0.061 -0.061 -0.002 -0.060 -0.147    -0.143    -0.178    -0.171**  
  (0.084) (0.084) (0.109) (0.066) (0.103)    (0.103)    (0.137)    (0.082)    
EXP_SELF 0.213 0.211 -0.082 0.087 0.342**  0.341**  0.083    0.260**  
  (0.135) (0.135) (0.181) (0.106) (0.157)    (0.156)    (0.214)    (0.125)    
EXP_RAD 0.650*** 0.650*** 0.432** 0.529*** 1.162*** 1.161*** 0.976*** 1.033*** 
  (0.149) (0.149) (0.175) (0.112) (0.144)    (0.144)    (0.179)    (0.110)    
INNO_IDEA 0.325*** 0.327*** 0.119 0.220*** 0.489*** 0.494*** 0.306**  0.421*** 
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.108) (0.064) (0.101)    (0.101)    (0.146)    (0.081)    
LAGE -0.037 -0.038 -0.442* -0.200 0.233    0.237    -0.133    0.036    
  (0.170) (0.170) (0.226) (0.134) (0.209)    (0.208)    (0.292)    (0.168)    
MALE_TEAM -0.063 -0.062 0.055 -0.023 0.370*   0.371*   0.093    0.284*   
  (0.145) (0.145) (0.184) (0.112) (0.210)    (0.211)    (0.253)    (0.162)    
MIXED_TEAM -0.055 -0.049 -0.091 -0.062 0.234    0.237    -0.227    0.078    
  (0.176) (0.177) (0.225) (0.136) (0.236)    (0.236)    (0.318)    (0.187)    
TEAM_FOUNDATION 0.060 0.056 0.272** 0.137* -0.083    -0.084    0.122    -0.007    
  
(0.104) (0.105) (0.138) (0.083) (0.123)    (0.123)    (0.168)    (0.099)    
Firm characteristics            
LSIZE 0.130 0.131 0.024 0.048 -0.021    -0.020    0.032    -0.005    
  (0.109) (0.109) (0.102) (0.050) (0.123)    (0.123)    (0.126)    (0.061)    
EXPORT 0.337*** 0.338*** 0.488*** 0.363*** 0.414*** 0.414*** 0.188    0.342*** 
  (0.096) (0.096) (0.125) (0.075) (0.101)    (0.101)    (0.145)    (0.080)    
DIVERSIFICATION 0.449*** 0.446*** 0.174* 0.318*** 0.202**  0.204**  0.106    0.152**  
  (0.079) (0.079) (0.103) (0.062) (0.096)    (0.096)    (0.132)    (0.077)    
Market conditions            
DEMAND_FUTURE 0.367*** 0.370*** 0.234** 0.316*** 0.205*   0.207*   0.089    0.153*   
  (0.093) (0.093) (0.107) (0.070) (0.118)    (0.118)    (0.134)    (0.088)    
COOPERATION 0.384*** 0.384*** 0.292*** 0.352*** 0.724*** 0.725*** 0.765*** 0.684*** 
  (0.082) (0.082) (0.109) (0.065) (0.098)    (0.098)    (0.132)    (0.076)    
PCOMP -0.066 -0.065 -0.003 -0.051 -0.155    -0.156    0.001    -0.101    
  (0.080) (0.080) (0.101) (0.062) (0.096)    (0.096)    (0.128)    (0.075)    
NPCOMP 0.341*** 0.343*** 0.180* 0.264*** 0.047    0.043    0.259**  0.133*   
  (0.080) (0.080) (0.103) (0.062) (0.098)    (0.098)    (0.131)    (0.077)    
MANUFACT -0.012 -0.016 0.705*** 0.260* 1.009*** 1.012*** 0.770**  0.982*** 
  (0.194) (0.194) (0.268) (0.155) (0.267)    (0.267)    (0.329)    (0.207)    
MOD_SERV -0.005 -0.005 0.500** 0.173 0.768*** 0.772*** 0.333    0.639*** 
  (0.152) (0.151) (0.210) (0.120) (0.234)    (0.233)    (0.279)    (0.179)    
TRAD_SERV 0.106 0.102 0.585*** 0.277** 0.640*** 0.649*** 0.331    0.577*** 
  (0.150) (0.150) (0.207) (0.119) (0.235)    (0.234)    (0.274)    (0.179)    
Y2003 
    
0.017     -0.076    
      
(0.071)     (0.090)    
INSAMPLE_03 -0.007       0.095          
  (0.080)       (0.099)          
INSAMPLE_06   -0.051 0.056     0.051    -0.320**    
    (0.082) (0.110)     (0.096)    (0.132)      
INSAMPLE_NEXT_PERIOD 
      
0.136       -0.038    
        
(0.090)       (0.107)    
CONSTANT -1.345** -1.326** 0.061 -0.749 -4.203*** -4.193*** -1.670    -2.984*** 
  (0.663) (0.664) (0.877) (0.520) (0.846)    (0.845)    (1.132)    (0.671)    
N 1186 1186 702 1894 1186    1186    702    1894    
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.157 0.113 0.127 0.314    0.313    0.269    0.281    
Wald chi2 220.53*** 220.91*** 105.18*** 300.71*** 301.97*** 300.22*** 162.76*** 442.34*** 
 
Notes: See Table 4.1 for the variable definitions; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White procedure) are in brackets under the 
coefficients; ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% test level, respectively. 
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Table C.3: Correlation matrix  
 (N=2393) 
  LEVEL_UNI 
LEVEL_O_ 
TERTIARY 
TYPE_ 
TECHNICAL 
TYPE_ 
MANAGEMENT 
TYPE_ 
MIX 
EXP_ 
IND 
EXP_ 
SELF 
EXP_ 
RAD 
INNO_ 
IDEA 
LEVEL_O_TERTIARY -0.515           
TYPE_TECHNICAL 0.077  0.011          
TYPE_MANAGEMENT -0.014  0.076  -0.310         
TYPE_MIX -0.023  0.029  -0.313  -0.362        
EXP_IND -0.034  0.054  -0.060  0.010  0.146       
EXP_SELF 0.063  -0.025  -0.024  0.030  -0.058  -0.222      
EXP_RAD 0.131  -0.008  0.236  -0.143  0.081  -0.165  -0.092     
INNO_IDEA 0.099  0.000  0.049  0.001  0.141  0.079  -0.025  0.089    
LAGE 0.067  0.037  -0.108  0.144  -0.008  -0.016  0.104  0.054  -0.071  
MALE_TEAM -0.013  -0.005  0.085  -0.056  -0.004  -0.036  -0.041  0.021  -0.020  
MIXED_TEAM 0.042  0.011  -0.015  -0.005  0.020  0.034  0.093  0.021  -0.013  
TEAM_FOUNDATION 0.138  -0.063  0.028  -0.082  0.038  0.046  0.186  0.095  0.030  
LSIZE 0.059  -0.032  0.017  -0.059  0.036  0.057  0.039  0.022  0.045  
EXPORT 0.161  -0.039  0.045  -0.025  0.072  -0.017  0.024  0.190  0.102  
DIVERSIFICATION -0.009  0.022  -0.055  0.007  0.102  -0.013  -0.012  0.016  0.054  
DEMAND_FUTURE 0.040  -0.023  -0.035  0.005  0.050  0.034  -0.028  0.027  0.073  
COOPERATION 0.084  -0.009  0.086  -0.068  0.046  -0.016  -0.016  0.115  0.105  
PCOMP -0.011  0.014  0.007  0.008  0.051  0.022  -0.065  0.026  0.063  
NPCOMP 0.045  0.009  -0.009  0.020  0.074  0.004  -0.035  0.062  0.072  
 
  LAGE 
MALE_ 
TEAM MIXED_TEAM 
TEAM_ 
FOUNDATION LSIZE EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION 
MALE_TEAM -0.019              
MIXED_TEAM 0.030  -0.786        
TEAM_FOUNDATION -0.057  -0.405  0.567       
LSIZE -0.039  -0.005  0.065  0.320      
EXPORT 0.082  0.029  0.009  0.062  0.069     
DIVERSIFICATION -0.026  0.029  0.044  0.026  0.074  0.104    
DEMAND_FUTURE -0.061  0.013  0.022  0.061  0.010  0.073  0.093  
COOPERATION -0.046  0.041  0.039  0.098  0.042  0.177  0.154  
PCOMP -0.045  -0.039  0.059  0.079  0.046  -0.016  0.028  
NPCOMP -0.014  -0.005  0.047  0.043  0.043  0.056  0.040  
 
  
DEMAND_ 
FUTURE COOPERATION PCOMP 
COOPERATION 0.110     
PCOMP -0.067  0.047    
NPCOMP 0.125  0.110  0.065  
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